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ABSTRACT 
Intelligent mobile agent systems offer a new approach to implementing intrusion detection systems 
(IDS). The prototype intrusion detection system. MAIDS, demonstrates the benefits of an agent-based 
IDS. including distributing the computational effort, reducing the amount of information sent over 
the network, platform independence, asynchronous operation, and modularity offering ease of updates. 
.\nomaly detection agents use machine learning techniques to detect intrusions: one such agent processes 
streams of system calls from privileged processes. Misuse detection agents match known problems 
and correlato events to detect intrusions. Agents report intrusions to other agents and to the system 
administrator through the graphical user interface (GUI). 
.A sound basis has been created for the intrusion detection system. Intrusions have been mod­
eled using the Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) technique: when augmented with constraint nodes 
describing trust, contextual, and temporal relationships, the SFTA forms a basis for stating the require-
nioiits of the intrusion detection system. Colored Petri Nets (CPN) have been created to model the 
design of the Intrusion Detection System. Algorithmic transformations are used to create CPX tem­
plates from augmented SFT and to create implementation templates from CPXs. The implementation 
maintains the CPX semantics in the distributed agent-based intrusion detection system. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This ciiaptor begins with a brief over%-iew of computer securit\-. security poHcy. and misuse i: anomaly 
intrusion detection. Then, sources of audit information and organization of attacks into temporal stages 
are introduced to form a basis for later chapters that discuss key components of the distributed agent-
based intrusion detection system. The chapter concludes with a brief glossary of terms and the thesis 
statement. 
1.1 Computer Security and Intrusion Detection 
.A. secure computer system provides guarantees regarding the confidentiality, integrity, and availabil­
ity of its objects (such as data, processes, or services). However, systems generally contain design and 
imj)lcincntation flaws that result in security vulnerabilities. .\n intrusion takes place when an attacker 
or group of attackers exploit security vulnerabilities and thus violate the confidentiality, integrity, or 
a\ailability guarantees of a system. Intrusion detection systems detect some set of intrusions and ex-
ofute some predetermined action when an intrusion is detected. Intrusion detection systems may also 
detect attempts at intrusions and use the information gained to determine appropriate action when an 
intrusion takes place. 
1.1.1 Security Policy 
security policy defines the standards of integrity, availability, and exclusivity at some level in a 
computing system. Enforcement of the security policy is accomplished (insofar as is possible) by the 
hardware and software of the computing system. An intrusion is a violation of that security policy. 
However, a formal security policy for a distributed system may not be well-defined and may possibly 
depend on sy.stem security policies. Multi-user operating systems and network protocols implement 
some default security policy. .A.dministrators of the systems can adjust the security settings and install 
software that enforces further policy components (e.g.. tcp wrappers [131|). Some attempts at violating a 
system s security policy may be flagged by the system (e.g.. multiple failed logins). Successful violations 
of the security policy may be difficult to detect and require an intrusion detection system to collect 
.Jc correlate data and detect the violation (e.g.. GrlDS [123]: MuSigs [73]) or to detect evidence of the 
violation (e.g.. Tripwire [oSj). 
1.1.2 Misuse Detection 
-A misuse intrusion detection system searches for occurrences of events which have been previously 
identified as intrusions. Intrusion detection systems which make use of misuse detection features include 
IDES. NIDES. i: EMER.\LD (using the P-BEST expert rule system |~o|). GrIDS Il23|. MuSigs [73|, 
L'ST.-\.T [o2[. and many current commercial and freely-a\-aiiable systems (including .Vetwork Flight 
Recorder. XetRanger. and SNORT). 
Misuse intrusion detection systems detect matching intrusions with reasonably good accuracy (al­
though such systems may be fooled by crafty attackers [109|). 
Misuse-based intrusion detection systems have several disadN-antages. Only known intrusions can 
bp identified, so newly discovered vulnerabilities can be exploited without being detected. Signatures 
may be difficult to develop for certain intrusions. .-V misuse IDS may flag intrusions that were merely 
unsuccessful attempts because the particular vulnerabilities are not present in the monitored system. 
Expert systems arc only as good as the encapsulated knowledge and also may require maintenance over 
time. 
1.1.3 Algorithms for Misuse Detection 
1.1.3.1 Pattern Matching 
Many misuse intrusions may be detected by patterns that match some audit data. Kumar [G2| uses 
computational complexity to classify patterns in a hierarchy: 
1. Existence - Matching evidence left behind by an intruder, such as changed file permissions. 
E.Kistence checking tends to have constant computational comple.xity. 
2. Sequence patters - Matching events in order, which is potentially an NP Hard computational 
complexity problem. 
3. Regular Expression patterns - Conjunctions of sequence patterns, which is superset of se­
quence patterns and thus is potentially an N'P Hard problem as well. 
4. Other patterns - .A.11 other intrusion signatures. 
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Example misuse detection systems based on pattern matching include: 
• Colored Petri Net Patterns from Purdue University [63| 
• MuSigs from George Mason University [73| 
• GrIDS from University of California. Davis [123] 
• Snort by .Martin Roesch of Stanford Telecommunications. Inc. [113| 
1.1.3.2 Expert Systems 
Knowledge is obtained from computer security experts and encoded into a rule sot. One of the best-
known expert systems used for misuse intrusion detection is P-BEST. which was used in the MID.A.S. 
IDES. NIDES. and EMERALD intrusion detection systems [75|[103|. 
1.1.4 Anomaly Detection 
-Vnonialous events may be detected by finding significant deviations from predicted or expected 
Ijchavior profiles, .\ssuming normal activity of a computing system falls well within the security policy, 
thoii anomalous activity is a likely indicator of an intrusion. Numerous algorithms have been developed 
to detect anomalies, including the NIDES statistical component [3|. Computer Immunology [40[[132|, 
(jur own work with anomaly detection using feature vectors [4S|[49|[47|. and Lane Brodley's instance-
based learning [G5|. 
Successfully using anomaly detection in intrusion detection systems has been a goal of intrusion 
detection for at least the past thirteen years [3I|. .A.nomaly-based intrusion detection has a number of 
advantages over misuse intrusion detection. It may not be necessan.- to have examples of misbehavior 
to develop a profile of expected or predicted beha'vior. .\n anomaly detection system does not depend 
on prior knowledge of possible misuses. An anomaly detection system can help discover new patterns 
of misuse. 
Unfortunately, anomaly detection presents a set of challenges [6o|. The temporal window of interest 
may vary from seconds to months. The volume of event data that must be analyzed may be huge 
(e.g.. system calls e.xecuted by processes). The representation of events affects the interpretation and 
long-term storage of the data. Normal usage patterns may change over time. Innocuous anomalies 
(false positives) may occur freciuently, thus obscuring true intrusions (true positives) and reducing user 
confidence. Profiles developed from •'normal" data containing intrusions results in a flawed profile. 
Profiles that are adapted to changes in normal behavior over time may be '"trained" by attackers to 
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accopt intrusive behavior. If a threshold is used to discriminate between normal and anomalous behavior, 
it may be difficult to balance false positives versus false negatives (the receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) convex hull method may be used to find a sound choice for such a threshold [108]). 
1.1.5 Algorithms for Anomaly Detection 
1.1.5.1 Specification-Bascd Profiles 
Sckar et al. [121] have developed an anomaly detection system which profiles transitions in state 
machine.s. The intrusion detection system flags events which fail to match the previously-learned profiles. 
1.1.5.2 Learning Algorithms 
.A. wide variety of machine learning algorithms may used for anomaly detection. Such algorithms 
used for anomaly detection include: 
• Instance-Based Learning from Purdue University [65| 
• RIPPER from .\TikT Research [26|, used by .JAM at Columbia [G7| and Warrender at Xew Mexico 
[I32| for anomaly detection 
1.1.5.3 Statistical Profiles 
.A.ti anomaly intrusion detection system can learn a statistical profile for events based on inten­
sity measures, relative distribution measures, categorical distribution measures, and ordinal measures. 
Implementations of statistical profiles for anomaly detection include: 
• IDES from SRI International {3I| 
• XIDES from SRI International [3| 
• EMER.ALD from SRI International [103| 
1.1.5.4 Immunological Approach 
.A.[)plying the highly effective concepts of animal immunology to anomaly detection and counter-
measures is an intriguing idea. Immune systems learn to distinguish normal from abnormal and attack 
abnormalities when encountered, .\lgorithms for an immunological approach to anomaly detection have 
been developed in these projects: 
o 
• Computer Immunologj' from University of New Mexico [41] (40| [132| 
• Artificial Immune System at the University College London [59j 
1.2 Audit Records 
Denning [SlJ defined the attributes of audit records in terms of subjects and objects. In this disser­
tation. the characteristic attributes of audit trail data are expanded to include network events. 
1.2.1 Audit Data Attributes 
• Event Source, which may include one or more of 
- User' 
- IP -Address 
- TCP Port 
- UDP Port 
- Hostname 
- Program i: Process ID 
• Event Target, which may include one or more of 
- User 
- Prores.s ID 
- IP .Address 
- TCP Port 
- UDP Port 
- Hostname 
- Filename 
• Event Count 
'Source IP address, source hostname, and source user may be spoofed or forged under certain protocols. This infor­
mation may be unreliable, but under normal operation these attributes are reliable and useful for development of profiles 
for anomaly detection. .A.n example of unreliable data is the TCP SYN spoofing attack, which uses TCP packets created 
with a forged source IP address. The issue of reliability of these attributes could be addressed by assigning a reliability 
estimate to the \-alues. and reducing the estimated reliability if an event is correlated with another intrusive event. 
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• Starting Time-
• Duration or Ending Time 
• Action 
• Result (success, failure, error code) 
• Source of Event Data (sen.sor identification) 
1.2.2 Data Sources in Systems and Networks 
Operating systems and networks are designed using layered models. Each layer in a model provides 
specific services and interfaces to higher layers. Layers separate a problem into pieces to reduce the 
overall complexity and to hide implementation details [r27|[r28|. Instrumentation at the \-arious layers 
of a system provide different types and amounts of information tliat has different uses. For example, 
system calls (at the kernel layer) executed by processes provide a large qu;mtity of data useful for 
anomaly dotoction [47|[49|[1.32|[67|[411. User logins and logouts would be best obtained from a system's 
authentication mechanism (which, in the case of UNIX, is managed by the application layer)and can 
be used for anomaly or misuse detection. 
Layers in host systems which may be instrumented include: 
• .\pplications 
• Daemons System sen'ices 
• File system 
• .Memory management 
• Process management 
• Devices 
Network protocol layers which may be instrumented include: 
• .Applications 
• Transport 
-Time synchronization between systems is necessar>- to enable fusion of event records based on timestamps. Unfortu­
nately. time synchronization itself may be a target of attacks. .-Xn attacker may forge network time messages, resulting in 
incorrect adjustments of system clocks. 
Network 
• Data Link 
• Physical 
As an illustration of needing to obtain data from appropriate layers of systems, consider Network 
Intrusion Detection (.NID) systems. NID systems often eavesdrop on individual IP packets at the 
Network layer. \t this layer, it is simple to find Network-layer attacks such as Smurf [23| or Teardrop 
[21]. However, discovery of intrusions at the higher network layers requires the NID to re-assemble 
fragments, interpret packet contents, and resequence out-of-order segments to construct an internal 
model of the activity at the Transport and Application layers. The internal model may be inaccurate 
due to latent faults in the actual implementations of the Transport and .Application layers on hosts and 
routers, differences between the traffic seen by the NID and the traffic that actually reaches the target, 
or ambiguities in protocol specifications. Ptacek and Newsham examine several such problems with 
NID systems and illustrate resulting vulnerabilities of NID systems themselves [109|. Data collected 
directly from the involved systems at the appropriate layers would avoid such problems. 
1.2.3 Means of Obtaining Audit Data 
Systems and networks are not normally designed to provide audit data to an intrusion detection 
system. Systems typically report abnormal events via a system logging facility and report most user 
authentication events, but extensive logging at all levels of a system is not normally performed. Network 
layers arc not instrumented in any standard fashion, with the exception of audit trails a\-ailable from 
firewalls. Thus, data must be obtained from a \-ariety of other sources, including system logs, add-on 
{jrograms. network sniffers, and network management protocols. 
1.2.3.1 System Log Files 
Log files contain information relating to all layers of a host system. Files containing logged infor­
mation must be parsed and interpreted to obtain audit records. 
.Api)Iications. daemons, and kernel layers typically use the system logging facility (syslogd) on 
Unix systems. Each log message has an associated facility (including kernel, user. mail, daemon, 
auth. syslog. Ipr, news, uucp, cron. authpriv. ftp, ntp. and security) and priority (including 
emergency, alert, critical, error, vaming, notice, info, cind debug). Log messages may be 
included or excluded from log files based on the facility and priority. Also, log messages may be sent 
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as UDP datagrams to syslog daemons on other systems. Figure 1.1 shows sample log file entries from 
applications (su). daemons (sendmail. ntpd. Ipd. and cron). and kernel la\-ers. 
System log messages ma}" easily be spoofed by users, either on a host system via the syslog daemon's 
named pipe (usually /dev/log or /var/nm/log) or on the network via UDP datagrams to port 514. 
.\ few binary files also contain auditing information on Unix systems. The wtmp file (usually found 
in /etc. /var/adm. or /var/log) contains fixed-length records for each user login and logout event. 
System shutdown, startup, and time change events are also recorded in the wtmp file. The utmp file 
(usually found in /etc. /var/adm. or /var/nm) contains fixed-length records describing current user 
sessions. When processes terminate, process accounting information may be written to acct or pacct 
(usually found in /var/adm or /var/account). 
Feb 28 09:52:22 hostname sendmail[66144]; JAA66144: from=user, size=1264, 
class=0, pri=31264, nrcpts=l, 
msgid=<200002281552.JAA66144Qhostname.cs.iastate.edu>, 
relay=user®localhost 
Feb 28 09:52:35 hostname sendmail[66146]: JAA66144: to=userScs.iastate.edu, 
ctladdr=user (1060/1060), delay=00:00:13, xdelay=00:00:13, mailer=esmtp, 
relay=css-l.cs.iastate.edu. [129.186.3.24], stat=Sent (JAA01230 Message 
accepted for delivery) 
Feb 28 12:40:32 hostname ntpd[143]: using kernel phase-lock loop 2041 
Feb 28 12:40:33 hostname Ipd[185]: restarted 
Feb 28 12:46:26 hostname su: user to root on /dev/ttyp5 
Feb 28 12:50:32 hostname /kernel: xlO: promiscuous mode enabled 
Feb 28 13:00:00 hostname CRON[480]: (root) CHD (newsyslog) 
Figure 1.1 Sample syslog entries 
1.2.3.2 Process Traces 
The system calls executed by processes may be obtained from most systems.^ On Unix systems, the 
triicin^ program may be named ktrace. strace. or truss. Systems that perform C2-levcl auditing [97| 
may provide audit data similar to system call traces. Each program outputs data in a different format, 
so the output must be parsed and interpreted appropriately. 
1.2.3.3 Host Status Monitoring 
The operational status of a host can be a useful indicator for intrusion detection. Characteristics 
that may be monitored include network interface packet statistics, system uptime, system task load. 
•^It may be infeasiblc to trace all processes due to processing and disk storage overhead. 
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disk I O rate, number of users, and amount of unallocated disk space. Unix programs that can be used 
to monitor these aspects of a system include netstat. uptime, iostat. and df.' 
1.2.3.4 Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping may be performed on network packets on broadcast networks or point-to-point links. ' 
This is the primary technique used to obtain network auditing data by most network intrusion detection 
systems. An issue with eavesdropping intrusion detection systems is where the sensor(s) should be 
placcd. Sensors can be positioned between outside networks and a site's firewall, between a firewall and 
a site's internal network, or even between internal networks [100|. Multiple sensors that can correlate 
events between themselves may help detect intrusions that would otherwise go unnoticed, such as 
internal attacks or e\'asive attacks [109| 
Eavesdropping may also be used to obtain information from user login sessions (via "tty snooping"). 
1.2.3.5 SNMP Queries 
The Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [11| provides a common protocol for manage-
nicrit of systems that implement the IP protocol. Managed systems can include network infrastructure 
devices such as routers, switches, hubs, and modems. Multi-user systems, including Unix and Windows 
workstations and servers, can also be managed via SNMP if the service is installed and enabled. 
SNMP defines a language (a subset of ASN.l synta.K) that identifies managed objects in a system. 
.\ Management Information Base (MIB) (S3| for each monitored systenj defines the a\-ail{ibIo attributes 
and describes each attribute. A manager can query attributes of the managed system via SNMP 
and receive responses which describe the state of the managed system. As with host status monitoring. 
SNMP queries can ije used to collect status data for an intrusion detection system. Information available 
from a monitored system often includes uptime, network interface statistics, and CPU load. 
Urifortuniitely. SNMP is not a secure protocol. SNMP requests are authenticated by a plain text 
password (or •'community", in SNMP parlance). Many SNMP implementations use the default password 
•"PUBLIC", and some devices allow attributes to be changed via the default password. SNMP messages 
may be spoofed with trivial effort. 
'Oiiipul from standard system programs may not be tru.stworthy if the system has been compromised by an Intruder 
who has installed replacement programs which hide his activity (typically as part of a rootkit). 
' . \ s  with process tracing, it may bo infeasible capture all data from eavesdropping due to the volume of the data and 
tlic overhead involved in processing aJI the data. 
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1.2.3.6 SNMP Traps 
SXMP traps [11|[114| can be sent asynclironously by systems to a manager. The traps that are 
available depend on the managed system. Many systems can issue traps for network problems and 
for socurity-rclatecl incidents. An intrusion detection system can make use of such traps for intrusion 
detection. However. SNMP traps can be forged and must be treated as unreliable data. 
1.2.4 Relationship of Available Data Sources to Graph Model 
Sensors at different points and levels of a distributed system will see parts of an intrusion. For 
example, in the FTP Bounce .\ttack intrusion of Figure 1.2. imagine a firewall with a network sensor 
between the .Attacker Host and other two hosts. This network sensor will identify the FTP network 
activity between the .A.ttacker Host and FTP Host but will not see the result of the attacker's GET 
command (the connection between the FTP Host and the Target Host). Thus another sensor, placed 
strategically so that activity between the internal hosts can be eavesdropped, would be required to fill 
in the niissiriK information. 
1 -Mljclxr H<r\t : FTP Htm 1 
• Pi*n FTP Server 
" Pi«rt S«.jn Tjryct Him 
I FTP C-mnctiu*! i 
-\nt'n>n*na FTP USER 
^nxiviTiiiuv Pass VW 
(FTP upkiAi 4rcj 
PORT jJUtLcf J 
PtT tilc 
[ TjffCt time I 
PORT ijfcci.*l4 (FTP wrxcr pirtN < I0r41 
GET lik 
j L'p<««jJcU FUc 
OfaeniN or file • , irsRMmttcJ ii> pivi 514 iti ttfpn | r%f; %cr%cr | 
• (rsh t»T user rn»tn FTP vrrvcrl 
' Cicaic \hcll A: c\cv.uK ct'tnnund 
vtcrm vkirkitm i>ficncJ tri>m loTfcf twnCu> ^iA.kcr \ .\ Wuv}k<\k v:r^cr • 
Shell i 
Figure 1.2 Diagram of an FTP Bounce Attack 
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1.3 Intrusion Taxonomy 
An analysis of intrusions is offered to enable fusion of intrusion information from multiple data 
sourccs in tlie multi-agent intrusion detection system. .A taxonomy is proposed, and \-arious known 
intrusions are examined under the developed taxonomy. An intrusion taxonomy is defined by .Amoroso 
a.s "a structured representation of intrusion types that pro\*ides insight into their respective relationships 
and differences" [2|. The aspects of intrusion classification arc drawn from analysis of hundreds of known 
intrusions gathered by Guy Helmer [46]. the Bugtraq mail list |r20|. CERT Advisories [24|. CIAC 
.Advisories [27|. various vendors, and numerous other sources. Previous work in the area, including [98| 
ancl [74]. were also consulted. Based on the previous clzissification work, dimensions identified for the 
ta.xoiiomy include temporal i: spatial aspects, techniques <k target components, outcomes, and potential 
responses. .Attributes of the dimensions are further investigated below. 
Temporal Aspects Temporally, intrusions tend to progress over time in stages ranging from 
ri'coimaissance to penetration and entrenchment. Identifying the stage of the attack leads to appropriate 
couiitornieasures. e.g. countermeasures may be softer in response to reconnaissance than to penetration. 
.Amoroso outlines the simple temporal model of intrusions but simply classifies actions as either benign 
or malicious [2. Ciiapter 4|. 
.Attacks tend to progress in temporal stages. Ruiu identifies seven temporal stages in successful 
attack.s; rcjroimaissance. vulnerability identification, penetration, control, embedding, data extraction 
modification, and attack relay [115|. 
E.xamples of reconnaissance and vulnerability identification include DNS table gathering, host and 
port scaiuiing. host operating system identification, and password sniffing. 
Penetration includes exploitation of \-arious network server daemon vulnerabilities (poor authentica-
ticjn and buffer overflows), authenticating with illicitly obtained passwords, and TCP session hijacking. 
Control includes installing Trojan, backdoor, and other rootkit programs, removing traces of the 
intrusion from system logs, and disabling detection systems. 
Embedding involves the installation or modification of a system so that even if the attacker is 
discovered and steps are taken to recover the system, the attacker will still be able to enter the system. 
For exainijle. the system bootstrap code could bo modified to re-insert backdoors if the sj'stem executable 
programs are restored from backups or installation media. 
In the data extraction and modification phase, the attacker gathers information about the configu­
ration and operation of the system. Covert channels are suggested as a good way to move discovered 
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data from the compromised system to the attacker's base. .A.n example of useful extracted data would 
be cracked account passwords. 
.•\fter a system is fully compromised, it may be used for attack relaying. Attacks can be launched 
against affiliated (trusting) hosts to expand the number of hosts under the attacker's control. A system 
also may simply be used to participate in distributed denial of service attacks [3.5|[33][34l[32|. 
Spatial Aspects We have identified attacks that include spatial aspects. .\n attack may be 
distributed across several hosts in a subnet or several departments of an organization. Implicit or 
explicit trust relationships (often insufficiently authenticated) between components of a distributed 
system in an organization allow an attack's effects to propagate beyond a single component. 
Attack Target The target of an attack affects how. where, and at what level the attack can be 
detected. Neumann and Parker developed the following taxonomy [98|. which generally ranges from 
physical hardware through operating systems and system management. The Neumann and Parker 
taxonomy is NPl-External Misuse. NP2-Hardware Misuse. NP.3-Masquerading. NP4-Subsequent Mis­
use. NPo-Control Bypass. NPG-.Active Resource Misuse. NP7-Passive Resource Misuse. NPS-Misusc 
via Inaction, and NP9-Indirect Aid. We further identify the layer of the host system (device, device 
driver, kernel, file system, memory manager, process manager, daemon, application) or network protocol 
(physical, data link, network, transport, application) targeted by each attack. 
Outcome and Lethality The outcome and lethality of an attack affects the priority and required 
response to the attack. The four levels of outcomes are normal, suspicious, attempted (failed) attack, 
and successful attack. Outcomes of successful attacks include unauthorized disclosure of data or use 
of services (violating exclusivity), unauthorized modification of data (violating integrity), and denial 
of service (violating availability). Lethality ranges from low (typical of reconnaissance attacks) to high 
(rypical of penetration attacks). 
Responses Responses to intrusions may include documenting the attack, automatically inter­
vening in the progress of the intrusion, remediating the changes due to the intrusion, deception or 
misdirection, redirection k: containment, and prevention of future intrusions. 
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1.4 Descriptions of Classified Intrusions 
The following descriptions of intrusions are grouped by attacks on the lower layers of the network 
protocol stack (OSI layers 3 4). host-based attacks, and attacks on network applications (OSI layer 
T). 
1.4.1 Network Protocol Intrusions 
The following intrusions are oriented to fiaws in networking protocols or fiaws in software that 
implements the networking protocols. This section concentrates on OSI layers 3 (network) and 4 
(transport). 
1.4.1.1 Host Scanning 
Attackers may use one of these techniques to identify hosts for further inspection. 
PING Scanning .\ttackers may iterate through the possible Internet Protocol (IP) [106| ad­
dresses for systems and send an ICMP ECHO REQUEST |105) to each address. Systems which respond 
with iin ICMP ECHO reply may be targeted for port scanning. 
Broadcast PING The broadcast PING (an ICMP ECHO REQUEST to a broadcast destination 
IP address) has two uses for attackers. The broadcast PIXG can be used to identify all hosts on the 
target's subnet. In this case, the source IP address will be %-alid so that the attacker can receive the 
ICMP ECHO replies. 
Smurf The broadcast PIXG can also be used to create a denial of service (known as the ""snmrf 
attack [231) by amplifying single, frequent requests which generate many more ICMP ECHO responses 
that will clog a network link or slow a target host. In this case, the source IP address will often be 
forged to he the target of the denial of service. 
1.4.1.2 Port Scanning 
.•Vttackers use port scanning to identify TCP [10"| and UDP [104| services that are offered by a 
particular host. Note that attackers may attempt to hide the true source IP address of the attack with 
decoys (sinmltaneously generating identical scanning packets with otiier source IP addresses), nmap [43| 
is a powerful tool that implements all of the following scanning methods and more. 
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TCP SYN Port Scanning An attacker sends TCP segments with the SYN flag set (the standard 
first segment in TCP connection establishment) to determine which ports are listening on the target 
iiost. Target ports which are open for listening will respond with a SYN I ACK packet. This method works 
through firewalls when connections are allowed to the port on the target host, but fails when a firewall 
docs not allow connections to the port on the target host. 
TCP Stealth Port Scanning An attacker sends forged TCP segments with the FIN flag set 
to determine which ports are listening on a host. Target ports which have a server listening will not 
respond: otherwise, the target host usually responds with an RST (reset). This scan method works 
through many packet filtering firewalls, since packets without the SYN flag set are often forwarded 
without further checking. 
\'ariations on this scanning method use different flag \-alues. including no flags (null). ACK. ACK I PSH I FIN. 
or ACKI FIN. 
UDP Port Scanning Because UDP ports are connectionless. UDP ports can (so far as is known) 
ordy be scanned by sending a L'DP packet to a particular port and then observing whether an ICMP 
port unreachable error response packet is received. This technique fails if ICMP packets are blocked 
botwopri the destination and source. This technique also fails if a firewall does not allow packets to the 
port on the target host. 
1.4.1.3 Finger 
The Finger protocol [136| provides either a list of active users or information about a specific user. 
If the finger service is active on a host, an attacker can learn 
• Whether a system administrator is currently logged on 
• What user names are available on a system 
• Personal information about a user that may assist password guessing 
1.4.1.4 Reverse DNS Spoofing 
.A.n attacker with authority over a reverse lookup domain name service table (which defines the 
mapping from IP addresses to domain names for a network) can spoof the domain name for his or her 
computer (119|. The attacker can; 
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1. Change the table to return the name of a host that is trusted by the attacker's target 
2. Connoct to the target using rsh or rlogin 
3. If tlie target accepts the spoofed reverse domain name and trusts the computer by ttiat name, the 
attacker will not be required to give a password 
1.4.1.5 DNS Cache Poisoning 
This attack is similar to the reverse DNS spoofing attack (section 1.4.1.4). .\n attacker that can 
observe or receive DNS requests from the target's domain name server can spoof a response that includes 
not only the requested data but also unassociated. poisoned data that the target's DNS server will add 
to its cache [I9|. The attacker can: 
1. Poison the target's name server cache with a reverse DNS record that gives the attacker's computer 
the name of a host trusted by the target 
2. Connect to the target using rsh. or rlogin 
.3. If the target accepts the poison domain name and trusts the computer b\- that name, the attacker 
will not be required to give a password 
1.4.1.6 DNS Zone Transfer 
.A.n attacker looking for targets may be able to obtain the DNS zone file for the target organization 
or deiiartiiient. The DNS zone file lists each of the DNS names for hosts controlled by the organization 
and the associated IP addresses. The attacker can use this information to discover the layout of the 
target's network and the hosts within the target's domain. 
The attack procedure is as easy as: 
1. Starting nslookup 
2. Using "set type=ns" to get name server records 
3. Entering the domain name of the target domain (e.g.. "ee. iastate. edu") to obtain the name 
servers for the domain 
4. Using "server w.x.y.z" to set the target name server to one of the IP addresses reported by the 
previous step 
•j. Using "Is target. domain" to list the contents of the target domain's zone file 
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1.4.1.7 FTP Bounce 
The FTP bounce attack can be used to transfer data to a port to which an attacker does not 
normally have access [20|. One way to exploit this problem is to use it to send data to a remote shell 
server that trusts the FTP server. .-Vfter an attacker discovers an FTP ser\-er and a host running rsh 
that might trust the FTP server, the attacker; 
1. Uploads a specially-formatted file to the FTP ser\-er 
2. Issues an FTP PORT command that directs the FTP server to send its next download to port 
514 on the target host 
3. Issues an FTP GET command to "download" the contents of the pre\-iously-uploaded file into 
port 514 on the target 
The GET command opens a connection from the FTP ser^-er on port 20 to the rsh daemon on the 
target. If the target trusts the FTP ser\'er. the rsh daemon will accept the contents of the file as if it 
were u.ser input and e.xecute the given command. 
1.4.1.8 TCP SYN Spoofing Denial of Service 
The exploitation of the TCP SYN flood vulnerability takes advantage of the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) connection establishment procedure, usually called the "three-way handshake" (1G|[38|. 
The tiiroe-way handshake works as shown in figure 1.3. 
A B 
SYN.x 
SYN y, ACK x-i-1 
ACK y+1 
Figure 1.3 TCP connection establishment diagram 
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When a TCP client on host A wants to connect to a TCP server on host B: 
1. Host A sends a SYN (s>Tichronization) segment to Host B. which includes A"s initial sequence 
number x. 
2. Host B responds with a SYN/ACK (synchronization acknowledgment) segment. This packet ac­
knowledges Host A's with sequence number x +1. and announces its initial sequence number 
y -
3. Host A acknowledges B's sequence number by responding with y 4- I. This fully establishes the 
connection. 
.\fter B receives the initial SYN from A. it must store information about the "embryonic" connection 
in an in-memory data structure. The operating system has a limited number of entries for embrj'onic 
connections. When no more entries are a\-ailable, B will be unable to accept any more connection 
requests until some of the embryonic connections have been fully established or have timed out. 
In a SYX flood attack, an attacker sends a high volume of SYN packets to the target without 
res{)onding to the target"s SYN/ACK responses. When the t;u-get"s limited number of table entries are 
consumed, the target can no longer accept TCP connection requests. .After the table fills, the attacker 
can contiime to send SYN packets to keep the table full as previous entries slowly expire. Note that 
becausc the attacker does not need to receive the target's SYN .A.CK packets, the source IP address 
can be forged to hide the identity of the attacker's host. 
1.4.1.9 Daemon Buffer Overflows 
Many daemons that provide network service run as a privileged user. Daemons that road or copy 
user input into a fixed size buffer may be vulnerable to buffer overflow vulnerabilities if the data is not 
consistently checked against the length of the buffer [72|. Because buffers are often stored as a local 
variable on the stack, user data that exceeds the length of the buffer can overwrite the procedure's 
return address. Data containing object code and a return address can be sent to the daemon by a 
malicious user. If the buffer overflow is successful, the malicious code is executed with privilege. The 
malicious code can make illicit changes to files on the system or open network connections to the 
attackers computer. 
This technique is the most useful and actively exploited method of gaining priN-ileged access to 
network-connected systems. Buffer overflow attacks are difficult to detect and defend. 
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1.4.1.10 TCP Session Hijacking 
If the segments in an active TCP connection can be observed, it is possible for the attacker to 
insert data into the TCP stream with \-alid acknowledgment numbers [61|. This can be used to insert 
commands into a telnet or rlogin session. If a user is logged into an administrative account at the time, 
it would be possible for an attacker to insert commands to modify the system configuration that would 
then allow the attacker direct access to the system. 
The legitimate user of the TCP session will likely notice that the connection is disrupted. The 
TCP acknowledgment numbers will be unsynchronized between the server and the legitimate user's 
computer. It is likely that no further legitimate communication wiU be possible over the connection. 
1.4.1.11 Forged Invalid IP FVagment (Teardrop) 
The teardrop attack sends forged IP fragments that overlap [21|. When a destination computer 
receives IP fragments, it must reassemble the fragments to construct the complete packet. Some IP 
stacks (including older Linux kernels and unpatched Windows XT and Windows 9-5 systems) do not 
correctly handle overlapping fragments and crash, resulting in a denial of service. 
Related variations include bonk, boink. jolt, and newtear. .A.n attack tool by the name of targa 
irriplerncnts all of those variations [9o(. 
1.4.1.12 Long ICMP ECHO REQUEST (Ping of Death) 
-An ICMP ECHO REQUEST (ping) with a payload size of 6-5510 crashes certain IP stacks, resulting 
in a denial of service [14|. The GoolO-bjte payload with an 8-byte ICMP header and 20-byte IP header 
results in an illegal G553S-bytc IP packet. 
1.4.1.13 Forged Invalid TCP SYN (Land) 
.A. TCP SVX (connection establishment) packet is forged with the target's IP address specified as 
both the source and destination and an open server port is specified as both the source and destination 
port. Several TCP stacks will either crash or enter an infinite loop when such a packet is received, 
resulting in a denial of service [21|. 
1.4.1.14 Out of Band TCP Data 
The Windows XT TCP stack crashes when it receives a TCP segment with the URG flag set but 
the urgent offset pointer points to the end of the segment and no normal (non-urgent) data follows (86|. 
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1.4.1.15 Simple UDP Services Bounce 
Several simple UDP services reply with a UDP packet when they receive a UDP packet. Such services 
include echo, chargen. daytime, and time. .\n attacker can forge a UDP packet with any of the simple 
UDP services specified for both the source jmd destination port. X storm of UDP packets between the 
source and destination IP address will result, resulting in a denial of service due to network congestion 
(17|. .\ltornately. if the source and destination IP address are the same, the target computer's kernel 
will spend most of its time proce.ssing the packets, resulting in a reduction of service. 
1.4.1.16 NFS File Handle Guessing 
Given an NFS file server, it may be possible to guess file handles for files exported by the file server 
(1.30|. Leendert \-an Doom's nfsbug.c program: 
1. Makes an RPC connection to the mountd serv ice on an NFS file server 
2. Makes an RPC connection to the file service on an NFS file server 
.3. Chocks for file systems that are exported to the world 
-1. Tries guessing the file handle of a filesystem's root inode (inode =2) based on typical device major 
minor numbers, using the fact that the root inode of a file system often ha^ an easy-to-gucss 
generation number (handles are computed as a function of device major, device minor, inode 
number, generation number ) 
If the root inode of a file system can be found, all files and directories below that point can probably 
l)o acccssed. 
1.4.1.17 RSH SYN Spoofing 
SVN spoofing allows an attacker to masquerade his computer as a trusted computer [7|. .-Yssumo an 
attacker learns that host .A. trusts rsh connections from host B. .A.ttacker: 
1. Uses a denial of service attack against host B to keep it busy or kill it (so B will be unable to 
quickly send an FIST after it sees .\"s forthcoming SYNIACK) 
2. Opens one or more valid TCP connections with A to determine the state of .A.'s Initial Sequence 
Number generator 
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.3. Spoofs a TCP SYN with B's IP address as the source. A s IP address as the destination, and port 
oi l (shell) as the destination port. This causes A to believe that B is creating a TCP connection 
to its rsh daemon 
-1. Spoofs a TCP ACK with the expected ISX so that believes it has a fully open TCP connection 
to its rsh daemon from B 
5. Spoofs a TCP segment to A's rsh daemon that changes a configuration file 
1.4.2 Host Intrusions 
Intrusions which attack a host operating sj-stem are discussed in this section. 
1.4.2.1 Password Guessing 
Authenticated network services offer several ways to guess passwords for accounts. Passwords are 
often easy to guess. Some systems contain default passwords for system accounts. Many users typically 
use [)(j<jr pjisswords that are based on names or dictionary- words. 
There are the obvious methods of using telnet or ftp to connect to a system and try passwords. 
However, systems will usually log multiple authentication failures that occur through telnet or ftp. 
leaving a trace that can lead back to the intruder. Other authenticated network services, such as the 
Post Office Protocol (POP), usually do not log multiple authentication failures nor do they close the 
connortion after some number of failures, .\utomated password guessing programs e.xist that connect 
r(j tlie POP service and try passwords for given users until a password succeeds or the dictionary of 
[)asswords is exhausted. 
If a list of encrypted passwords can be obtained from the target site, attackers can discover the 
plainte.xt for the passwords by using programs such as crack (for UNIX passwords) or LOphtcrack (for 
UXIX and Windows passwords). 
1.4.2.2 Signals to Setuid Programs 
.A. usor may use signal handling vulnerabilities in privileged programs to gain privileges. .A.n e.xample 
is a vulnerability in sendrnail version 8.7 [I5|. This version of sendmail would execute the program 
"smtpd" when it received a hangup signal (SIGHUP). An attacker could 
1. Create a symbolic link named "smtpd" to /bin/sh 
2. E.vecute sendmail 
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3. While sendmail is waiting for input, use "kill -1 p i d " .  where p i d  is the process ID of the 
sendmail process 
Now the attacker will have a copy of the shell /bin/sh executing with root pri\ileges. 
1.4.2.3 Temporary File Races 
Tomporary files are usually created in a directory- which is publicly writeable. such as /tmp. Tem­
porary files often have guessable names, based on the process ID of the creating process. If an attacker 
knows that a privileged process is about to create or open a temporary file for writing, the attacker 
can create a symbolic link in the public directory with the same name as the process's temporary file. 
If the syniliolic link points to a critical file, such as /etc/passwd. and if the attacker has guessed the 
name of the temporary file correctly, the process will open the file to which the s\-mbolic link points. 
If the attacker is able to force information to be written to a system configuration file, he may 
be able to increiise his privileges on the system. A privileged program may grant privileges to a user 
if particular files exist or contain specific information. For example, the remote shell daemon, rshd. 
will grant login rights to any user without requiring a password if /etc/hosts. equiv contains the line 
The privileged process may try to reduce the chance of this attack by issuing an access (2) system 
call to check for the c.xistence of a file or s^-mbolic link before creating the temporary file. This merely 
reduces the window of opportunity for the attacker, since the symbolic link could still be created between 
the time the access(2) call is made and the time the open(2) system call is executed. 
1.4.2.4 Reading or Writing Critical Memory 
Disclosure and compromise of critical system data presents serious problems. If an attacker can read 
arbitrary data from the system's memory space, the attacker may gain acccss to privileged information. 
Unencrypted passwords, authentication keys, and other private information may be stored in memory 
and may be vulnerable. 
If an attacker can write to arbitrary addresses in the system's memory space, all protections imple­
mented by the kernel can be compromised. For e.Kample. an attacker could modifj- his credentials and 
become the system administrator. 
UNIX Memory Device Special Files In UNIX, the device special files /dev/kmemand /dev/mem 
provide user-level access to the kernel memory space and the physical memory space of the sj-stem. re-
22 
spcctively. Access to system memorj- via these de\ice files is provided so that system utilities can show 
systcni status, including information about the process table, network protocol statistics, and virtual 
memory statistics. .Access to these files must be strictly limited. Programs that execute with privileges 
to access system memorj- often include ps. vmstat. w, and netstat. \ ulnerabilities in these programs 
or unrestricted access to these spccial files can allow attackers to gain privileges. 
Windows NT SecHole .An intrusion utility named Sechole.exe changes the object code executed 
by the OpenProcess .API so that a subsequent request for debug rights allows the process to obtain 
elevated privileges [91|. 
1.4.2.5 Trojan Programs 
.An attacker can install modified versions of programs that, when executed by another user, obtain 
information for the attacker or modify permissions such that the attacker gains new privileges. .An 
example of this attack could be carried out like this: 
1. The attacking user on a system creates a modified version of the Is program in his or her home 
directory. The Trojan Is lists files just like the original, but also copies /bin/sh to /tmp/sh and 
makes it setuid to the root user 
2. The user complains to the system administrator that something is wrong with the files in his or 
her account 
.3. The system administrator changes his or her current working directory to the user's home di­
rectory and executes the Is program to see what files are in the user's directory. If the system 
administrator's path includes the current directory, the user's Trojan Is is executed 
4. The attacking user executes the setuid copy of the shell created by the Trojan Is to obtain increased 
privileges 
1.4.2.6 Rootkits 
.A "Tootkit" is package of programs that are typically installed by an attacker after he or she has 
gained root privileges on a system. The programs in the rootkit hide the attacker's activities and allow 
"backdoor" access to the system. Programs included in a rootkit typically include: 
• ps 
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• Is 
• rietstat 
• \v 
• login 
Newer rootkits replace many access control, password database management, and system utilities [1221-
Windows NT and Windows 2000 rootkit. ntrootkitOSl. has recently appeared but has ver%- limited 
capabilities. 
1.4.2.7 Backdoor Access 
.A.n attacker that has gained access to a system may install a "backdoor" program that will allow 
privileged access to the system in the future. This may be useful for the attacker if the system adminis­
trator closes the original hole that was used to compromise the system or if the original exploit required 
a largo investment of time or work. The attackor may also use the backdoor to provide easy access for 
other intruders. Typical backdoors include: 
• modified login program allows a particular user to login without a password and gives root 
privileges to that user 
• .A. network daemon that accepts telnet connections and runs a shell with root privileges (like rshd. 
but without any authentication checks) 
The Linux Root Kit version 4 (122) includes several standard programs with backdoors, including chfn. 
inetd.login.and rshd. 
1.4.2.8 Trim or Remove System Logs 
System audit logs provide traces of an attacker's activity. This information can be used to trace 
the attacker and may provide legal evidence that could be used against the attacker in court. Tools 
such ;is wipe, utclean. and remove exist to remove traces of the attacker's activities from the lo­
gin file (/var/log/wtmp), list of currently logged-in users (/var/rtm/utmp). and last login times 
(/var/log/lastlog) [122|. Attackers may simply erase all logs. 
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1.4.2.9 Disabling Intrusion Detection Systems 
An intrusion detection system which is implemented as one or more processes running on a system 
can be killed by a root-privileged intruder. An intrusion detection system which is implemented as a 
passive network monitor can be overwhelmed by high traffic loads. 
1.4.2.10 Password Sniffing 
An intruder may install a password sniffer to obtain passwords for accounts on other systems. Telnet. 
FTP. POP. and other authenticated network protocols usually transmit passwords as cleartext. Many 
systems offer a facility, such as the Berkeley Packet Filter, which can be used to hear all traffic on the 
network to which the system is attached. Password sniffing programs use this eavesdropping facility to 
listen to the first few bytes of each network connection. The overheard information is saved to a file or 
transmitted to another host for storage. .An intruder can use the passwords to gain access to accoimts 
on other systems. The Linux Root Kit version 4 includes a p:vssword sniffer [122|. 
1.4.3 Network Application Intrusions 
This section examines known intrusions that target OSI layer 7 (applications). 
1.4.3.1 Sendmail Debugging Commands 
The sendmail niiiil transfer daemon, prior to version 5.59 [121. contained two commands for remote 
flebugging. wiz and debug. These two commands could be issued remotely to a sendmail daemon to 
allow execution of arbitrary commands as the root user. .After the Morris worm incident highlighted this 
vulnerability, most publicly-accessible systems should have been upgraded to eliminate this problem. 
1.4.3.2 RPC Portmapper Proxy 
.\n attacker can use the PMAPPROC_CALLIT remote RPC (procedure number 5. the protocol forward­
ing service) indirectly to invoke other RPC functions, such as the NFS mountd FlPCMNT_MOUNT function. 
For example, if a computer exports file systems to itself via NFS. and if the mountd daemon accepts 
recjuests from port numbers greater than 1023. and if the portmap daemon e.xecutes pmap_rmtcall func­
tions for untrusted clients, this problem can be exploited to obtain NFS file handles (see also section 
1.4.1.16). 
Reference: bugtraq thread of .August 1994 entitled "RPC protocol problem?", beginning with mes­
sage ID < 199408230539.AA13138®ph-meter.beckmaxi.uiuc.edu>. 
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1.4.3.3 Unauthorized Use of NFS 
Most iniplemcntations of NFS use the RPC AUTH_UNIX authentication mechanism, which authenti­
cates requests only on the source IP address and source port number. If attackers obtain a \-alid NFS 
file handle. .\FS requests can be spoofed with trusted IP source addresses. The spoofed requests can 
create or modify files on the target server (130|. 
1.4.3.4 Trivial File Transfer Protocol 
The Trivial File Transfer Protocol (tftp) is often used to provide software updates or boot kernels 
to simple network devices, including routers. X terminals, and diskless workstations, tftp does not use 
any authentication. .A.ny file a\-ailablc via tftp can be retrieved by anyone who can send requests to 
the tftp port. UDP port 69 [13|. If the files a\'ailable via tftp include password files or other security 
configuration information, this information can assist an attacker. If the tftp daemon allows files to 
be written, anyone who can send requests to the tftp port can upload files. If the files writable by 
tftp include password files or other security information, the system can be easily compromised by an 
intruder. 
Modern tftp daemons implement strict limitations on file access, but can still be configured in an 
insecure maimer. 
1.4.3.5 Use of rlogin or rsh From Untrusted Hosts 
Other attacks, including those mentioned in sections 1.4.1.4. 1.4.1.5. 1.4.1.7. and 1.4.1.17. setup 
attacks on rlogind or rshd. Both protocols authenticate based on the source IP address of the TCP 
connection and the DNS name obtained via reverse lookup. If an attacker successfully spoofs the IP 
address or name of a trusted host, the attacker is given access to a shell prompt [16|. 
1.4.3.6 Insecure Web Server CGI Programs 
The NCS.A. and .\pache httpd web server daemons were installed with sample Common Gateway 
Interface (CGI) programs that contained vulnerabilities that allowed attackers to execute arbitrary 
commands on the server. \ ulnerable CGI programs include pfaf [18| and nph-test-cgi [22|. 
.A.n attacker can build an HTTP request like "http://server .net/cgi-bin/phf?Qalias=y^0acat7, 
20/etc/passwd" that will exploit the vulnerability in the phf program and cause it to return the 
contents of the system's password file. .\n attacker can then use a password cracker (mentioned in 
section 1.4.2.1) to obtain plaintext passwords for further access to the system. 
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1.4.3.7 Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) 
X'ariou.s versions of IIS contain security holes which allow access to prirate information, creation of 
tiles, or cause the server to crash. 
Showcode IIS \ersion 4.0 contains an .\ctive Server Page named showcode. asp which allows 
any rornote user to view any text file on the web ser\-er [64). .A.s an example, an HTTP URL recjuest 
could be written like this: 
http://server.net/msadc/Samples/SELECTOR/showcode.asp?source=/msadc/Samples/../../. 
./../.. /program f iles/ws_ft:p/ws_ftp. ini 
which would obtain the contents of \VS_FTP's WS_FTP.ini file, which contains encoded passwords 
for FTP sites visited by the computer's user. The encoded passwords may be decoded by the decoder 
at http://www.hispasec.com/wsftp.asp. 
MS-DOS Style Names IIS .3.0 and 4.0 may allow attackers to access protected files with alter­
nate ("S-S '-stylc) names [89| [90|. .\s an example, say jin attacker sends a request to a vulnerable server 
for a known file that contains sensitive information, such as siilary information: the URL 
http://server.net/protected-dir/salaries.htm 
fail.s with a permission denied error, while the URL 
http: //server .net/protec~l/salciries .htm 
Alternate Data Streams IIS may allow attackers to access protected files using alternate names 
for a file's D.A.T.A. stream (93| [921 [87). NTFS associates multiple streams with each file. .A. user may 
specify the default stream. D.\T.A.. by appending the string :$DATA" to the pathname to a file. IIS 
normally executes .Active Server Pages and sends the results to the user as HTML, but a user may obtain 
the source code for the .Active Serv-er Page (which may contain privileged information) by appending 
••: : SDATA" to the URL. 
1.4.3.8 NT NULL Session 
\\'indows NT allows anonymous connections (known as NULL session connections) through which 
account names and names of shared resources are visible [88]. .Attackers may use this vulnerability to 
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obtain lists of user names, network file shares, and other resource information. This information gives 
an attacker information that can be used to assist penetration of the target. 
1.5 Classifications using Intrusion Taxonomy 
Tables 1.1. 1.2. 1.3, 1.4. and 1.5 show classifications of \-arious intrusions using the proposed model 
attributes. 
.A. problem that is evident in the examination of intrusions under the proposed taxonomy is the level 
of abstraction applied to the intrusions. Identification and classification of vulnerabilities [82| can give 
duos to appropriate level of abstraction, since intrusions bear a close relationship to vulnerabilities. 
However, vulnerability analysis tends to focus more on the causes rather than the identification of 
intrusions (8|. .\bstraction in the taxonomy examined here ranges from specific attacks (e.g.. most 
network protocol intrusions) to very general (e.g.. buffer overflow attacks). This \'ariation in abstraction 
is due to the dissimilarities in attack spatiality. target, outcome, and lethality. 
1.6 Glossary 
Audit Record .A. unit of information that uniquely identifies an action taking place in a computing 
system, including time of action, location where action took place, initiator of the action, and 
object acted upon. 
Anomaly .A.ction that deviates from normal activity. 
Attacker .A.n individual who attempts one or more attacks against a system. 
Attack .\n action by an individual that violates or attempts to violate a security policy. 
Backdoor .A. method of access to a system that bypasses normal authentication. 
CPN Colored Petri Net. 
False Negative .\otation for an intrusive event that was incorrectly identified by an intrusion detec­
tion system as nomial. 
False Positive Notation for a normal event that was incorrectly identified by an intrusion detection 
system as intrusive. 
Intrusion .A. collection of attacks by an attacker or group of related attackers to achieve a single goal. 
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Table 1.1 Network intrusions classified using proposed model attributes 
Intrusion Temporal Spatial Target Outcome Lethality Response 
DNS Zone 
Transfer 
Recon Multiple 
DXS 
Servers 
XP7 Xetwork: 
DNS Applica­
tion 
Disclosure 
of Data 
Low Deception 
Broadcast PING Recon Ail Hosts NP7 Xetwork: 
ICMP Protocol 
Disclosure 
of Data 
Low- Deception 
Broadcast PING 
(Srnurf) 
Operation All Hosts XP7 Xetwork: 
ICMP Protocol 
Denial 
of Ser­
vice 
High Prevention 
Host Scan Recon All Hosts XP7 Xetwork: 
ICMP. TCP. iz 
UDP Protocols 
Disclosure 
of Data 
Low Prevention. 
Deception 
Port Scan Recon Single 
Host 
XP7 Xetwork: 
TCP UDP 
Protocols 
Disclosure 
of Data 
Low Prevention. 
Deception 
Xinas Recon Single 
Host 
XP7 Xetwork: 
TCP Protocol 
Disclosure 
of Data 
Low Deception 
Finger Recon Single 
Host 
X'P7 Xetwork: 
TCP Protocol 
"finger" 
Disclosure 
of Data 
Low Deception 
Reverse DXS 
Spoofing 
Penetration Single 
Host 
XP3 Xetwork: 
Insecure TCP 
App 
Use of 
SerWce 
High Terminate 
connection 
DXS Cache Poi-
:^oning 
Penetration Single 
Host 
XP3 Xetwork; 
Insecure DXS 
Caching Server 
Modification Moderate 
of Data 
Remove 
incorrect 
data 
FTP Bounce Penetration One or 
Two 
Hosts 
XP5 Xetwork: 
Insecure TCP 
App 
Use of 
Service 
High Terminate 
connection 
TCP SVX 
Spoofing 
Penetration Single 
Host 
XP5 Xetwork: 
Insecure TCP 
App 
Use of 
Service 
High Terminate 
connection 
Daemon Buffer 
Overflows 
Penetration Single 
Host 
NP5 Xetwork: 
Insecure TCP or 
UDP App 
L'se of 
Service 
High Terminate 
connection 
TCP Session Hi­
jacking 
Penetration Single 
Host 
XP5 Xetwork: 
TCP Protocol 
Use of 
Service 
High Terminate 
connection 
Password Guess­
ing 
Penetration All Hosts XPo Host: User 
.Authentication 
Use of 
Service 
Higli Lock 
target 
account 
Forged Invalid 
IP Fragment 
(Teardrop) 
Operation Single 
Host 
XPG Xetwork: 
IP fragment 
reassembly 
Denial 
of Ser­
vice 
Moderate Restart 
target 
host 
Forged [nvalid 
TCP SVX 
(Land) 
Operation Single 
Host 
XP6 Xetwork: 
TCP connection 
establishment 
Denial 
of Ser­
vice 
.Moderate Restart 
target 
host 
Simple UDP Operation Multiple 
Hosts or 
Xetwork 
XP6, Xetwork: 
UDP packet 
bouncing 
Denial 
of Ser­
vice 
Moderate Terminate 
inetd 
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Table l."2 UNIX intrusions classified using proposed model attributes 
Intrusion Temporal Spatial Target Outcome Lethality Response 
Signals to setuid Pen. Single NPo Host; Use of High Disable 
programs Host Tamper with 
running process 
Service user 
Privileged Pro­ Pen. Single NP5 Host; In­ Use of High Terminate 
gram Buffer Host secure privileged Service process 
Overflows program Disable 
user 
Exploit tempo­ Pen. Single NP6 Host: Modification High Revert 
rary file race to Host Change file of Data changes 
create or over- svstem 
"•rite files 
Write to pro­ Pen. Single NP6 Host; Modification High Restart 
tected memory Host Change kernel 
memory-
of Data system 
Install Trojan Pen. Single NF4 Host; Modification Moderate Revert 
Programs Host Change file 
system 
of Data change 
Execute Trojan Pen. All Hosts XP6 Host; Modification High Re\-ert 
Program Grant privileges of Data changes 
Execute Trojan Pen. All Hosts NP6 Host; Modification High Revert 
Program Change file 
under user's 
control 
of Data changes 
Install "Tootkit" Camo. Single NPG Host; Modification High Revert 
Host Change file 
system 
of Data changes 
Install Back­ Entrench Single NP4 Host; Modification Moderate Revert 
doors Host Change file 
system 
of Data change 
Use Backdoor Operation Single NP5 Host: Use of Moderate Terminate 
for Access Host Service sessions 
Remove Svstem Camo. Single NP6 Host: Modification Moderate -Alert secu­
Logs Host Change file 
system 
of Data rity officer 
Disable Detec­ Entrench Single NP6 Host: Modification High Restart 
tion Systems Host Tamper with 
processes 
of Data detection 
systems 
Install Password Operation Single NP7,'Network: Disclosure High Terminate 
Sniffer Host TCP Protocols 
"telnet", ""ftp" 
of Data process 
Password Guess­ Pen. Multiple NP3, Host; Use of Moderate Temporarily 
ing Hosts Masquerade as 
another user 
Service block ac­
counts 
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Table 1.3 UNTX network service intrusions classified using proposed model attributes 
Intrusion Temporal Spatial Target Outcome Lethality Response 
Sondmail 
(lebujr 
wiz. Pen. Single NP5 Host: Use of 
Host Avoid authenti- Ser\ice 
cation 
High Deception: 
reduced 
level of 
service to 
source 
RPC port map- Pen. 
per proxy 
Single XP5 Host; Use of 
Host Insufficient Service 
authentication 
High Blacklist 
or reduce 
level of 
service to 
source 
NFS Pen. Single 
Host 
XP6.NP7 Host: 
Insufficient 
authentication 
Disclosure 
or Mod­
ification 
of Data 
High Blacklist 
or recluce 
level of 
service to 
source 
tftp Pen. Single 
Host 
XP8 Host: 
Unprotected 
sen.'ice 
Disclosure 
or Mod­
ification 
of Data 
High Blacklist 
or reduce 
level of 
service to 
source 
rlogiti. rsh from Pen. 
untrusted host 
Single XP5 Host: Im-
Host proper modified 
configuration, 
DXS informa­
tion attacked 
Use of 
Service 
Hish Terminate 
session; 
Blacklist 
source 
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Table 1.4 Windows intrusions classified using proposed model attributes 
Intrusion Temporal Spatial Target Outcome Lethality Response 
Privileged Pro­ Pen. Single NP5 Host: In­ Use of High Terminate 
gram Buffer Host secure privileged Ser\-ice process 
Overflows program Disable 
user 
U'rite to pro­ Pen. Single XP6 Host: Modification High Restart 
tected memory Host Change kernel of Data system 
memory 
Install Trojan Pen. Single XP4 Host: Modification Moderate Revert 
Programs Host Change file of Data change 
system 
Execute Trojan Pen. Hosts XP6 Host: Modification High Revert 
Program Grant pri\-ileges of Data changes 
Execute Trojan Pen. .•VII Hosts NP6 Host; Modification High Revert 
Program Change file of Data changes 
under user's 
control 
Install Back­ Entrench Single XP4 Host: Modification Moderate Revert 
doors Host Change file of Data change 
system 
Use Backdoor Operation Single XPo Host: Use of Moderate Terminate 
for Access Host .\void authenti­ Service improp-
cation erlv au­
thenti­
cated 
sessions 
Remove Svstem Camo. Single XP6 Host: Modification Moderate 
Logs Host Change file of Data 
system 
Disable Detec­ Entrench Single XP6 Host: Modification High Restart 
tion Systems Host Tamper with of Data detection 
running pro­ systems 
cesses 
P;issword Guess­ Pen. Multiple XP3 Host: Use of Moderate Temporarily 
ing Hosts Masquerade as Service block tar­
another user geted 
accoimts 
Table 1.5 Windows network service intrusions classified using proposed model attributes 
Intrusion Temporal Spatial Target Outcome Lethality Response 
IIS Attacks Pen. Single XPo Host; Use of High 
Host .•\void authenti­ Service 
cation 
IIS Inde.x Server Operation Single XP7 Host; Ac­ Disclosure Moderate 
Host cess to Files of Data 
.\ULL Session Recon Single .XPTHost: Ac­ Disclosure .Moderate 
.\ccount Name Host cess to account of Data 
Gathering information 
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Misuse Action known to violate security policy. 
Rootkit A collection of programs an attacker may install in the embedding stage of an intrusion. The 
programs may: 
• hide the attacker's activity, including network connections and processes: 
• allow the intruder backdoor access to the system: 
• collect confidential data from processes, files, or network interfaces. 
Sec also section I.4.2.G. 
Security Policy Definition of allowed activities by users on objects (including files. de\-ices. and other 
users). 
True Negative Notation for a normal event that was correctly identified as non-intrusive by an in­
trusion detection system. 
True Positive Notation for an actual intrusive event that was correctly identified as intrusive by an 
intrusion detection system. 
Vulnerability .A. weakness in a system that allows actions contrary to the security policy. 
1.7 Thesis Statement and Outline 
I.s it possible to build a distributed agent-based system for intrusion detection based on sound 
fngineeriiig techniques for misuse detection and machine learning techniques for anomaly detection? 
Prior work in intrusion detection has examined misuse and anomaly detection in both monolithic 
and distributed systems. This work applies mobile agent technology- to provide a distributed intrusion 
detection system operating within a distributed computing system. A portion of the work targeted 
the addition of intelligent anomaly detection agents into the system. Other parts of the work develop 
engineering-based requirements and design specifications for the distributed agent-based system based 
on temporal aspects of intrusions. 
Chapter 2 reviews related intrusion detection systems and algorithms and discusses differences from 
oiH" work. 
Chapter 3 introduces the intrusion detection system based on mobile agents. An overview of agent 
systems is given, and arguments for using mobile agents for intrusion detection are presented. 
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Chapter 4 shows the use of a feature vector representation to describe the system calls executed by 
privileged processes. A rule learning algorithm is used to induce rules that can be used to monitor the 
system for anomalies. The performance of the rule learning algorithm on this task with and without 
feature subset selection using a genetic algorithm is examined. Feature subset selection is shou-n to 
.significantly reduce the number of features used while impro\-ing the accuracy of predictions. 
Chapter 5 examines the use of Software Fault Tree Analysis to model intrusions and develop re­
quirements specifications for the intrusion detection system. 
Chapter 6 introduces Colored Petri Nets (CPXs) for intrusion detection systems. CPXs are a 
well-documented and well-used abstraction used for modeling complex and distributed systems. CPXs 
provide a convenient model for describing the gathering, classification, and correlation acti\-ities of 
an intrusion detection system. CPXs appear to provide a clean design upon which to base further 
flevelopmerit of our agent-based IDS. 
Chapter 7 integrates the Software Fault Tree-based requirements. Colored Petri Xet-based design, 
and mobile agent implementation of an intrusion detection system. 
Chapter S offers conclusions and ideas for future work. 
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2 RELATED WORK 
This chapter describes intrusion detection systems and algorithms that are related to the mobile 
agents intrusion detection system. None of the related intrusion detection systems use a distributed 
Colored Petri Net. combine anomaly detection ^^^th misuse detection, or develop a requirements model 
for intrusion detection. 
2.1 Intrusion Detection System Architectures 
Related system architectures for intrusion detection systems include CIDF and DIDS. 
2.1.1 Common Intrusion Detection Framework 
The Conmion Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) [ir2| resembles our project's architecture. 
CIDF is a standard proposed by a group including the Information Technology Office of the Defense 
.\dvancod Re.search Projects .A.gency, University of California-Davis. Information Sciences Institute. 
Odyssey Research, and others. 
.A-t the bottom layer, the CIDF reconnai.ssance agents correspond to our data gathering agents. In 
the middle, the CIDF analysis agents correspond to our low-level agents. At the top layer, the CIDF 
decision-response agents correspond to our high-level agents. The similarity of our prototype system to 
the CIDF model and the flexibility of the Common Intrusion Specification Language (CISL) (37| should 
lend itself to integration with other CIDF-compatible systems when the need arises. 
2.1.2 Distributed Intrusion Detection System 
The Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) of the University of California-Davis |96| uses a 
combination of host monitors and local area network monitors to monitor system and network activities. 
.A. centralized director aggregates information from the monitors to detect intrusions. 
DIDS is similar to our agent system for intrusion detection and countermeasures in that it uses 
multiple monitors and artificial intelligence algorithms to determine the severity of events. DIDS differs 
from our system in that the intelHgence is purely centralized, and DIDS does not make use of any agent 
technology. 
2.2 Graph-based Models 
Related graph based modeling techniques and implementations of intrusion detection systems, in­
cluding GrIDS. MuSigs. IDIOT, ajid Specification-based ID. are briefly reviewed. 
2.2.1 Graph-Based Intrusion Detection System 
The Graph-Based Intrusion Detection System (GrIDS) developed at the University of California-
Davis dynamically builds graphs describing network activity by applying user-defined rules to audit 
data [12.3]. In GrIDS graphs, nodes represent hosts or aggregations of hosts and edges represent net­
work activity. Rather than building a single graph including all system activity, individual graphs are 
niaintaineti by nde sots. Each rule set matches certain events from the network audit trail and either 
builds a new graph or adjusts an existing graph. Rule sets may also combine graphs and raise ederts 
when suspicious patterns are discovered. 
The motivating example given by the GrIDS designers is the graphical model of a worm such as the 
.Morris Worm [.36(. .\s the worm spreads through systems, a tree-shaped graph would be developed by 
GrIDS a.s in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Beginning of a worm graph, and the graph after the worm has spread [1231 
In the GrIDS approach, nodes model hosts and edges model activities. The model allows intuitive 
aggregation of nodes and edges into reduced graphs. Reduced graphs allow higher le%-el analysis and 
data sharing, resulting in a scalable design. 
GrIDS dctects violations of security policy, and as such is inherently a misuse detection system. 
36 
However, it should be possible to extend the graphical model to select objects and events to analyze 
for anomalies. 
Our specification and design is not limited to modeling communication patterns in networks but 
includes the entire distributed system. Rather than directly using the graphical model, a mobile agent 
intrusion detection system is developed and implemented using graph-based models as the requirements 
and design specification. 
2.2.2 Misuse Signatures 
The .Adaptable Real-time Misuse Detection system (.\RMD) developed at George Mason University 
represents misuses as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) [TS]. .A-bstract events are represented by nodes 
in a graph. Edges in a graph represent the ordering of inter-event rules satisfied by the nodes. Nodes 
are selected for the grapli by intra-event rules. The inter- and intra-event rules together define misuse 
signatures (named MuSigs). If a graph is built such that a sink node has an edge to it. an intrusion is 
detected. 
Unlike the object event model used by GrIDS. MuSig graphs are not amenable to aggregation. Edges 
in a .\IuSig graph only mean a predicate has been satisfied; edges then have no \-aluos or attributes 
that can be aggregated. Nodes in a MuSig graph correspond to specific events: aggregation of events 
seems to he a difficult proposition in the absence of structured methods to aggregate the attributes 
a.s.sociated with the events. Finalh". MuSig graphs can not be used for anomaly detection since by 
dofinition a MuSig graph detects a misuse intrusion. Thus, the GrIDS-style object event model seems 
more powerful for general misuse and anomaly intrusion modeling. 
Our CPN models allow for aggregation through unification of tokens and also allows for anomaly 
detection. Our intrusion detection system is developed using the CPN for the design specification, so 
our IDS does not need to implement matching of graphs. Our SFT.A. approach models intrusions, not 
irurusioii detection. 
2.2.3 Intrusion Detection In Our Time 
Kumar and Spafford developed a \'ariant of CPNs for misuse detection [C3| at Purdue, which imple­
ments pattern matching for intrusion detection. Intrusion Detection In Our Time (IDIOT). Kumar's 
intrusion detection system, implemented CPNs with modifications. Kumar eliminated concurrency, 
removed local condition \-ariables at transitions, added start and final states, and added im-ariant 
conditions to patterns [62|. IDIOT used a custom language to describe patterns. To improve the 
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computational complexity of direct execution of CPNs. \-arious optimizations were used to reduce the 
computational effort involved in matching audit data to patterns. 
Our IDS is developed using the CPN as a design specification rather than a direct execution of a 
CPX. ^\e define a transformation from the CPNs to the implementation of the software agent intrusion 
detection system that preserves the CPN semantics. Our IDS also operates in a distributed environment 
using an agent-based approach. After modeling intrusions using SFT.A.. we use CPNs for modeling 
intrusion detection. Our CPNs are hierarchical and composable. and they model stages of attacks and 
are traccable to SFT-based requirements. 
2.2.4 Specification-based Intrusion Detection 
Sekiir et al. at SUNY-Stonybrook have used state machine models of protocols for intrusion detection 
[121]. Their intrusion detection system detects anomalies when transition frequencies in a state machine 
exceed normal (Iccirned) frequencies. Rather than modeling intrusive activity, their technique models 
all possible behaviors of a system. Their technique is oriented to anomaly detection. 
Our CPN-based IDS handles both anomaly and misuse intrusions. It is not limited to a particular 
algorithm, so it could make use of the state-transition approach to anomaly detection as well as other 
iuiornaly detection algorithms. 
2.3 Agent-based Intrusion Detection 
Projects closely related to our intrusion detection project include .JAM. .AAFID. and IDAS. 
2.3.1 Java Agents for Meta-Learning 
The .Java .\gents for Meta-Learning (.I.A.M) project at Columbia University [124] is the most similar 
to our agent system for intrusion detection and countermeasures. .J.\M uses intelligent, distributed Java 
agents to learn models of fraud and intrusive behavior. The data mining aspects of .J.A.M are discussed 
separately in section 2.4.1. 
Our project differs from .J.A.M in our use of mobile agents for intrusion detection. Our project also 
is looking at countermeasures that could be used to combat intrusions. 
2.3.2 Autonomous Agents for Intrusion Detection 
The A.\FID group at Purdue's CERI.\S has prototyped an agent-based intrusion detection system. 
Their paper analyzes the agent-based approach to intrusion detection and mentions the prototype work 
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that has been done on AAFID [5j. 
Our project differs from AAFID in that we are using data mining to detect intrusions on multiple 
components, emphasizing the use of learning algorithms in intrusion detection, and using mobile agents. 
-A.AFID is implemented in Perl while our system is implemented in .Ja\-a. 
2.3.3 Intrusioa Detection Agent System 
The Intrusion Detection .Agent system at the Information-Technology- Promotion .Agency in .Japan 
watches for suspected intrusions, traces information related to the suspected intrusion, and determines 
whether an intrusion actually took place [4|. 
Our agent-based system shares data between agents to determine whether an intrusion has taken 
place. Our agents arc continually collecting and monitoring information, rather than dispatching an 
investigator (tracing) agent after a suspicious event is noticed. 
2.4 Machine Learning and Data Mining Approaches to Intrusion Detection 
Machine learning and data mining for intrusion detection projects include .I.AM. Computer Irn-
tiumology. and temporal sequence learning. 
2.4.1 Java Agents for Meta-Learning 
The .Java .Agents for Meta-Learning (.J.AM) project at Columbia University [r24| uses intelligent. 
di.stributed .Ja\-a agents and data mining to learn models of fraud and intrusive behavior. The .J.AM 
project e.xpanded on the work done by Forrest's group [41| to detect intrusions on privileged programs. 
Like the .J.AM project, we apply the data mining approach to intrusion detection but use a different 
data representation that provides a single signature for each process. 
Our project differs from .I.AM in that we are concentrating on data mining within an organization. 
The .I.AM Project seemed to focus on data mining over multiple organizations. 
2.4.2 Computer Immunology 
The Computer Immunology project at the University of Xew Mexico (40| explored designs of intru­
sion detection systems based on animal immune systems. One portion of the project developed a sense 
of •"self for security-related computer programis by creating a databsise of normal system call traces 
from instances of e.xecution of the programs [41|. This sense of self can be used to detect intrusions 
by comparing execution traces of processes to the database of system call traces. Work that is more 
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reccnt used a \'ariety of approaches to detect intrusions using system call traces from several different 
privileged programs [132]. 
In general, the Computer Immunolog>' project differs from our project by focusing on individual 
agents rather than sharing data between agents and feeding the data into a data warehouse. In our 
specific application of intrusion detection using system calls, we do not attempt to develop a sense of 
.self but instead concentrate on developing rules to check a particular program's execution trace for 
anomalies. We assume knowledge of the identify of the program being traced and apply a rule set 
learned for that particular program. 
2.4.3 Temporal Sequence Learning 
Terrance Lane at Purdue University developed a data mining algorithm for anomaly detection called 
Temporal Sequence Learning [65|. an instance-based learning technique. Temporal Sequence Learning 
was applied to the shell commands executed b%- users to leam profiles that can distinguish between 
normal and anomalous sequences of commands. 
Lane's algorithm would be a candidate for inclusion in our agent-based system as another data 
mining agent. However, we have concentrated on rule-learning algorithms operating on feature vectors 
built from lists of system calls executed by privileged programs. 
2.5 Summary 
Related prior work performed on intrusion detection s\'stem architectures, models for intrusion 
detection, and agent-based IDSs was briefly examined and contrasted with our mobile agent intrusion 
detection system. Over\-iews were also given of influential machine learning and data mining projects 
dealing with anomaly intrusion detection. 
-After this point, the dissertation will deal with our work performed. First, the use of mobile agents in 
an IDS will be considered, including the use of dynamic aggregation for extending agent capabilities and 
communicating between agents. Then, an anomaly detection technique using a "bag of words"-inspired 
representation combined with the RIPPER rule learning algorithm will be detailed. Modeling intrusions 
using Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) will be e.xplored. and modeling intrusion detection using 
Colored Petri Nets (CPN) will also be examined. Finalh\ the connections between SFT.\. CPN. and 
the agent implementation of the IDS will be shown. 
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3 MOBILE INTELLIGENT AGENTS FOR INTRUSION DETECTION 
The multi-agents intrusion detection model is based on the idea of distributed knowledge networks. 
The model makes use of the following layers: 
• User Interface and Feedback 
• Data Warehousing 
• Data Fusion and Aggregate Classification ic Data Mining 
• Data Gathering. Base Classification, and Basic Data Mining 
• Data Cleaning and Formatting 
This modular and extensible approach to building a s\-stem helps solve the complex problems in an in­
trusion detection system. It divides the problem into the problem of infonnation retrie\'al. classification, 
collaboration, and compilation. Agents have been developed for our system that retrieve information 
from distributed systems, classifies the data (either using embedded expert rules or machine learn­
ing techniques), and stores the data in a database. The fundamental design of the department-level 
intrusion detection system is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
At the bottom of the tiered architecture, the system log routers and system activity agents read 
log files and monitor the operation of the systems. The routers feed into the distributed data cleaning 
agents which previously registered their interest in particular events. Targeted data cleaning agents 
process data obtained from the routers and activity agents. They render the data into common data 
formats. 
In the middle of the architecture, the low level, mobile agents form the first line of intrusion detection. 
They periodically travel to each of their associated data cleaning agents, obtain the recently-gleaned 
information, and classify the data to determine whether singular intrusions have occurred. 
The low level agents are managed by mediators which control the systems visited by tlie agents. 
ol>tain the classified data from the agents, and route the data into the local database and to the user 
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Figure 3.1 Original architecture of the Mobile Agents Intrusion Detection System 
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interface. As the system is developed, the mediators will apply data mining algorithms to the data in 
the database to conncct individual events into a cohesive viev\- of the elements involved in an attack. 
Our implementation of the system currently includes: 
• Static data gathering agents that mine information from system logs, audit data, and operational 
statistics and render the information in a common format: 
• Low level agents that monitor and classify ongoing activities, classify events, and pass on their 
information to mediators: 
• Facets for the low level agents that add cooperation to the agents: 
• Data mining agents that use machine learning to acquire predictive rules for intrusion detection 
from system logs and audit data. 
.A.S we further develop the system, multiple departmental-level systems can be monitored. Data ware­
housing can bo used to combine the knowledge and data from the individual departments into an 
organization-wide view of attacks. The agent system of Figure 3.1 is targeted to run at the departmen­
tal level of an organization. To provide entorpri.se-wide information about intrusions, the data from 
each departmental agent system will feed into a data warehouse as shown in Figure 3.2. 
TTT 
Data 
Warehouse 
Figure 3.2 Enterprise data warehouse for intrusion detection 
43 
Bccausc the data warehouse will provide a global view of the intrusion detection systems, it supports 
nor only rho identification of attacks but also; 
• helps administrators discover new attacks. 
• trains system administrators about how attacks are mounted on their systems, and 
• identifies weak points in the enterprise information systems. 
3.1 Agent Systems 
Software agents consist of program code state and exist to perform tasks on behalf of a user with 
some degree of autonomy. software agent's goal may require some degree of intelligence, allowing 
it to react to its environment, make plans to achieve its goal, maximize its utility, and or modify its 
behavior over time [501. Software agents may use mobility to travel to sources of data and remotely 
execute their tasks, resulting in a natural distribution of work and reduced communication overhead. 
number of agent infrastructures exist to support agent systems. Generally, agents infrastructures 
provide agent servers, agent interfaces, and agent brokers. .A.gents servers may provide mobility and 
authentication, .\gent interfaces are used by application programs to create and communicate with 
agents. .A.gcnt brokers provide naming and location services. The prototype mobile agent intrusion 
detection system has been built in the .Ia\7i language using tlie \byager Object Request Broker [101|. 
\byager provides the mobility, interfacing, and naming services needed to implement the agents in the 
IDS. Research work is being performed on secured agent systems, such as the SMART agent system 
[13.3|. 
3.2 Motivation for Using Distributed Mobile Agents 
Di.stributed mobile autonomous agents solve several critical problems in intrusion detection and 
provide a general architecture for adding and integrating "components" into the system. Monolithic, 
centralized systems liave several faults which may be overcome by the use of a distributed architecture 
l53j[o4l. 
Network intrusion detectors typically use single sensors attached to network segments. However, 
local area networks have moved towards switched architectures which do not broadcast unicast frames 
to all network segments. Centralized sensors will miss traffic on segments to which the sensor is not 
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attached in a switched environment. Distributed agents solve this problem by monitoring network 
activity at each host. 
Network intrusion detectors also have problems with high data rates. Centralized systems may 
miss packets under heavy load situations on Fast or Gigabit Ethernet networks. Distributed agents 
distribute the processing effort between the networked systems and likely would improve the chances 
that intrusions will be detected that would be missed by a centralized IDS. 
The modular architecture of the agent-based intrusion detection system allows for the integration 
of intrusion detection components from other projects. For example, the SNORT network intrusion 
detection system [113] is a small, fast, low-overhead sensor that watches for network packets that match 
signatures. The agent-based intrusion detection system can incorporate SNORT and provide network 
misuse detection at each host. Likewise, various small programs detect specific intrusions such as port 
scanning, broadcast pings (smurfs). logins at unusual times, and changes to files. These can be included 
in the distributed intrusion detection system via wrapper agents. 
.•\ centralized or centrally-governed intrusion detection system provides a single point of failure 
;ind a single target for an attack. The distributed agent architecture avoids a central point of failure. 
.-\.utononious agents may continue operating despite the failure of other agent servers or other failures 
in a system, which avoids the compromise of the entire IDS even if one component fails or is attacked 
[S4|. .Mobile agents also may be capable of erading attackers and resurrecting themselves if killed. 
-A. distributed agent-based intrusion detection system helps solve spatial problems in intrusion de­
tection. where more than one host is involved in an intrusion. For example, in an "FTP bounce" attack, 
an attacker may use an anonymous FTP server on one host to spoof a command to a remote shell 
on the target host. Agents on both the anonymous FTP server and the target host could detect the 
spatially-separate events in the attack and correlate the events in near real-time. 
Kumar [C2| lists shortcomings of intrusion detection systems. \'iewed in a different way. the short­
comings provide a list of desirable features in an intrusion detection system. 
Generic Architecture. The Common Intrusion Detection Framework [102] (CIDF) specifies a generic 
architecture for an intrusion detection system and classifies the components of an intrusion de­
tection system. .A system of distributed mobile agents implements the intrusion detection system 
in a flexible way compatible with the CTDF architecture. 
Efficiency. A distributed multi-agent system obtains audit data at the appropriate levels of the dis­
tributed system and distributes the information processing and intrusion detection effort. 
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Portability. Intrusion detection systems have tended to be developed with an orientation to an orga­
nization's security policy. Differences in security policies between organizations result in a lack of 
portability of an intrusion detection system. In a different sense, portability of the intrusion de­
tection system with respect to operating systems and computer architecture is also an issue. Perl 
and .Java, two interpreted languages, have been used to provide portability for intrusion detection 
systems- .A..A.FID [o] and our own project. MAIDS, are two such IDSs. 
Upgradability. .\n intrusion detection system based on a component-beised architecture such as that 
available in an agent-based system satisfies the upgradabilit\' and enhancement concern. New 
features can easily be added to such a system. 
Maintenance. Maintaining and updating the learned knowledge used by components of an intrusion 
detection system would depend on the architecture of the components. 
Performance Benchmarks. Exhaustive quantitative performance eraluations of current intrusion 
dotccfion systems in real-world en\"ironments do not exist. N'ulnerability coverage is beginning to 
he addressed by vendors with the assistance of vulnerability assessment projects, including the 
Common \'ulnerability Enumeration [82|. 
Testing. Kumar claimed, "there is no easy way to test intrusion detection systems." (62. page 35| 
The MIT Lincoln Labs intrusion detection evaluation [76| was one of the first major tests of 
research intrusion detection systems. .Attacks remain difficult to simulate, effectiveness of systems 
is difficult to e%-aluate without operating them under real world loads, and significant tuning and 
expertise tends to be necessary to operate systems. 
The multi-agent intrusion detection system is similar to other intrusion detection systems in that 
its effectiveness would need to be demonstrated in real-world settings. 
3.3 Lightweight Agents 
.\gent systems with lightweight agent support allow nmtinie addition of new capabilities to agents. 
This section explains the addition of agent collaboration to the system by dynamicalU* adding capabil-
itie.s to lightweight agents. 
We call the small, minimal agents lightweight because the agents implement a minimum of function­
ality. as opposed to heavyweight agents that include all functions that may ever be needed. Compared 
to heavyweight agents, lightweight agents are: 
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• Smaller: 
• Simpler: 
• Faster to transport (due to their smaller size): 
• Dynamically updatable and upgradable. 
Dynamic aggregation allowed us to add collaboration capabilities to the lightweight mobile agents and 
quickly add new features to the system. Our particular use of dynamic aggregation allows the agents in 
our intrusion detection system to inform each other about intrusive activity. Each agent uses dynamic 
aggregation to manage its sensitivity level. The sensitivity level determines how sensitive an agent is to 
event.s which may not be considered intrusive under normal circumstances but which can be intrusive 
in the presence of related intrusions. .A.n example of the sensitivity issue is the problem of failed login 
attempts. .A. few login failures on a single host may be normal, such as when a user forgets her password. 
However, when an attacker lias identified a target host (perhaps by portscanning. which is considered 
intru.sive by our system), he may connect to the target host and trj- a few typical passwords. In this 
ca.sc. a loose temporal relation exists between the first event (portscanning) and the second event (failed 
login attempts), .\gent sensitivity levels can provide a real-time correlation of related intrusions while 
allowing normal, individual events to pass without triggering alarms. 
3.3.1 Adding Agent Capabilities with Dynamic Aggregation 
Dynamic aggregation of objects offers three benefits [101]. 
• The behavior of a binary-only object may be extended. 
• .An object may be customized in specific ways. 
• .An object's behavior may be e.xtended at runtime, in ways that need not be specified at compile 
time. 
To this list of benefits we add; 
• .An object is as small as it can be until new functionality is needed. 
The \bvager terminology- for objects used in dj'namic aggregation is 'facets", \byager defines a primary 
object and its facets to be an "aggregate" that is managed as a single unit. \byager's facet selection 
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rules conveniently select a facet implementation tailored to a particular object. This allows specific 
customization of an object. 
\byagor selects an implementation of a facet based on the name of the facet and the class name 
of the primary object. When a facet of a particular class is requested, \byager searches for a facet 
that implements an interface by the facet class's name with an I prefixed. For example, if the facet 
by the name of AFacet were requested. Voyager would search for a class that implements the interface 
lAFacet. 
\'oyagor searches objects for implementations of the facet's interface using the name of the primary-
objort siifBxrd by the name of the facet. If a matching implementation is not found, \byager searches 
using the primary object's superclasses. For example, if the primary- object were of the class aClass 
(which extends ja\-a.lang.Object) and the facet AFacet were requested. \'oyager would first look for a 
facet named aClassAFacet. then for ObjectAFacet, and finailly AFacet. 
When X'oyager looks for an implementation for the facet, it searches the primary- object's package 
and the facet's package. 
3.3.2 Use of Dynamic Aggregation 
Intelligent agents in the Multi-.-\gents Intrusion Detection System are lightweight in that they are 
oriented towards gathering and classifying data. The low-level agents themselves communicate directly 
only to their related data gathering agents and mediators. .Adding low-level agent communication in the 
IDS allows agents to fuse related data in real time and take ad\-antage of knowledge about the security 
statu.s of related components in the system. Dynamic aggregation provides a convenient way of adding 
comnumication between low-level agents without adding excess baggage to the agents themselves. 
Inter-agent communication was implemented by the use of sensitivity facets as an aggregate to the 
low-level agents. Sensitivity facets area family of objects that communicate intrusion information among 
themselves and use information about related intrusions to affect future decisions about intrusions. 
The i.ssue of failed attempts to login provides a good example of how the sensitivity facets are used. 
.A. few failed logins in a distributed system are expected as users tend to forget passwords, try wrong 
passwords on the wrong systems or mistype as they try to login. However, in the face of an attack, 
a few failed logins may signal the next step in an intrusion as the attacker tries commonly-used or 
default passwords after having identified systems that allow virtual terminal or file transfer connections 
from the network. The failed logins sensiti\-ity facets listen for network connection events from unusual 
sources (which occur as the attacker identifies her targets), remember these events, and increase their 
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sensitivity to failed logins for a period of time. 
.A.gent collaboration in the IDS was not developed until after the agents had been designed, devel­
oped. and tested. Dynamic aggregation provided a way in which the agents could be extended without 
having to overload an agent with new features. However, the agents needed a bit of redesign to ac­
commodate the sensitivity facets. Each adjustment facet must integrate itself into its primary agent to 
affect decisions on whether events are intrusive. The agents were modified to provide newly-obtained 
events to a listener (namely, the adjustment facet) for adjustment of the event's intrusion classification. 
The agents were also modified to notify a listener (the reporting facet) if an event was determined to 
bo intrusive. This adjustment to the agent architecture makes the agents much more flexible and open 
to future enhancement by aggregation. 
The reporting facets were designed to broadcast intrusion messages from their primary agent to 
other interested facets. The adjustment facets listen for intrusion messages from the reporting facets. 
Fisure 3.3 illustrates the flow of information between the agents and facets. 
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3.3.3 Communication in the IDS 
.Auditing information is exchanged between agents using subclasses of an .A.udit class. The .Audit 
class provides methods for serializing an audit object in a table of keys and values, deserializing an audit 
object, storing an audit object in a database, and obtaining an audit object from a database. Subclasses 
of the .Audit chuss fully describe events like logins, changes to important files, network connections, and 
processes executed. Low-level agents obtain audit objects from data gathering agents and apply the 
first level of intrusion detection, using artificial intelligence or expert rules. .Audit objects are passed 
vertically through the IDS (see Figure 3.1). 
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Intrusion information is exchanged between facets using descriptive strings in ASX.l syntax. In 
tlic style advocated by Tim Bass [6|, a small management information base (MIB) was designed to 
encapsulate information about intrusions. The MIB allows the low-level agents to communicate intru­
sion information at a higher, more abstract level suid describe more knowledge about the intrusion. .A. 
sample of the .A.SN.1 hierarchy of intrusions follows. 
host hitrusions identified on a host computer 
host.priv_prog Intrusions against a privileged program 
host.auth Intrusions related to authentication 
net Intrusions related to network serv'ices 
net.ip Intrusions via the IP network protocol 
net.ip.icmp Intrusions via the ICMP protocol 
net.ip.udp Intrusions via the UDP protocol 
net.ip.udp.service=nfs Intrusions via NFS 
net.ip.tcp Intrusions via the TCP protocol 
net.ip.tcp.service=Iogin Intrusions via the rlogin protocol 
Listeners ciin register interest in any portion of the hierarchy by specifying a prefix. For e.xampie. a 
list oner could register the prefix net.ip.tcp to listen for all TCP-related intrusions. 
3.3.4 Communicating between Facets 
The intrusions detected by each agent in the IDS were examined for related intrusions. Examples 
of such relations are shown in table 3.1. 
Roj)orting facets were constructed to encode intrusion information in the MIB described previously 
and send the reports to interested facets, .\djusting facets encode the relationships between intrusions 
by registering interest in related intrusions. .-Vdjustment facets interpret the received intrusion messages 
to affect their sensitivity level and use their sensitivity level to adjust intrusion classifications of events 
via their related low-level agent. 
3.3.5 Implementation 
In the following sections, the o%-eralI implementation of the prototype IDS is discussed. Then, tiie 
implementation of dynamic aggregation to add communications between agents is presented. 
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Table 3.1 Agents and their related intrusions 
Agent Related Intrusion Rationale 
Untrusted 
Connections: 
NetTCP 
.\ttack on network daemon: 
Changed configuration file 
.Attacker will often attempt to login via 
the network after attacking a network 
daemon or changing a configuration file 
Critical Files .Attack on network daemon: NFS .Attacker may change a critical file to en­
able further attacks 
Failed Logins Port scanning -Attacker may scan a\-ailable network 
ports to find machines on which to try to 
login 
3.3.6 IDS Implementation 
The prototype IDS has been implemented using Sun's .Java Development Kit (.IDK) version 1.1 
[12o| and ObjectSpace's X'oyager Object Request Broker version 3 [101|. 
•Java was chosen as the development language because of its platform independence, security, and 
speed of development. .Ia%-a's platform independence has allowed us to compile and execute completely 
shared code on any one of several platforms including Silicon Graphic's IRIX and Hewlett-Packard's 
HP-UX commercial operating systems and free operating systems including FreeBSD and Linux. .Ia\-a"s 
security features include sandboxes for executing untrusted code, strict typing, bounds checking, byte-
code verification, and code signing. Ja\-a's strict typing and object orientation assisted development by 
enforcing structure, allowing the addition of functionality by extending existing objects, and reducing 
time needed for debugging as compared to projects of similar complexity that have been implemented 
in the C language. 
The runtime performance of Java code is a concern, but has not been an obstacle to the IDS project. 
The performance has been sufficient to demonstrate operation of the prototype IDS. When additional 
performance has been roc[uired. .lust-In-Time (.IIT) compilers that compile .Ja\-a byte code into native 
machine code have satisfied the reciuirements. 
The X'oyager O'oject Request Broker was chosen for the prototype IDS because of its availability, 
devflopiiient in .Java as its native language, and support for mobile agents. X'oyager provides mobility, 
message p;issing (independent of the target object's location), and naming services for .Java objects, all 
of which are necessary for our prototype IDS. \'oyager also supports extending lightweight agents via 
dynamic aggregation, or facets. Facets allow us to add capabilities to IDS agents, including agent com­
munication and collaboration. We could also dynamically add countermeasures capabilities to agents. 
This would allow a running IDS system to adapt to ne%v attacks by implementing new countermeasures. 
The bottom tier of agents in the IDS is the set of stationary data cleaning agents. The stationarj-
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agents obtain information from sources including system logs, audit data, and operational statistics. 
The stationary agents convert the information into a common format for use by the higher levels of 
agents. 
.A.n example of a stationary agent is the DGFailedLoginAgent. which reads the system logs for 
reports of failed logins. It parses failed login messages from the system log into Login objects which 
describe when the failed login took place, which user account was used, and which computers were 
involved in the failed login. 
The middle tier of agents in the IDS is the set of low level agents. Low level agents are mobile agents 
that gather information from the stationary- agents. Low level agents process the gathered information 
to monitor and classify events. Low level agents then pass on the information to their mediator. 
.A.n e.xample of a low level agent is the FailedLoginAgent. which visits each host's DGFailedLogin 
Agent to retrieve the recent list of failed logins. If the number of failed logins in the entire distributed 
.system exceeds a threshold in a short period of time, the failed logins are flagged as an attempted 
imru.sion. 
The prototype detects intrtisions including attempts at trying multiple passwords on multiple ma­
chines. unusual TCP network connections, changes in critical files (with the assistance of Tripwire [5S|). 
attacks against the sendmail mail transfer agent, and refused connections to unsafe network services. 
Note, however, that the flow of information in this design is purely vertical (in terms of Figure 3.1) 
and agents at each level are not cooperating or coordinating with each other. The existing low-level 
agents arc then considered "lightweight" in the view that they do not have the capability to communicate 
directly with each other. 
3.3.7 Adding cooperation to the agents 
Sensitivity facets were created to add communications capabilities to the low-level agents. The 
Sensitivity facets implement the adjustment and intrusion reporting functions shown in Figure 3.3. 
Mediators construct agents and attach Sensitivitj- facets to agents. The Sensitivity facets implement 
the reporting and adjusting functions described in Section 3.3.3. .A.s agents gather information, the 
information is passed through the Sensitivity facets for reporting and adjusting. 
The interface ISensitivity was defined with the methods: 
register() To subscribe to events in the associated agent. 
setlntrusionClasses() To subscribe to interesting intrusions from other agents. 
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getSensitivity() To obtain the current sensitivity level. 
sendlntrusionHessageO To publish messages about intrusions, and 
recvIntrusionHessageC) Through which intrusion messages are received by the facet. 
-A. default implementation of the interface. Sensitivity, was created. The registerO method imple­
mentation subscribes to all events seen by its attached agent. The setlntrusionClassesO method im­
plementation defines which intrusions are interesting to this facet. The getSensitivity () method im­
plementation returns an indicator of how sensitive the facet is to suspicious events. The sendlntrusion 
Message() method implementation publishes information about an intrusive event to other listening 
Sensitivity facets. The recvIntrusionMessageO method implementation receives messages about 
intrusive events from other Sensitivity facets and adjusts the facet's sensiti\*ity level based on the sig­
nificance of the event. 
Figure 3.4 shows a slice of the intrusion detection system with Sensitivity facets included. A 
specific Sensitivity facet. NetTCPAgentSensitivity. extends the basic Sensitivity facet to listen 
for intrusive activity including changes to files and buffer overflow attacks. If other agents report 
these intrusive activities, the sensitivity of the NetTCPAgent should be raised since the target may 
receive anomalous TCP connections in the near future which may be part of the intrusion. Because of 
\byager's rules for attaching facets to an agent, when a Sensitivity facet is added to the NetTCPAgent, 
the NetTCPAgentSensitivity facet is added to the NetTCPAgent. 
The FailedLoginAgentSensitivity facet listens for intrusive activity reports from the NetTCPAgent. 
If the NetTCPAgent were to sense activity such as scanning for aN-ailable telnet ports, the FailedLogin 
AgentSensitivity facet will raise is level of suspicion. .\n intruder may scan for a\-ailable telnet ports, 
then connect to the discovered telnet ports and trj- to login to well-known accounts with typicaily-used 
pa.ssword.s. If this were to happen, the FailedLoginAgentSensitivity facet would help detect the 
attack by lowering the threshold of acceptable failed logins. 
3.3.8 Results 
Intrusion events should be infrequent, so the intrusion detection system should rarely require the 
scn.sitivity capability. By only adding the sensitivity capability when it is required, the load on the 
network and speed of transmission of the agents is much better in the normal case. 
In particular, the .Ja\-a byte-compiled code for the FailedLoginAgent class is a total of 5665 bytes 
(2298 - 3367). The byte-compiled code for the FailedLoginAgentSensitivity class is a total of 5547 
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bytes (1540 - 4007). Permanently adding the sensitivity capability to the FailedLoginAgent would 
iacrca.sc the size of the agent by 969c. Considering only the size of the code, the FailedLoginAgent is 
roughly half the size without the sensitivity facet as it would be with the sensitivity facet. .\t a constant 
transmission rate, the time to transmit the lightweight agent by itself is about half the time required 
to transmit the agent with the facet. 
The savings are less dramatic for the NetTCPAgent. The Ja\-a byte-compiled code for the NetTCPAgent 
class is a total of 7434 bytes (4067 — 3367). The byte-compiled code for the NetTCPAgentSensitivity 
class is a total of 4493 bytes (486 — 4007). Permanently adding the sensitivity capability to the 
NetTCPAgent would increase its size by 60%. 
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Figure 3.4 .A. portion of the intrusion detection system with facets 
3.3.9 Conclusions 
Extending lightweight agents provides a convenient mechanism for implementing a new form of 
communication in our intrusion detection .system. By developing facets that implemented listening and 
reporting fimctions. a significant new feature was added to the IDS without negatively affecting the 
existing agent design or operation. Operation of the system is improved in the normal case, since the 
load on the system due to the size of the agents is reduced when no intrusions are present. 
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3.3.10 Future Work 
Extension of agents offers many possibilities for extending the intrusion detection system. .A. potential 
uso for liglitweight agent capabilities would be to add data mining capabilities to mediators in the 
hitrusion detection system. .A. group of facets could be constructed that implement \7irious data mining 
algorithms. Mediators could then dynamically add data mining algorithms for higher-level intrusion 
detection by adding appropriate facets. 
Tho [jrototype MIB for intrusions should be formalized based on a taxonomy of intrusions. Using 
cho .A.SX.1 syntax for describing intrusions seems to hold promise for integration of intrusion detection 
systems and conmiunication between intrusion detection agents. .Also, relationships between intrusions 
.should bo formally identified and encoded into facets. The prototype table of intrusion relationships 
\v;i.s a first step in developing our sensitivity facets. Previous intrusion detection systems encoded these 
relationships as rules in an expert system [96]. Using agents and facets seems to offer a more dynamic, 
malleable way to deal with these relationships than encoding rules in an expert system. 
.An extension of the IDS system may be possible by using facets to implement data fusion to identify 
the source of an intrusion in real time. Some attacks identify the source IP address of the attacker, and 
at iime.s even more information may be gathered from the source that help determine the identity of 
the attacker. 
.A possible further extension using facets would be to implement countermeasures to respond to 
intrusions. Facets could be designed that fuse intrusion information in real time. When the fused 
information meets certain criteria, the facets could direct the monitored system to take corrective 
or deff^nsive action to deter or stop the intrusion. If the source of the intrusion is known (by the 
identification facets previously mentioned), countermeasures may be possible to prevent further attacks. 
Because facets are aggregated with their agents, the countermeasures facets would be operating on the 
system on which the actions would need to be executed. No additional communications overhead would 
he required to send commands to the target system to counter an attack. 
4 LEARNING PREDICTIVE RULES FOR INTRUSION DETECTION 
In tliis chapter, the design of a system call intrusion detector for the agent-based intrusion detection 
system is presented. We then explain our research in the application of artificial intelligence to the 
problem of identifying misuse of privileged programs. The Computer Immunology.' project [41| and 
the Java .Agents for Meta-Learning project [67] explored the use of s\-stem call traces from privileged 
programs to detect intrusions. We use a feature vector approach to describe the system calls e.xecuted 
by a privileged program. We show that our feature vector representation works well for automated 
knowledge discovery using rule learning. We then employ feature subset selection using a genetic 
algorithm to reduce the number of features necessarj- in the feature vector tmd to improve the accuracy 
of the results by eliminating extraneous features. 
4.1 Rule Learning from System Call Traces 
Programs that provide network services in distributed computing systems often execute with special 
privileges. For example, the popular sendmail m£iil transfer agent operates with superuser privileges on 
UXIX systems. Privileged programs like sendmail are often a target for intrusions. 
The trace of system calls executed by a program can identify whether an intrusion was mounted 
against a program [-ll|[G7|. Forrest's project at the University of New Mexico [4l| developed databases 
of system calls from normal and anomalous uses of privileged programs such as sendmail. Forrest's 
system call data is a set of files consisting of lines giving a process ID number (PID) and system call 
number. The files are partitioned based on whether they show behavior of normal or anomalous use of 
the? privileged sendmail program running on SunOS 4.1. 
Forrest organized system call traces into sequence windows to provide context and showed that a 
database of known good sequence windows can be developed from a reasonably sized set of non-intrusive 
.sendmail e.xecutions. Forrest then demonstrated that intrusive behavior can be determined by finding 
the percentage of system call sequences that do not match any of the known good sequences. The data 
sets that were used by Forrest's project are a\'ailable in electronic form on their Web site [39|. We use 
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the same data set to enable comparison with techniques used in related papers [67|(132|. 
Our feature vector technique improves on Forrest's technique because it does not depend on a 
thresliold percentage of abnormal sequences. Our feature vector technique compactly summarizes the 
vast data obtained from each process, enabling longer-term storage of the data for reference and analysis. 
With respect to other rule learning techniques, our approach induces a compact rule set that is easily 
carried in lightweight agents. Our technique also may mine knowledge from the data in a way that can 
bo analyzed by experts. 
Lee [67| used a portion of the data from Forrest's project to show that the RIPPER [26| learning 
algorithm could learn rules from system call sequence windows. Leo empirically found sequences of 
length 7 and 11 gave the best results in his experiments [67|. For training, each window is assigned a 
label of ""normal" if it matches one of the good windows obtained from proper operations of sendmail: 
otherwise, the window is labeled as ""abnormal". .A.n example of the system call windows and labels are 
shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Sample system call windows with training labels 
System Call Sequences Label 
4. "2. 66, 66. 4. 138. 66 Xornial 
2. 66. 66. 4. 138. 66. -5 Normal 
66. 6G. 4. 138. 66. 5. 5 Normal 
66. 4. 138. 66. 5. 5. 4 .-Abnormal 
4. 138. 66. 5. .5. 4. 39 .A.bnormaI 
.A.fter RIPPER is trained, the learned rule set is applied to the testing data to generate classifications 
for each sequence window. Lee uses a window across the classifications of length 2L + 1. where L is 
the step size for the window, to group labels {C7|. If the tmmber of ""abnormal" labels in the window 
cxceeds L. the window is considered abnormal. .\n example of a single window over the classifications 
is shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Sample system call windows with classifications 
ripper's Classification System Call Sequences Actual Label 
Normal 4. 2.66. 66. 4. 138. 66 Normal 
Normal 2. 66, 66. 4. 138. 66. b .Normal 
.A.bnormal 66. 66. 4. 138. 66. 5. 5 Normal 
.\bnormal 66. 4. 138. 66. 5. 5, 4 .\bnormal 
-Abnormal 4. 138. 66. 5. 5. 4. 39 .Abnormal 
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The window scheme filters isolated noise due to occasional prediction errors. When an intrusion 
takes place, a cluster of system call sequences will usually be classified abnormal. In Table 4.2. since 
there are more "abnormar' classifications than "Tiormal" in this window, then this entire window is 
labeled anomalous. Lee empirically found that %-alues of I, = 3 and L = o worked best for identifying 
intrusions [C7|. 
Finally, when the window has passed over all the classifications, the percentage of abnormal regions 
is obtained b.v dividing the number of anomalous windows by the total number of windows. Lee uses this 
percentage to empirically derive a threshold that separates normal processes from anomalous processes. 
Warrender [132] uses a similar technique, the Locality Frame Count (LFC). that counts the number of 
mismatches in a group and considers the group anomalous if the count exceeds a threshold. Warrender's 
technique allows intrusion detection for long-running daemons, where an intrusion could be masked by 
a large number of normal windows with Lee's technique. 
Lee [G7| developed an alternate technique that predicts one of the system calls in a sequence. The 
alternate technique allows learning of normal behavior in the absence of anomalous data. Our technique 
requires anomalous data for training. 
4.2 Representing System Call Traces with Feature Vectors 
One of the goals of automated discovery of predictive rules for intrusion detection is to extract the 
relevant knowledge in a form that lends itself to further anah'sis by human experts. .A. natural question 
that was raised by examination of the rules learned by RIPPER (26| in Lee's experiments [67| and our 
experiments [48j was whether essentially the same performance could be achieved by an alternative 
approach that induced a smaller number of simpler rules. 
To explore this question, we designed an alternative representation scheme for the data. This 
representation was inspired by the success of the "bag of words" representation of documents [11S| 
that luis been successfully used by several groups to train text classification systems {I35(. In this 
representation, each document is represented using a vector whose elements correspond to words in the 
vocabulary. In the simplest case, the vectors are binary: a bit \'alue of I indicates that the corresponding 
word appears in the document in question and bit \-alue of 0 denotes the absence of the word. 
In this experiment, the data was encoded as binary-\-alued bits in feature vectors. Each bit in the 
vector is used to indicate whether a known system call sequence appeared during the execution of a 
process. This encoding is similar in spirit to the "bag of words" representation for text documents. 
Feature vectors were computed on a per-process basis from the sendmail system call traces [SOj. 
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Ba^od on ideas from previous work [41|[67|. sequence windows of size 5 to 12 were eraluated for use 
with our feature vector approach. Sequence windows of size 7 were selected for their good performance 
in learning accuracy and relatively small dictionary size. 
The training data was composed of 80% of the feature %-ectors randomly selected from normal traces 
and all of the feature vectors from the selected abnormal traces. To compare our results to those from 
the .JAM project, four specific anomalous traces were .selected for training. Five different selections of 
anomalous traces were also tested to ensure that arbitrarily selecting these four anomalous traces did 
not significantly affect the results. 
The number of abnormal records in the training data was quite small (15 records) in proportion 
to the set of normal training data (520 records). To balance the weightings, the abnormal training 
data was duplicated 36 times so that 540 abnormal records were present in the training data. Lee [67| 
explains the rationale for balancing the data to obtain the desired results from RIPPER. From the 
feature vectors built from sequences of length 7. RIPPER efficiently learned a rule set containing seven 
.simple rules: 
good IF al406 = t 
good if a67 = t 
good if a65 = t 
good if a576 = t 
good if al32 = t 
good if al608 = t 
bad otherwise 
The size of this set of rules compares favorably to the set of 209 rules RIPPER learned when we used 
Loo's system call window approach. The feature vector approach condenses information about an entire 
process" history of execution. Feature vectors may make it easier for learning algorithms by aggregating 
information over the entire execution of a process rather than by looking at individual sequences. 
.Applying the learned rule set produced the results shown in Table 4.3. All traces except "Normal 
sendiriail" are anomalous. Boldface traces were used for training. The total numbers of feature vectors, 
numbers of vectors predicted abnormal by RIPPER, and detection results are shown. Since a single 
feature vector represents each process, each trace tends to have few feature vectors. 
The rules can not be expected to flag all of the processes in an attacked trace as an intrusion. 
While handling a mail message, sendmail spawns child processes that handle different parts of the 
59 
Table 4.3 Results of learning rules for feature vectors 
Trace Name Total Feature 
Vectors 
Vectors 
Predicted 
Abnormal 
Attack Detected? 
chasin 6 3 V 
clecodel 6 2 V 
(iecodo2 6 2 
fwd-Ioops-l 2 2 V 
f\v(i-loops-2 1 0 X 
f\vd-loops-3 2 2 V 
f\vd-loops-4 2 2 V 
f\vd-loops-5 3 2 Y 
recursive 25 23 V 
sriio65a 3 2 Y 
srnox 8 3 Y 
srndhole 3 2 Y 
sscp-1 1 1 
sscp-2 1 1 Y 
ssc{)-3 1 1 
syslog-local-1 G G Y 
,sy.slog-local-2 G G Y 
syslog-remote-1 7 1 
.syslog-remote-2 4 4 
Xorrnal sendmail (not 
used for training) 
130 3 
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prorodtires involved in receiWng. queuing, and forwarding or delivering the message. Some of these 
processes involved in handling an intnisive transaction may be indistingiiishable from processes handling 
a normal transaction because the attack only affects one of the processes. Therefore, if at leaist one 
of the processes involved in an intrusion is flagged cis abnormal, we can identify the group of related 
processes £is anomalous. 
Several attacks did not result in successful intrusions. For our intrusion detection system, we identify 
all attacks, successful and unsuccessful, as intrusive activity that merits further investigation by the 
IDS. It would be unlikely that an attacker would attempt a single exploit and give up if it fails. The 
data mining portion of our intrusion detection system would then correlate these multiple (successful 
and unsuccessful) attacks. 
The anomalous traces are clearly identified in our experiment with the exception of one of the minor 
intrusions, fwd-loops-2. The fwd-loop attacks are denial-of-service attacks where the sendmail process 
.spends its time repeatedly forwarding the same message. The feature vector technique may need to be 
adju.stod from simple binary \'3Jues to statistical measures to identify this class of attack. 
.A. benefit of the feature vector approach is the simplicity of the learned rules. Training takes place 
"off line" due to the amount of time need to learn a rule set. Each learned rule set for the sendmail 
system call feature vectors is simple: generally fewer than 10 rules, where each rule often consists of a 
conjunction of one or two Boolean terms. Such a small set of rules applied to this simple data structure 
sliould allow us to use this approach in a near real-time intrusion detection agent without placing an 
excessive load on a system. .A. small, simple rule set also may lend itself to human expert examination 
and analysis in data mining situations [I0|. 
.-Vnothor benefit of the feature vector approach is the condensed representation of a process by its 
fixed-length feature vector. The list of system calls executed by a process can be enormous. Storing 
this information in its entirety is infeasible. Representing the data by a relatively short fixed-length 
string helps solve the problems of transmitting and storing the data. This technique realizes the mobile 
agent architecture's goal of reducing and summarizing data at the point of generation. 
4.3 Feature Subset Selection Using Genetic Algorithms 
learning algorithm's performance in terms of learning time, classification accuracy on test data, 
and coinprehensibility of the learned rules often depends on the features or attributes used to represent 
the examples. Feature subset selection has been shown to improve the performance of a learning 
algorithm and reduce the effort and amount of data required for machine learning on a broad range 
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of problems [77|. A discussion of alternative approaches to feature subset selection can be found in 
[o7!|134l[77|. 
The benefits and affects of feature subset selection include: 
• Feature subset selection affects the accuracy of a learning algorithm because the features of a data 
set represent a language. If the language is not expressive enough, the accuracy of any learning 
algorithm is adversely affected. 
• Feature subset selection reduces the computational effort required by a learning algorithm. The 
size of the search space depends on the features: reducing the feature set to exclude irrele\"ant 
features reduces the size of the search space and thus reduces the learning effort. 
• The number of examples required to learn a classification function depends on the number of 
features [66l[94|. More features require more examples to learn a classification function to a 
desired accuracy. 
• Feature subset selection can also result in lower cost of classification (because of the cost of 
obtaining feature \-alues through measurement or simply the computation overhead of processing 
the features). 
-Against this background, it is natural to consider feature subset selection as a possible means of im-
{)roviiig the performance of machine learning algorithms for intrusion detection (42|. 
Genetic algorithms and related approaches (4-l|[8ol[60l offer an attractive alternative to exhaustive 
search (which is infeasible in most cases due to its computational comple.xity). They also have an 
advantage over commonly used heuristic search algorithms that rely on the monotonicity assumption 
(i.e.. adfiition of features does not worsen classification accuracy) which is often violated in practice 
!134|. 
The genetic algorithm for feature subset selection starts with a randomly generated population of 
individuals, where each individual corresponds to a candidate feature sub.set. Each individual is encoded 
a.s a string of 0"s and Ts. The number of bits in the string is ecjual to the total nuinber of features. .A. 
1 in the bit string indicates an attribute is to be used for training, and a 0 indicates that the attribute 
should not be used for training. The fitness of a feature subset is measured by the test accuracy (or 
cross-validation accuracy of the classifier learned using the feature subset) and any other criteria of 
interest (e.g.. nimiber of features used, the complexity of the rules learned). 
We used the RIPPER rule learning algorithm as the classifier. The training data is provided to 
RIPPER, which learns a rule set from the data. The number of conditions in the learned rule set is 
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counted, and this ralue is used to determine the complexity of the learned hypothesis. The learned 
rule sot is applied to the test excunples and the determined accuracy is returned to the feature subset 
selection routine. The fitness of the individual is calculated, based on the accuracy of the learned 
hypothesis {accuracy(x)). the number of attributes (cost(x)) used in learning, the complexity of the 
learned hypothesis (complexity(x)). and weights [iVnccuracy- u-'cost^ u-'compUxiiy) for each parameter: 
fitncssix) = Waccuracy * accuracy(x) + iVcost * cost{x) + WcompUrity * Complexity{ x )  
This fitness is then used to rank the individuals for selection. Other methods of computing fitness are 
po.ssihle and are discussed by Yang [134j. 
.A. primary goal in using feature subset selection on this intrusion detection problem is to improve 
accuracy*. A high percentage of the intrusion detection alerts reported by current intrusion detection 
systems are false alarms. Our system needs to be highly reliable, and we would like to keep false alarms 
to a minimum. .A. secondary goal is to reduce the amount of data that must be obtained from running 
processes and classified. This would reduce the overhead of our intrusion detection approach on the 
monitored system. 
4.3.1 Feature Subset Selection Results 
The genetic algorithm used standard mutation and crossover operators with 0.001 probability of 
mutation and 0.6 probability of crossover with rank-based selection [44|. The probability of selecting 
the i)est individual was 0.6. A population size of 50 was used and each run went through 5 generations. 
W'c started with the training data used for the previous feature vector experiment (1060 feature 
vectors). We added an additional copy of each unique feature vector in the training data (72 feature 
vectors) to ensure that rare but potentially important cases had a reasonable probability of being 
sampled in tlie training and testing phases. This gave a total of 1132 feature %-ectors in the input to 
th(> genetic algorithm. 
To show the general effectiveness of genetic feature selection on this problem, Table 4.4 shows the 
results of five separate runs of the genetic algorithm with RIPPER with identical parameters used for 
each run. The number of attributes is significantly reduced while the accuracy is maintained. 
Table 4.5 shows the results of using the rules from the best individuals found in the five genetic 
feature selection runs and compares the results to the original results learned from all the features. 
.\11 traces except "Normal sendmail" are intrusions. Boldface traces were used for training. Despite 
using only about half the features in the original data set, the performance of the learned rules was 
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Table 4.4 Feature subset selection results with constant genetic parameters 
Trial Training Accuracy of 
Best Individual 
Attributes Used by 
Best Individual 
1 98.9399 847 
2 98.8516 857 
3 99.1166 846 
4 99.1166 849 
5 99.1166 839 
comparable to that obtained using the entire set of features. After feature subset selection, none of the 
feature vectors from normal sendmail are labeled as abnormal. This shows an improvement in the rate 
of false positives. 
Table 4.5 Results from rules learned by genetic feature selection 
Trace All Attributes Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 1 
chasin Y Y Y Y Y Y 
decode1 V Y Y Y Y Y 
docode2 V Y Y Y Y 
fwd-loops-1 V Y Y Y Y Y 
fwd-loops-2 .\' .X Y X X X 
fwd-loops-3 Y Y 
fwd-loops-4 Y Y Y Y 
fwd-loops-o V Y Y Y Y Y 
recursive V Y Y Y 
smoGoa \' \* Y Y Y Y 
sm5x V Y Y Y 
.^rndhole Y Y Y Y 
sscp-1 Y Y Y Y Y 
sscp-2 Y Y 
sscp-3 Y Y 
syslog-local-1 V Y Y Y Y 
syslog-local-2 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
syslog-remote-l Y Y Y Y 
syslog-remote-2 Y Y Y 
.\ormal sendmail 1 120 0 120 0 120 0 120 0 120 0 120 
4.4 Analysis 
.A. comparison of the effectiveness of RIPPER on the problem using two different data representations 
and genetic feature selection algorithm follows. 
Table 4.G illustrates the advantages of the feature vector representation over the system call windows 
for this learning problem. The feature vector representation allows the learning algorithm to learn a 
hypothesis much faster and with comparable accuracy on the normal test data, and the complexity of 
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Table 4.6 Effectiveness of \-arious learning techniques 
Measure Sequence Win­
dows 
Feature Vectors 
Genetic Algorithm 
Feature Selection 
Lecu-ning Effort 
Moderate 
(30 minutes) 
\"ery Good 
(under 1 minute) 
Intensive 
(approx. 4 hours) 
Accuracy of 
Learned Hypothe­
sis 
Good 
(0.539c False Posi­
tive) 
Good 
(0.83% False Posi­
tive) 
\ er}' Good 
(05c False Positive) 
Complexity of 
Learned Hypothe­
sis 
Poor 
(.\vg. 225 rules) 
Good 
(4 rules. 7 tests) 
Good 
(.•Vvg. S.6 rules. 9.6 
tests) 
Number of At­
tributes Used 
7 (7 system calls in 
window) 
1832 .A.vg. 848.9 
Classification Ef­
fort Moderate 
(large rule set) 
Small 
(trivial rule set) 
Smaller 
(trivial rule set. 
fewer features) 
the iiypothosis is rnucii smaller. Using genetic feature selection on the feature vectors is time consuming 
but further improves the learned hypothesis and reduces the set of attributes used for learning. 
4.4.1 Rules Learned by RIPPER 
-Vn example set of rules that were learned in first trial of RIPPER with genctic feature subset 
.selection is sliowii below: 
good IF al024 = t . 
good IF a27 = t . 
good IF a873 = f AND al30 = f . 
good IF al2 = t . 
good IF al91 = t . 
good IF a223 = t . 
good IF a327 = t . 
bad IF . 
The set above contains 8 individual rules composed of 8 tests, whicii correspond to this pseudocode: 
IF "unlink,close,imlink,unlink,close,gettimeofday,open" seen THEN good 
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ELSE IF "chmod,ioctl,fstat,write,close,unlink,rename" seen THEN good 
ELSE IF "sigsetmask,sigblock,sigvec,sigvec,sigset:mask,sigblock.sigvec" not seen and 
"close,setitimer,close,gettimeofday,link,socket,fcntl" not seen THEN good 
ELSE IF "accept,wait4,wait4,wait4,wait4,accept,fork" seen THEN good 
ELSE IF "fcntl.gettimeofday,getpid,sendto,accept.fork,close" seen THEN good 
ELSE IF "fstat,mmap,close,open,fstat,mmap,getdents" seen THEIN good 
ELSE IF "getpid,sendto,accept,wait4,wait4,accept,close" seen THEN good 
ELSE bad 
Each of the rule sets from the five genetic algorithm trials contaixis rules that can be found in the other 
rule sets. The third and fourth trials contain mostly unique rules, while the other three runs contain 
a majority of rules that are duplicated in other rule sets. The similarities of rules between runs likely 
indicates the strength of particular sequences in identifying normal beha\-ior. 
Because the rule sets identify normal processes and consider all others abnormal, none of the rules 
idoiuifies particular abnormal system call sequences. Consequently, the rules do not identify system call 
sequences that would directly signal an intrusion. However, these rules may lead to an understanding 
of how an attack causes the typical sequence of system calls to change. 
In general, the small size of the rules sets learned by RIPPER from the system call feature vectors 
and the performance of these learned rule sets indicates that a concise set of rules clearly distinguish 
normal sendniail processes from anomalous. 
4.5 Conclusion and Future Work 
Intrusion detection and abuse detection in computer .systems in networked environments is a problem 
of great practical interest. This chapter investigated the classification of system call traces for intrusion 
detection through the technique of describing each process by a feature vector. From the feature vector 
representation RIPPER learned a small, concise set of rules that was successful at classifying intrusions. 
In comparison with other techniques, the feature vector representation does not depend on thresholds to 
separate normal from anomalous. We are concerned that establishing an arbitrary threshold is difficult 
and would require tuning in practice to balance false alarms (false positives) against missed intrusions 
(false negatives). 
The rule sets learned using the feature vector representation are an order of magnitude simpler than 
those obtained using other approaches reported in the literature [48l[67|. This is especially noteworthy 
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f^ivori the fact that all of the experiments in question used the same rule learning algorithm. We 
conjecture that the feature vector representation used in our experiments is primarily responsible for 
the differences in the rule sets that are learned. The feature vectors condense information from the 
entire execution of a process compared to the fine-grained detail of individual sequences. The scope of 
information contained in the feature vectors may make it easier for learning algorithms to leam simple 
rules. 
It was further shown that feature subset selection reduced the number of features in the data, which 
resulted in less data and effort required for training due to the smaller search space. Feature selection 
aLso gave equivalent accuracy with a smaller set of features. 
\\V have integrated the learned rules into a mobile agent running on a distributed system consisting 
of Pentium II systems running FreeBSD. This laboratory network is connected by a firewall to the 
Department of Computer Science's network so we may operate the intrusion detection system in a 
controlled environment. For operation of the IDS. a \byagor ser^'er is started on each host in the 
monitored distributed system. The mobile agent is travels through the system, classifies sample sendmail 
system call feature vectors, and reports the results to its mediator. The mediator reports the results 
to the user interface and optionally stores the information in a database for potential mining and 
warehousing operations. We have implemented a set of .Java classes that can interpret and apply the 
RIPPER rules, which allows our mobile agent to bring its classifier and rule set(s) with it as it travels 
through the distributed system. 
Open issues include the use of this technique in heterogeneous distributed systems. Specific rule sets 
may need to be developed for each node in a distributed system due to \-ariabilities between operating 
systems and workload characteristics. Fortunately, the rule sets discovered by RIPPER have been small, 
so mol)ile agents ought to be able to carry multiple rule sets without becoming overly "heavy". 
.Another issue is whether this technique could be applied in real time. Feature subset selection itself 
is computationally expensive, so training and refining the agent can not be done in real time. After the 
agent is trained, our technique can determine whether a process is an intruder only after the process 
has tiiiished. which provides near real time detection. Either Warrender's [132| or Lee's techniques [67[ 
would allow anomaly detection in real time during the execution of the process. Our technique could 
l)e refined to determine the likelihood that a process is intrusive during the process' execution, giving 
real time detection. This refinement would be necessan.- for long-lived daemons such as HTTP servers. 
We would also like to know how well this technique applies to privileged programs other than 
sendmail. Warrender worked with five distinct privileged programs and identified cases where different 
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thresholds and or different algorithms worked better for different programs [132|. Based on her work, 
wo cxpcct this tcchniquc will be successful for other programs than sendmail. 
Work in progress on intrusion detection is aimed at the integration of data-driven knowledge discov­
ery agents into a distributed knowledge network for monitoring and protection of distributed computing 
systems and information infrastructures. The investigation of machine learning approaches to discover 
patterns of coordinated intrusions on a system wherein individucd intrusions are spread over space and 
time is of particular interest in this context. 
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5 A SOFTWARE FAULT TREE APPROACH TO MODELING 
INTRUSIONS 
This chapter examines the use of a software safety technique. Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFT.\). 
for use as a model for intrusions. Benefits of using SFT.\ for intrusions are considered. Intrusions are 
categorized by temporal stages, and Software Fault Tree (SFT) models of intrusions in each stage are 
developed. Paths through the fault trees are examined for two sample intrusions. 
Benefits of the SFTA technique include developing an understanding of intrusions, determining which 
eveiiis in an intrusion may be detected, assisting the development of an intrusion detection system, and 
testing the intrusion detection system. 
5.1 Introduction 
Software Fault Tree .Analysis (SFT.A) is a method for identifj-ing and documenting the combinations 
of lower-level software events that allow a top-level event (or root node) to occur. When the root node 
is a hazard, the SFTA assists in the requirements process by describing the ways in which the system 
can reach that unsafe state [GSj. The safety requirements for the system can then be derived from the 
software fault tree, either indirecth- [29|[7Sj or directly via a shared model such a^ a dynamic systems 
model used by Hansen to link SFT.A with a requirements specification [45|. 
In the work described here, we use SFT.A to assist in determining and verifying the requirements 
for an intrusion detection system. The root node of the top-level SFT.A is not strictly a hazard, as in a 
safety analysis, but an intrusion which is a violation of a system's security policy. Intrusions result in 
compromise of exclusivity (unauthorized disclosure of data or use of services), integrity (unauthorized 
modification of data), or availabilit\- (denial of service). Whereas safety failures are often accidental or 
unexpected, intrusions are intentional, perpetrated by individuals, and can be expected to occur. Both 
safety and security failures represent potentially significant or catastrophic losses. 
Intrusions can occur in a variety of ways. The software fault tree models the combinations and 
.sequences of events by which intrusions can occur. The understanding and capture of domain knowl­
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edge needed to accurately define the requirements on an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is difficult. 
Questions such as what intrusions can be feasibly detected by the IDS software, at what stage of an 
intrusion the IDS software should detect each attack, and what assurances can be given that the IDS 
software detects intrusions must be addressed by the requirements analysis. The goal is not to build a 
system in which the root node never occurs, but to build an IDS in which the root node never occurs 
undetected. 
We are investigating formal underpinnings for IDSs in terms how to describe intrusions, identify 
intrusion characteristics, and pro%-abIy detect intrusions based on observable characteristics. Existing 
intrusion detection systems tend to be built by .selecting a set of data sources and developing a clas­
sification system to identify some set of intrusions using the selected data [48|. .A. broader approach 
that begins with a thorough analysis of intrusions and supports development of a theoretical model 
of intrusion detection will answer questions about which intrusions are detectable, how they can be 
detected, how the data from different sensors may be correlated, and a quantifiable certainty that an 
intrusion took place. 
The field of software safety provides techniques for developing answers to the problems posed above. 
Software safety is concerned with software-related errors that represent "potentially significant or catas­
trophic failure effects" [79|. Leveson has described software safety engineering techniques in her book 
Safeware [68|. and Leveson and others have reported on the application of safety engineering techniques 
to a number of software systems [70|[71|[79l[80|. When safety engineering techniques are applied to 
safety-critical software systems, potentially significant or catastrophic errors are consistently identi­
fied. Ideally, safety engineering techniques are applied as early in the software development process as 
possible, such as in the requirements specification phase of a project [SO]. 
The nature of software safety-related failures is different from intrusions. Safety failures result in 
loss of equipment or property as well as cause or contribute to death, injury, or environmental harm 
[G9|. Intrusions result in compromise of exclusivity (unauthorized disclosure of data or use of services), 
integrity (unauthorized modification of data), or availability (denial of ser\ice). Safety failures are 
usually accidental and unexpected, while intrusions are intentional, perpetrated by individuals, and 
may be anticipated. However, the analogies between safety and securit}- are strong enough to merit 
the application of software safety techniques to intrusion detection. Both safety and security failures 
represent potentially significant or catastrophic losses; for a safety-critical system that requires strong 
security, the two domains become intertwined. Rushby further relates safety and security as both being 
components of "critical systems" and promotes the use of hazard analysis [116j. 
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Engineering-based analysis of the intrusion domain assists the requirements specification and design 
of an intrusion detection sj'stem. Safety engineering techniques may be applied to the analysis of the 
intrusion and intrusion detection domains. An in-depth analysis of intrusions using known defects in 
software and protocol specifications may lead to a verifiable specification of detectors for the analyzed 
intrusions. 
5.2 Software Fault Tree Analysis 
The Software Fault Tree .\nalysis used to model the intrusions is a backward search. It begins with 
a known luizard (here. cm. intrusion) bls the root node and traces back through the possible parallel 
and serial combinations of events that caused such an intrusion. The fault tree graphically represents 
this information in a diagram of events and logic gates leading to each hazard. Xormally. the goals 
of developing a software fault tree include identifying contributing circumstances, demonstrating that 
n .sy.stern may not reach an unsafe state or unsafe states are reached witii very low probability, or 
cknermining ways to recover from paths to imsafe states [G9|. In the intrusion domain, however, widely-
doployed existing systems and protocols which are unsafe (i.e.. allow intrusions) are modeled in the 
intrusion detection domain to enable reasoning about the possible <k necessary combinations of events 
that load to intrusions. Such analysis leads to adrances examined in section 5.4.3. 
Figure .5.1 shows commonly-used fault tree symbols. The procedure for fault tree analysis starts 
with identifying a hazard. The hazard becomes the root of the fault tree. Necessary preconditions for 
Tho hazard are specified in the next level of the tree and joined to the root with a logical And or a 
logical Or. Each precondition is similarly expanded until all leaves are events that occur with some 
calculable probability or cannot be further analyzed. Fault tree analysis is used at the system level to 
identify high-level requirements for software safety. Software fault tree analysis is then performed on 
codc. designs, or requirements specifications (79|. 
5.2.1 Minimum cuts 
Definitions. 
2.1 A fault tree is a rooted acyclic digraph with vertices including .A\D gates. OR gates, and events. 
2.2 cut set is a set of basic events whose occurrence causes the system to fail [111]. More formally, 
a cut C of a fault tree G = (V. £7) with root r is a subset C of I' such that: 
1. r £ C. 
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Rectangle indicates an event 
to be analyzed further. 
Circle represents a basic fault 
event or primary failure of a component. 
It requires no further development. 
House is used for events which normally 
occur in the system. It represents the 
continued operation of the component. 
Diamond is used for non-pnmal evenLs 
which arc not developed further for lack 
of information or insufficient consequences. 
Oval indicates a condition. It defines 
the state of the system that permits 
a fault sequence to occur. It may be 
normal or result from failures. 
AND gate indicates that all input events 
are required to cause the output event. 
OR gate indicates that one or more of 
the input events are required to produce 
the output event. 
Figure 5.1 Relevant fault tree symbols 
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2. V AND gate node a €  C.  V(a. a^-) E E.  Oc €  C.  and 
3. V OR gate node o £  C.  3{o.Oc)  €  E .  £  C.  
2.3 cut set is callcd a minimum cut  se t  if it cannot be reduced and can still cause the system to 
fail Equi\-alently. a minimum cut of a fault tree G = (l. •£") is a cut of G such that 
V. \ / '  C  M .  M' i s  not  a  cut  of  G. 
2.4 A nse case is a high-level description of a user's interaction with a system. 
.A mininmm cut of a fault tree gives a minimum set of succes.sful event.? necessary- to satisfy the root. 
minimum cut of an intrusion fault tree describes a scenario in which an attacker successfully exploits 
.security flaws to achieve the goal of compromising the system. Manian et al. [81] use Binary Decision 
Diiigrams ;is an alternative to cutset-based solutions of fault trees for large, combinatorial solutions. 
In our current work, the size of the fault trees has been manageable using traditional cutset-based 
solutions. 
5.3 Developing Fault Trees for Intrusions 
Intrusion fault tree modeling draws from a variety of sources. The standards used in current TCP, IP 
lU'twork.s arc publicly available. Proposals and standards for IP networks are published by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) as Requests for Comment (RFC's) and Standards (STD's). Implemen­
tations of most network protocols are freely a\-ailable in software such as Linux. FreeBSD. and .Apache, 
allowing public review for security issues. Numerous researchers and hackers actively discover and pub-
li.sh security vulnerabilities in public forums including mail lists such as bugtraq and web sites such as 
www.securityfocus.com. 
Faults that are generally UNIX-centric are considered in the fault trees, although many similar 
problems (e.g. buffer overflows) exist in software on other systems. Rather than looking directly at the 
source code for these systems, the immense body of publicly-discussed vulnerability information is used 
a.s input for development of the sample fault trees discussed here. 
5.3.1 Reasonable Fault Trees 
Each complete, successful intrusion can \-ar>' greatly from other intrusions, and analysis of complete 
intrusions is difficult. .\ monolithic fault tree that would attempt to describe all attacks would be huge, 
unwieldy, and less useful than several trees divided in a systematic manner. .A reasonable approach is 
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to divide intrusions into stages of attacks that achieve intermediate goals of the attacker and develop 
fault trees that model each of the stages. 
Ruiu's analysis of intrusions [115] divides intrusions into seven stages: 
1. Reconnaissance - find targets 
2. \'ulnorability Identification - find \-ulnerabilities in the targets 
3. Penetration - gain unauthorized access to a target through a vulnerability 
4. Control - gain privileges over the target 
•5. Embedding - hide activity within the target and ensure future access to target 
6. Data Extraction <k Modification - obtain or change confidential information 
7. Attack Relay - attack other targets 
Our analysis of documented intrusions, such as the intrusion into www.apache.org [129|. and our 
hypothesized intrusions correspond to Ruiu's breakdown. 
5.3.2 Developed Examples of SFT for Intrusions 
The OR gates in the fault trees shown are "^rue" if any input is true. The .AND gates are "true" if 
all inputs are true in the current context, where the context may be a virtual network connection, a 
user's login session, a series of related transactions, or some other temporal context. The .A.XD gates 
in the fault trees shown generally assume that the child events occur in left-to-right order. (Hansen et 
al. (45| discuss the ambiguities of traditionally accepted fault trees.) 
The developed sample fault trees are not complete, but represent a significant subset of the intrusions 
of most concern to administrators of distributed networks. Examples of how paths in the trees can 
describe complete intrusions is discussed below. 
We consider an act ive  attack to be an attack that includes events that can be seen within the 
distributed system under the organization's control. The majority of attacks in an intrusion are active. 
We consider a pass ive  attack to be an attack that leaves no trace within an organization's distributed 
.system. E.xamples of passive attacks are password sniffing or DNS zone transfers from an off-site 
secondary DNS server. 
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5.3.2.1 Reconnaissance 
The reconnaissance phase identifies potential targets within an organization's networks. Network 
targets include not only multiuser hosts (e.g.. UNIX or Windows N'T systems) but also routers, intel­
ligent hubs, and perhaps even modems. The ser\-ices offered by systems and names of users on the 
systems are also useful bits of information for an attacker, but only a portion of this information may 
be required to mount a successful attack. Figure 5.2 shows a sample fault tree for the reconnaissance 
phase. 
5.3.2.2 Vulnerability Identification 
X'ulnerability identification is closely related to reconnaissance. In this phase, an attacker searches 
for vulnerabilities that can lead to penetration. The attacker sequentially scans many ports looking for 
services known to bo vulnerable to attack. Port scanning is a "'noisy" active attack, and is usually easy 
to detect unless done very slowly. 
Figure 5.3 matches searches for vulnerable versions of servers for numerous services and for the 
e.xistence of "remote control" services such as Back Orfice and NetBus. "Remote control" services allow 
the remote operation of a computer and obser\'ation of the activities of the legitimate user. 
5.3.2.3 Penetration 
Penetration occurs when an attacker obtains unauthorized access to a system. Penetration methods 
include e.xploitation of %arious network server daemon vulnerabilities (poor authentication and buffer 
overflows), authenticating with illicitly obtained passwords, and TCP session hijacking. Figures 5.4. 
5-j. -5.0. and 5.7 together represent a sample fault tree for the penetration stage of intrusions. 
5.3.2.4 Control 
.A.n attacker needs to gain sufficient privilege in a system to continue to the next stages of the 
intrusion. Often an attacker must obtain privileges equivalent to those of the system administrator to 
gain sufficient control of a system. If the penetration was particularly effective and sufficient privilege 
was already gained, this step may not be necessarj-. 
Mechanisms traced in figure 5.8 include exploiting buffer overflows in privileged local programs, 
exploiting race conditions in temporary files or signals, e.xploiting weak permissions on critical files and 
devices, and cracking a password for an administrator's account. 
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5.3.2.5 Embedding 
Embedding involves the installation or modification of a system so that even if the attacker is 
discovered and steps are taken to recover the system, the attacker will still be able to enter the system. 
For example, the system bootstrap code could be modified to re-insert backdoors if the system executable 
programs are restored from backups or installation media. T\-pical techniques include installing Trojan 
horses, backdoors, and other rootkit programs, removing traces of the intrusion from system logs, and 
disabling detection systems. 
Figure 5.9 identifies two different rootkit installations by matching particular sets of modified system 
files. rootkit is a collection of embedding programs that allow an attacker to hide his activities and 
may include programs for use in the next step, data extraction i: modification. The two rootkits 
identified are the Linux rootkit from 1994 and version 4 of the Linux rootkit. 
The 1994 Linux rootkit is ver>' basic. It is comprised of four programs: 
fix .-V program to install the other rootkit programs in place of the legitimate system programs while 
copying the permissions, time. date, and checksum of the legitimate program to the rootkit pro­
gram. 
login .\ modified version of the login user authentication program that allows anyone to login with 
the password whOOt!. 
nctstat modified version of the netstat network activity reporting program that hides network 
activity by particular users or connections to particular hosts or ports. 
ps .A. modified version of the ps process status reporting program that hides processes owned by par­
ticular users, processes executing on particular terminals, and processes executing particular pro­
grams. 
\ ersion 4 of the Linux rootkit installs a much larger set of embedding programs than the 1994 rootkit. 
including chfn. chsh. crontab. find, inetd. passwd. rshd, sysklogd. tcp wrappers, and a password 
sniffer. 
5.3.2.6 Data Extraction & Modification 
In the data extraction and modification phase, the attacker gathers information about the config­
uration and operation of the system. Covert channels ma\- be used to move discovered data from the 
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comproniised system to the attacker's base. An example of useful extracted data would be cracked 
account passwords. 
5.3.2.7 Attack Relay 
.\fter a system is fully compromised, it may be used for attack relaying. Attacks can be launched 
against affiliated (trusting) hosts to expand the number of hosts under the attacker's control. .A. system 
also may simply be used to participate in distributed denial of service attacks [35|[33][34|[32|. Figure 
•5.10 represents some basic faults seen from Stacheldrciht. Tribe Flood Network, and Trinoo distributed 
denial of service attacks. For example, the Stacheldraht distributed denial of ser\"ice attack depends 
on relay agents that are installed by an attacker on compromised computers. The Stacheldraht relay 
agent accepts commands from a handler, which manages a group of relay agents. The handler, in 
turn, is controlled by the Stacheldraht client which provides the user interface for the attacker. The 
Stacheldraht relay agent implements ICMP flood. SYN flood. UDP flood, and "Smurf attacks [18|[23|. 
With a rmmber of Stacheldraht agents distributed logically in the Internet, an attacker can mount an 
attack that can completely disable the Internet access of even a large, well-connected organization. 
Many other forms of attack relaying exist, including automated and manual means. Stacheldraht. 
Tribe Flood Network, and Trinoo are a sample of the current well-known, well-analyzed distributed 
attack relaying systems. 
5.4 Experience with Fault Trees for Intrusions 
The relationship of the developed fault trees to two actual intrusions is examined in this section. 
Each intrusion follows one of the multiple paths through each of the staged subtrees in Figures 5.2-
•5.9. A portion of the fault tree of Figure 5.7. describing the FTP bounce attack, was selected for 
further analysis. The FTP bounce attack subtree is particularly interesting because it shows several 
time-ordered steps which must take place for the attack to be successful. 
5.4.1 Example 1: FTP SITE EXEC Intrusion 
The SITE EXEC attack against the wuftpd daemon [25| is an interesting buffer overflow exploit. 
When someone logs into the wuftpd daemon as the user anonymous or ftp. the daemon requests the 
email address be entered as the password. However, an attacker can send malicious shell code in response 
to the password prompt. Then, if the SITE EXEC command is enabled, the attacker can send a SITE 
EXEC command with ^-formatting characters that cause a buffer to overflow with data previously 
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obtained as the password (99|. An example of an attacker's FTP SITE EXEC command might be the 
string "SITE EXEC ..(object code to execute)'/Cn(more object code)y.n(more object code)'/^\ 
n". The '/.n formatting sequence is interpreted by the printf function as a request to write the number 
of characters output so far into an integer location. A patient attacker can develop an exploit that uses 
the 7.n formatting sequence to overwrite a procedure's return address on the stack. When the printf 
function returns, and if the exploit is successful, the code provided by the attacker is executed. In 
the case of the wuftpd FTP server, the string provided as the argument to the SITE EXEC command 
is passed to the syslog function, which interprets %-formatting characters using the printf family of 
routines. 
5.4.1.1 Reconnaissance 
The intruder discovers the FTP server host by using any one or more of the methods under the 
" HostDiscovery" node in the reconnaissance tree in Figure 5.2. 
The intruder also discovers the ax'ailability of the FTP ser\-er by one of the methods under the 
"TCP-Servicc-Discovery" node in the reconnaissance tree. 
5.4.1.2 Vulnerability Identification 
The intruder may or may not take the time to make a connection to the FTP server and verify that 
the version number reported by the server is vulnerable to the FTP SITE EXEC attack. (Known FTP 
vulnerabilities have not yet been expanded under the "FTPD" node in the vulnerability identification 
tree in Figure 5.3.) 
5.4.1.3 Penetration 
Tho intruder connects to the FTP server, gives "anonymous" or "ftp" as the user name, and enters 
malicious shell code as the password. The intruder then issues a SITE EXEC command containing 
printf-style formatting character sequences which overflow the character buffer on the process" stack 
to executed the code provided as the previously-entered "password." If the overflow is successful, the 
code provided by the intruder is e.xecuted with root privileges. These activities match the penetration 
subtree of figure 5.5. 
The successful FTP SITE EXEC attack also gives the attacker control, so the attacker can move on 
to the later stages of the intrusion. 
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5.4.1.4 Control 
We assume the successful penetration results in privileged access, so the control phase of the intrusion 
may be by-passed. 
5.4.1.5 Embedding 
The intruder instaJIs the Linux Rootkit version 4, which replaces a number of programs with Tro-
janed implementations that hide the attackers activities. Figure 5.9 matches the changes to the file 
system that result from the installation of the Linux Rootkit version 4. 
5.4.1.6 Data Extraction 
The intruder installs and runs a password sniffer that takes user names and passwords from telnet 
and ftp sessions on the L.A.X. 
5.4.1.7 Attack Relay 
The intruder installs and runs a distributed denial of service agent, such as Trinoo. TFN. or Stachel-
draht. The intruder can then use the system to execute attacks against other networked sites. 
5.4.1.8 Derived IDS Requirements 
The software fault trees involved in this intrusion helped identify the software requirements for the 
mobile agent software tasked with detecting the FTP SITE EXEC intrusion. Examination of the trees 
shows that in the penetration subtree's path taken by the FTP SITE EXEC attack, it is feasible to 
(ictect this penetration with software. .\n intrusion detection system should monitor P.\SS commands 
in an FTP session for data that does not represent a \-alid sequence of printable characters. That is. an 
invalid sequence of printable characters is a minimum cut event. The analysis does not say anything 
about how the monitoring should be implemented or performed: it merely leads to requirements for the 
intrusion detection system. 
5.4.2 Example 2: FTP Bounce Intrusion 
The FTP bounce attack can be used to transfer data to a network port to which an attacker does 
not normally have access [20|. One way to e.xploit this vulnerability is to send data to a remote shell 
server that trusts the FTP host \-ia the FTP server. .-Vfter an attacker discovers an FTP server and a 
host running rsh that might trust the FTP server, the attacker tries this exploit: 
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1. Uploads a specially-formatted file to the FTP server: 
2. Issues an FTP PORT command that directs the FTP server to send its next download to port 
514 on the target host: 
3. Issues an FTP GET command to "download" the contents of the pre\iously-uploaded file into 
port 514 on the target: the GET command opens a connection from the FTP ser\-or on port 20 
to the rsh daemon on the target. 
4. If the target trusts the FTP server, the rsh daemon will accept the contents of the file as if it were 
user input and e.xecute the given command. 
The following steps in an intrusion based on an FTP bounce attack show how the trees fit the entire 
intrusion. 
5.4.2.1 Reconnaissance 
The intruder discovers the FTP server host and target host, using am* one or more of the methods 
under the "HostDiscover^'" node in the reconnaissance tree. 
The intruder also discovers the a\-ailability of the FTP ser^-er and RSH server by one of the methods 
under the "TCP-Service-Discoverj-" node in the reconnaissance tree. 
5.4.2.2 Vulnerability Identification 
The intruder may or may not take the time to make a connection to the FTP server and verify that 
the version number reported by the server is vulnerable to the FTP bounce attack. The intruder also 
needs a directory on the FTP server to which he may upload a file: if the intruder has no access to 
the FTP server other than "anonymous", the intruder will have to search for such a directory. (The 
large mimber of known FTP vulnerabilities has not yet been expanded under the "FTPD" node in the 
vulnerability identification tree.) 
The intruder will likely have to assume that the target host trusts the FTP server host, unless the 
intruder already has some access to the target host and can read the etc, hosts.equiv or "root, .rhosts 
files. We have not considered "insider access" in the vulnerabilit\- identification tree. 
5.4.2.3 Penetration 
The intruder uploads the shell command file to the FTP server and issues the appropriate FTP 
commands to cause the FTP server to "download" the file into the target's RSH service. The "FTP-
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Bounce" subtree of figure 5.7 shows the required FTP commands and responses. The structure of the 
subtree enforces the order of the events in the FTP command response stream. 
The successful FTP bounce attack mounted against a privileged account on the target also gives 
the attacker control, so the attacker can move on to the later stages of the intrusion. 
5.4.2.4 Control 
We assume the successful penetration results in privileged access, so the control phase of the intrusion 
may be bypassed. 
5.4.2.5 Embedding 
Tlio intruder installs the Linux rootkit version 4. which replaces a number of programs with Trojaned 
implementations that hide the attacker's activities. Replaced programs include ps. login, netstat. 
chfn. chsh. crontab. find, inetd. passwd, rshd. sysklogd. and tcp wrappers. .A password sniffing 
progrjim is also installed as part of the Linux rootkit version 4. which leads into the data extraction 
pliasc. 
5.4.2.6 Data Extraction 
The intruder installs and runs a password sniffer that takes user names and passwords from telnet 
and ftp sessions on the L.A.N. 
5.4.2.7 Attack Relay 
The intruder installs and runs a distributed denial of service agent, such as Trinoo. TFX. or Stachel-
clraht. The intruder can then use the system to execute attacks against other networked sites. 
5.4.2.8 Derived IDS Requirements 
The software fault trees involved in this intrusion helped identify the software requirements for the 
mobile agent software tasked with detecting the FTP bounce attack. Software requirements on the 
IDS are to monitor commands and responses in an FTP session, to monitor rsh connections, and to 
correlate outputs from the two monitors to determine whether an FTP bounce attack was attempted 
and whether the attack was successful. The analysis does not say anything about how the monitoring 
should be implemented or performed, but merely yields requirements for the intrusion detection system. 
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5.4.2.9 Countermeasures for the FTP Bounce Attack 
Each of the steps in the intrusions detailed above is a scenario which fits a minimum cut of the 
corresponding fault tree. Inspecting the minimum cuts for each intrusion leads us to the best point 
at which countermeasures could be applied. Countermeasures in intrusion detection systems typically 
include alerts to the system manager (via email, paging, or simply log messages), termination of network 
connections or logins, and disabling user accounts. 
We examined the minimum cut from the penetration tree for the FTP Bounce .\ttack and informally 
considered the cost of applying countermeasures at each node. Cost included the complexity of the 
software required and the effect on the legitimate users of the system. It appears that the lowest cost 
counlermeasure would be killing the TCP connection made from the FTP server to the RSH server; 
countermeasures at other nodes would either be prohibitive to implement, prevent legitimate uses of 
the FTP or RSH services, or be too late to terminate the FTP bounce intrusion. 
5.4.3 Results of Software Fault Trees for Intrusions 
Software fault trees for intrusions explore the necessary and sufficient combinations of events that 
lead to exploitation of a vulnerability. Development of fault trees for intrusions enables a \-ariety of 
discovery and verification activities. .A. brief summary of activities are given below. 
5.4.3.1 Requirements Identification & Analysis 
Fault trees document properties of intrusions and allow for analysis of intrusion properties. 
Determining Requirements Each minimum cut models an intrusion sequence that the software 
may be required to recognize. Identification of leaf events in the fault tree illustrates what components 
of a distributed system must be monitored to detect the intrusion. In addition, analysis of intrusion fault 
trees exposes conditions where countermeasures may be successfully applied by an intrusion detection 
system to intervene before the intrusion is successful. 
Fault Detectability Analysis This refers to the abilit\- of the system to detect the problem if it 
appears during system operation [30|. Determining which characteristics of intrusions can be monitored 
is an essential part of the requirements analysis for an IDS. Each leaf event in the fault tree must be 
analyzed to determine what part of the monitored system provides evidence of the event's occurrence. 
If there is no way to obtain evidence of the event, it is undetectable. Marking these events in the fault 
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tree as undetectable allows analysis of which intrusions would be particularly difficult to detect, and 
may give hints regarding ways to prevent such intrusions from occurring. 
For e.xample. there exist certain intrusive events which do not ha%'e any discernible effect in a site's 
distributed system. Such events include "DNS zone transfers" from off-site secondary name servers 
and passive password sniffing. In the case of password sniffing, the ways to prevent the intrusion 
from occurring include using one-time passwords or encr>-pting terminal sessions to avoid transporting 
passwords in clearte.xt. 
5.4.3.2 Requirements Evolution & Incremental Development 
Prioritization of Requirements The addition of historical information regarding likelihood and 
severity on the leaf nodes would assist in prioritizing requirements. In addition, based on severity and 
likelihood information from tiie fault trees, alert priorities could be encoded in an intrusion detection 
system. 
New Attacks Xewly-discovered attacks need to be integrated into the intrusion fault tree. Such 
new information may encourage re-organization of the fault tree, as when a new attack depends on 
a set of circumstances that is already diagrammed in the fault tree, or the addition of a new subtree 
(either new or reused). The changes necessary in the intrusion fault tree to incorporate information 
about newly-discovered attacks will then guide the necessary modifications of the intrusion detection 
system requirements and design to detect the new attacks. 
5.4.3.3 Verification 
Once confidence is established in the software fault tree, primarily through expert review, the de­
sign of the intrusion detection system can then be traced to the software fault tree to determine its 
completeness and correctness. 
5.4.4 Testing Intrusion Fault Trees 
We would like to use intrusion fault trees to provide requirements for an intrusion detection system. 
It will bo necessary- to test the developed fault trees to find and correct faults before creating a design 
and implementation of an IDS based on the requirements. 
Given a subtree of an SFT.A. that describes related intrusive events, define the subtree to be an 
equivalence class for the set of intrusions. Select one or more representative minimum cuts of subtree to 
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be tested. Then, given scenarios which are positive and negative examples of the intrusions, execute the 
intrusions and determine whether the subtree accurately matches the events. The scenarios form a set 
of representative test cases for the equi\-alence class (based on the testing strategy" shown by Puketza 
et al. [llOj). 
The set of scenarios will be useful to test the design and implementation of an intrusion detection 
system if the SFT.A. is used as a requirements specification for an IDS. Because an SFT.\ is a high-level 
specification with few constraints cind details, it will match all positive use cases and some negative use 
cases. It will be necessary to augment the use cases with information regarding whether it is expected 
to be identified by the fault tree as intrusive and whether it is expected to be identified by the design 
and implementation as intrusive. 
5.5 Summary 
The use of software fault tree analysis to model intrusions has been presented with supporting 
examples and illustrative uses. Division of fault trees for intrusions into \-arious stages was examined. 
Sample fault trees for each of the intrusion stages were described, and two intrusions were examined using 
the developed fault trees. .A.n example use of fault trees for countermeasures analysis was described. 
Software fault tree analysis of intrusions results in a number of benefits. SFTAs enable structured 
analysis of intrusions, including severity and probability analysis. SFT.As assist the intrusion detection 
system development process by modeling intrusions, helping identify priorities for development, and 
specifying requirements for an intrusion detection system. SFT.A. models of intrusions may assist the 
verification process for an intrusion detection system and help identify appropriate countermeasures. 
^\e have begun to formalize the use of the developed software fault trees to drive the development 
of an intrusion detection system design. Soft%vare fault tree models of intrusions provide an indirect 
requirements description for the design of the IDS. The resulting design is based on Colored Petri Nets 
and implementable in mobile agents, which will be described in the following chapters. SFTA models 
of intrusions may also assist the %-erification process by pro%iding tost case scenarios {paths of attack) 
that the IDS is required to detect. 
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6 COLORED PETRI NET MODELING FOR INTRUSION DETECTION 
This chapter examines the use of Colored Petri Nets (CPXs) for modeling intrusion detection sys­
tems. CPXs are a compact model often used to describe distributed systems. CPXs closely correspond 
to system implementations and as such are suited for use as a design tool. When hierarchically com­
posed. CPXs also closely correspond to the design of our agent-based intrusion detection system. 
The construction of CPXs to model detection of sample intrusions are presented. The correspondence 
of CPXs to code in our Ja\-a-based agent system is also examined. 
6.1 Introduction 
-A. secure computer system provides guarantees regarding the confidentiality, integrity, and a\'ailabil-
ity of its objects (such as data, processes, or services). However, systems generally contain design and 
implementation flaws that result in security vulnerabilities. .A.n intrusion takes place when an attacker 
or group of attackers exploit security vulnerabilities and thus violate the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability guarantees of a system. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) detect some set of intrusions 
and execute — some predetermined action when an intrusion is detected. 
Intrusion detection systems use audit information obtained from host systems and networks to 
determine whether \-iolations of a system's security policy are occurring or have occurred [2|. Our 
Multi-.\gents Intrusion Detection System (MAIDS) [48| uses mobile agents [9j in a distributed system 
to obtain audit data, correlate events, and discover intrusions. 
The MAIDS system comprises (1) stationary data cleaning agents that obtain information from 
system logs, audit data, and operational statistics and convert the information into a common format, 
(2) low level agents that monitor and classify ongoing activities, classify events, and pass on their 
information to mediators, and (3) data mining agents that use machine learning to acquire predictive 
rules for intrusion detection from system logs and audit data. 
However, we find the lack of a sound theoretical model and systematic method for the construction to 
be an impediment to development of the system. It is difficult to determine exactly what data elements 
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should be correlated to determine whether an intrusion is taking place on a distributed system. It is 
also difficult to determine what data was necessary to discover intrusions, \erification of the proper 
operation of the IDS was possible only informalh- by executing the IDS and checking its results. A 
model of intrusion detection is necessary to describe how the data should flow through the system, 
determine whether the system would be able to detect intrusions, and potentially suggest points at 
which countermeasures could be implemented. 
Software Fault Tree .Analysis (SFT.\) [68] is used first to model intrusions and develop requirements 
for the IDS. SFT.A. is a natural fit as the IDS design resembles a tree where data is obtained at the leaf 
nodes, travels up through the internal nodes as data is correlated with other information, and rises to 
the root node when an intrusion is identified. 
We do not interpret the Software Fault Trees fSFT) directly as requirements, unlike (45j. where the 
SFT has a formal semantics. .A. less formal approach was desired in the intrusion application because 
we want the fault tree to be developed and maintained by system support personnel rather than by 
e.xperts in formal specification. It is primarily the support personnel's knowledge of the system and its 
vulnerabilities that the fault tree is intended to capture. 
The SFTs are then mapped into Colored Petri Nets (CPXs) [55j that serve as the design for the 
IDS. CPXs are a well-documented and frequently-used abstraction for modeling complex and distributed 
systems. They appear particularly suited for describing the gathering, classification, and correlation 
activities of an intrusion detection system. CPXs provide a design upon «-hich to base further devel­
opment of our agent-based IDS. Our work with modeling intrusion detectors as CPXs has shown that 
CPXs show promise for: 
• Providing a formal foundation for the agent-based distributed intrusion detection system: and 
• .-Vliowing anai\-sis of the intrusion detection sys tem for: 
- discovering inconsistencies between components of the system. 
- finding ideal places in the monitored system for security improvements, and 
- proving that certain attacks can not be successful if a system is changed to remove or disallow 
vulnerabilities. 
These CP.N's are then mapped into the implementation as mobile agents that form the distributed 
intrusion detection system. \\e develop CPXs that detect single attacks or attack components, and then 
compose these CPXs to match intrusions whose attacks proceed through the temporal stages described 
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in Scction 1.3. Composition of the CPNs provides correlation of attacks by unifying the tokens. Such 
correlation assists identification of the attackers and or the source of the attack. Discovering how-
attacks may fit together into complete intrusions can assist the composition of CPNs. For example, 
if detectors for single attacks are developed, data mining techniques such as frequent episodes may 
discover groups of attacks that occur in combination. .\ detector for the group of attacks can be made 
by composing the individual attack detectors together. 
distributed implementation of the CPX model using mobile agents can provide a reliable, robust, 
and efficient intrusion detection system that can highlight intrusions and provide ven.- useful information 
to the security analyst in the form of a trail of transitions through which CPNs passed. 
The SFTA approach applies safety engineering techniques to the intrusion detection domain for 
developing IDS requirements. Similcirly. the CPN model for an intrusion detection system provides 
a way to develop an IDS design. Finally, the software mobile agent intrusion detection architecture 
enables development of an efficient, distributed intrusion detection system. However, each part of the 
development proce.ss — SFTs. CPNs. and software agent implementation — is distinct, and we want 
to ensure the satisfaction of each stage in the development process with respect to the previous stages. 
.\n algorithmic transformation is useful to convert requirements into design templates and design into 
implementation templates. The constructive approach helps ensure the correctness of the design with 
respect to requirements and correctness of the implementation with respect to the design. 
We present the process for developing a CPN design for the IDS using a requirements specifica­
tion based on a SFTA of intrusions, and we show the procedure for creating an implementation of a 
distributed agent-based IDS from the CPN design. 
The rest of this chapter follows this sequence. Color Petri Nets are explained. Intrusions are divided 
into temporal stages to enable development of detectors that may be aggregated to form a complete 
intrusion detection system. Finally, motivating examples of attacks are explained. 
6.2 Colored Petri Nets 
(CPNs) arc a powerful modeling technique for complex systems [55|. CPNs combine state and 
action into a single diagram through the use of tokens of \-arious colors (colors can be thought of 
as data types) which reside in places (or states). Tokens move from one place to another through 
transitions. Transitions allow tokens to pass if all input arcs are enabled (meaning tokens are a\-ailable 
for each input arc). Tokens entering from multiple places may be merged (or unified) at transitions. 
Tokens leaving transitions may be duplicated to multiple destination places. CPNs may be organized 
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in hierarchical fashion to allow reuse and top-down or bottom-up development, as is possible in modern 
progriunming languages. 
In a graphical representation of a CPN. places are denoted by o\-als or circles, transitions are denoted 
by squares or rectangles, and lines with arrows denote arcs. If a predicate or tuple is wxitten next to 
an arc. a token must satisfy the predicate or unify with the tuple before it may pass through the arc. 
Token colors are defined at the top of each CPN in terms of tuples of standard \-alues. such as strings 
or integers (tokens may also be defined as data structures). Places may be labeled with a particular 
color by an italicized label. 
Formally, "a non-hierarchical CP-net [Colored Petri Net] is a tuple CPX = (E. P.  T .  .4. .V, C. G. E.  / )  
satisfying the requirements below [o5|: 
1. E is a finite set of non-empty types, called color sets. 
2. P is a finite set of places. 
3. T is  a  finite set of transitions. 
4. .4 is a finite set of arcs such that: 
Pnr = Pn.4 = rn.4 = 0. 
•5. .V is a node function A P 'x  T  UT x P.  
G. C is a color function P —> H. 
7. G is a guard function defined from T into expressions such that; 
V< e r :  [T! /pe{G{t) )  =  Boolean A Ti jpe{Var{G(t ) ) )  C E]. 
5. E is an arc expression function defined from .4 into expressions such that: 
Va € .4 : [Type{E{a))  = C{p{a))Ms A Typ€{Var{E(a)) )  C E] 
whore p(a)  is the place of X(a) .  
9. / is an initialization function defined from P into closed expressions such that 
Vp € P : [Typedip)) = C(p).v/s]." 
•A. hierarchical CPX is a set of CPNs composed into a hierarchy. The two building blocks of hierarchical 
CP.Vs are substitution transitions and fusion places. Substitution transitions and fusion places allow 
the construction of a hierarchical CPN by combining a number of non-hierarchical CPNs. hierarchical 
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CPS may be translated into a behaviorally equi\-alent non-hierarchical CP\. and vice versa. Hierar­
chical CPXs are important to our design of the IDS because they allow construction of detectors for 
attacks that can be composed into detectors for complete intrusions. 
CP.Vs have been applied to a \"ariety of problem domains, including security, network protocols, 
mutual exclusion algorithms, \'LSI chip designs, and chemical manufacturing systems [56|. Petri Nets 
have also been applied to the safetj- domain (71|, which is closely related to the security domain [116]. 
We use Ruiu's stages [lloj to structtu-e the analysis of the intrusions discussed in this chapter. The 
CPXs examined in this chapter generally correspond to the reconnaissance, vulnerability identification, 
and penetration phases of intrusions, as these first three stages are essential to intrusions. The previous 
chapter examined Software Fault Tree Analysis, which assist generation of CPXs for other attacks and 
other stages of intrusions. 
6.2.1 Descriptions of Examined Intrusions 
One type intrusion we consider in detail is an FTP bounce attack. The "FTP Host" provides an 
anonymous FTP service that allows uploads and the "Target Host" proxides a remote shell service that 
trusts the users on the "FTP Host." 
1. In preparation, the attacker creates a file containing a valid remote shell (rsh) message such as 
\0root\0root\0xterni -display bad.hacker.org:0.0 
which means "I am the user root on the local computer. I wish to execute a command on the 
remote computer as the user root, and the command I wish to execute will open a terminal 
window from the remote computer on my screen." 
2. The attacker scans for \-zLlid hosts in the target's network. For the purposes of our spatially 
distributed attack, assume the attacker discovers at least two host systems in the target's networks. 
.3. The attacker scans for listening TCP ports on the target network's \-alid hosts. .A.ssume the 
attacker discovers a vulnerable anonymous FTP server listening at TCP port 21 on the "FTP 
Host", and a remote shell daemon (rshd) listening at port 514 on the "Target Host." 
4. The attacker uploads the previously created file to the anonymous FTP server on the "FTP Host". 
o. The attacker uses a "feature" of the FTP protocol to tell the FTP server to send the next download 
to port 514 on the "Target Host"'. Then the attacker issues a command to the FTP server that 
initiates a "download" of the file containing the rsh message. If the "Target Host" trusts the 
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users on the "FTP Host", the remote shell daemon on the "Target Host" accepts the message and 
executes it due to an authentication \nlnerability in the remote shell protocol. 
6. The "Target Host" opens a terminal window on the attacker's X Window server that provides 
the attacker with root pri\-ileged shell. The attacker may proceed with any number of activities, 
including: changing passwords or adding users; reading or changing any file on the system; erase 
traces of his her presence: and install tools to sniff passwords, provide backdoors for future access, 
and disguise his her activities. 
We also consider an intrusion based on an NFS file handle guessing attack. 
1. The attackcr scans for %-alid hosts in the target's network. To demonstrate the spatially distributed 
attack, assume the attacker discovers at least two host systems in the target's networks. 
2. The attacker scans for av^ailable UDP services on the target network's \-alid hosts, .\ssume the 
attacker discovers the NFS file service operating at port 2049 on the "NFS Host." The NFS file 
service typically does not require authentication and will provide a way for the attacker to modifj-
files on the "NFS Host." 
3. The attackcr scans for listening TCP ports on the target network's \-alid hosts. .A.ssume the 
attackcr discovers a remote login daemon (rlogind) listening at port 513 on the "Target Host.'' 
4. The attacker uses an NFS exploit tool (perhaps based on nfsbug.c [130|) to discover an NFS file 
handle for the root of the file system containing the file /etc/hosts. equiv. 
•j. The attacker uses the learned root NFS file hcmdie to obtain the NFS file handle for /etc/hosts. equiv. 
G. The attacker uses an NFS write remote procedure call on /etc/hosts.equiv's file handle to add 
the attacker's host name to the file. 
7. .Assuming the "Target Host'' uses /etc/hosts.equiv from the "NFS Host." the attacker may now 
use rlogin to remotely login from his host to "Target Host" as the user root. The attacker will 
bo able to login without a password because the remote login server on the "Target Host" now 
mi.stakenly trusts the users on the attacker's host. 
8. The attacker may proceed with any number of activities, including: changing passwords or adding 
users; reading or changing any file on the system: erase traces of his'her presence; and install tools 
to sniff passwords, provide backdoors for future access, and disguise his/her activities. 
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6.2.2 CPN Models of Intrusion Detection Systems 
Detectors for the intrusions explained in Section 6.2.1 were modeled using the hierarchical Colored 
Petri Xet notation described by .Jensen [oSj. 
6.2.2.1 FTP Bounce Attack Detector 
Figures 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 6.7. and 6.8 collectively represent a hierarchical CPX for the FTP 
Bounce intrusion. 
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Figure 6.1 CPN for the entire FTP Bounce intrusion (ftp-bounce-hier-cpn) 
Figure 6.1 shows the temporal sequence of the attack at the highest level of representation and 
provides an example of composition of CPXs. It illustrates the combination of the reconnaissance, 
vulnerability identification, and penetration phases. Tokens are expected to always be available at the 
Xornial place and advance through the FTP Bounce Scan transition when scanning activities occurs. 
Tokens are taken from Recon place when a connection is made to a potentially vulnerable FTP server. 
Tokens finally move through the FTP Bounce .A.ttack transition when an attack occurs. The boxed 
"HS" next to the FTP Bounce Scan, \ulnerability ID, and FTP Bounce Attack transitions denotes 
"hierarchy and substitution" as described by Jensen's hierarchical CPX diagrams [55|. The three lines 
in the dashed box to the left of the "HS" give the name of the CPX to substitute, the outgoing place to 
substitute, and the incoming place to substitute. For the FTP Bounce Scan transition, the "ftp-bounce-
scan" CPX is substituted (Figure 6.2), its outgoing place named "Recon Successful" is substituted for 
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Figure 6.2 CPX for the reconnaissance stage of the FTP Bounce intrusion (ftp-bounce-scan-cpn) 
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Figure 6.3 CPX for scanning for a host providing the FTP service (ftp-bounce-scan-ftp-cpn) 
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Figure 0.4 CPX for scanning for a host providing the RSH service (ftp-bounce-scan-rsh-cpn) 
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Figure 6.5 CPX for host scanning detector (host-scan-cpn) 
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Figure 6.6 CPX for port scanning detector (port-scan-cpn) 
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Figure 6.7 Simple CPX for identifying FTP server vulnerable to FTP Bounce (ftp-bounce-vuln-cpn) 
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Figure G.S CPN for the penetration stage of the FTP Bounce intrusion (ftp-bounce-cpn) 
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this CPXs place named "Recon'^ and its incoming place named "Incoming'" is substituted for this CPXs 
placc named "N'ormar. 
Figure 6.2 models detection of the reconnaissance phase of the intrusion. It watches for the attackers 
actions that would be used to discover the presence of one or more hosts that provide FTP and RSH 
sorvices. Unlike the parent CPN of figure 6.1 which is serial, this CPX allows discoverj- of "FTP 
Scanning " and "RSH Scanning"' events in parallel. When both the FTP Scanning and the RSH Scanning 
event from the same source host are noticed, the tokens are merged and moved to the "Recon Successful" 
placc. The "FTP Scanning"" transition is substituted with the CPX in Figure 6.3. and the "RSH 
Scanning" tran.sition is substituted with the CPX in Figure 6.4. 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 represent the process of detecting the scans for the host(s) that offer FTP and 
RSH services, respectively. Both these CPXs substitute the lowest-level CPXs. shown in Figures 6.5 
and 6.6. for host scanning and port scanning detection. Watching for host scanning is performed in 
parallel with watching for port scanning, and tokens are unified when they have matching source and 
destination IP addresses. 
Figure 6.5 is the non-hierarchical CPX that outputs tokens when a host is discovered by scanning. 
Hosts may be actively disco%-ered through the use of ICMP Echo Requests to a network s broadcast 
address, unicast ICMP Echo Requests to individual addresses. TCP connection requests to well-known 
ports, or TCP "stealth" scanning packets. .A.ny of these scanning techniques will betray the IP address 
u.secl by the attacker. If the IP address used in scanning matches the IP address used in other parts of 
an intrusion, stronger identification of the source of the intrusion can be made by correlating the events 
based on the IP address. 
Figure 6.6 is the non-hiercirchical CPX that outputs tokens when TCP services are discovered on 
a host by scanning. A\-ailable services on a host may be actively discovered by TCP SVX (connection 
establishment) segments or TCP segments with some combination of the flags FIX. URG. PSH. ACK. 
RST set (aLso known as "stealth" scanning segments). .A.s a matter of implementation, tools such as 
SXORT or Portsentry may be used to detect scans and provide data that can be turned into tokens. 
Figure 6.7 shows a simple CPX for the vulnerability identification phase. It allows tokens through 
when a connection is made to a possibly vulnerable FTP server. Because of the vast number of FTP 
servers available, a check against a few known invulnerable FTP servers is made as part of the "Vul­
nerable?" transition; if the check fails, the token is allowed to pass under the assumption that the FTP 
server may be vulnerable. 
Figure 6.8 sliow a model that detects the actions taken by the attacker to exploit vulnerable FTP 
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and RSH services. The existence of a place ("Network Monitor: FTP") that generates tokens from 
observed FTP commands and responses is assumed; such a place could sniff network traffic or obtain 
events directly from a cooperative FTP server. This figure shows how the attacker's first command is 
detected (using regular expressions for matching), the FTP server's "command successful" response is 
detected, and finally the attacker's second command, which completes the attack, is detected. 
6.2.2.2 NFS Misuse Detector 
Figures G.9. 6.10. 6.11. 6.12. and 6.13 show a hierarchical CPX for the NFS file handle guessing 
intrusion. Many similarities and commonalities exist between this attack detector CPN and the FTP 
Bounce detector CPN. including the host scanning detector (Figure 6.5) and the port scanning detector 
(Figure 6.6) which are completely shared. 
cclcr IP_CUAu3 = product unsigned Icng • unsigned shcrt • 
unsigned Icng • unsigned shcrt. 
cclcr MFS = product string • string • IP_Cv^*AC; 
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Figure 6.9 CPN for the entire NFS Filehandle Guessing intrusion (nfs-filehandle-hier-cpn) 
Figure 6.9 shows the attack detector at the highest level of representation. In the reconnaissance 
phase of the attack, it is expected that the attacker will scan the organization's network to discover 
the hosts that provide NFS and rlogin services. The a\-ailability of these services also satisfies the 
vulnerability identification phase, as NFS is itself vulnerable and it is not possible to test rlogin for 
vulnerabilities short of attempting to exploit it. In the penetration phase of the attack, the attacker is 
expected to exploit the \Tilnerabilities in NFS and rlogin to gain unauthorized access to the systems. 
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Figure 6.11 CPN for scanning for a host providing the N'FS service (scan-nfs-cpn) 
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Figure 6.12 CPX for scanning for a host providing the Rlogin service (scan-rlogin-cpn) 
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Figure 6.13 CPX for the penetration stage of the XFS Filehandle Guessing intrusion 
(nfs-filehandle-cpn) 
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Figure 6.10 is substituted for the "NFS Rlogin Scan" transition, and Figure 6.13 is substituted for 
the "XFS File handle Attack" transition. 
Figure 6.10 models detection of the reconnaissance phase of the attack. It watches for attacker 
activity that indicates the attacker is discovering one or more hosts that provide XFS and rlogin services. 
This CPX allows identification of XFS scanning events in parallel with rlogin scanning events. When 
corresponding XFS and rlogin scanning events have occurred, the merged token moves to the "Scan 
Successful" place. The "XFS Scanning"" transition is substituted with the CPX of Figure 6.11. and the 
"Rlogin Scanning" transition is substituted with the CPX of Figure 6.12. 
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 represent the host and port scan detection for XFS and rlogin services. .A.S 
with the FTP Bounce scan CPXs. both these CPXs substitute the lowest-level CPXs. shown in Figures 
6.5 and 6.6. for host scanning and port scanning detection. Watching for host scanning is performed in 
parallel with watching for port scanning, and tokens are unified when they have matching source and 
destination IP addresses. 
Figure 6.13 models detection of the attacker's actions which exploit vulnerable .XFS and rlogin 
services. The detector watches for XFS getattr requests from an unexpected client, followod by an 
"OK" response from the XFS server. These steps correlate loosely with the methods used in van 
Doom's nfsbug program [130|. and could be expected as an attacker attempts to find an XFS file 
handle for a directory on an XFS-exported file system. If an attacker is able successfully to discover or 
guess an XFS file handle for a file system containing the /etc/hosts.equiv file or any user's .rhosts 
files, the attacker will then likely be able to find the XFS file handle for one of these files and issue an 
.\FS ijrrite to the file and thus give himself login privileges. The attacker can use these newly-gained 
privileges to login to the target host. 
6.2.2.3 Anomaly Detection Rules as a CPN 
The FTP Bounce and XFS Misuse CPX models misuse intrusion detection. To illustrate the com­
pleteness of the CPX approach for intrusion detection, rules learned by a data mining algorithm for 
anomaly detection are modeled with CPXs. In this case, rules that detect sendmail anomalies [48| were 
modeled. Figure 6.14 shows the rule set from RIPPER. Each line consists of a rule where the left side 
is a classification to be assigned if all of the terms on the right side are true. Rules are tested in order. 
Figure 6.15 shows an equivalent CPN for the rules. Constants in the tuples on the edges between tran­
sitions and the "Classified" place set the classification and the number of correct k. incorrect matches 
from the training set. 
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good aayk=f, aacp=t (170/0). 
good accc=t, aaae=t (152/0). 
good aaai=t (161/36). 
good :- aaaz=f, aacn=t (6/0). 
good :- aacb=t (2/0). 
default bad (480/19) . 
Figure 6.14 Rules for Sendmail anomaly detection 
y 
j Scndnuil I 
•R2i 
R2 R4 
Figure 6.15 RIPPER rules for Sendmail modeled as a CPX 
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The algorithm for translating serially executed rules to a CPX is as follows: 
1. For each non-default rule r in the rule set; 
(a) Create one transition with an incoming edge whose predicate evaluates true when the rule r is 
satisfied. Connect the outgoing edge to the final place and set the classification ic confidence 
measures for rule r on the token via this edge. 
(b) Create one transition with an incoming edge whoso predicate e\-aluates true when the rule r 
is not satisfied. Connect the outgoing edge to an intermediate place that provides input to 
the immediately-following rule. 
2. For the default rule d. create an incoming edge from the previous rule's intermediate place. 
Connect the outgoing edge to the final place and set the classification k. confidence measures for 
rule (I on the token via this edge. 
Two transitions are created in the CPN for each rule to duplicate the sequence nature of the rules. The 
first transition represents matching a particular rule, and the second transition represents a mismatch 
for the particular rule. Together, the predicates on the arcs into the two transitions form a tautologj". 
and thti.s any token of the correct color will take one of the two paths. Tokens then move through 
""mismatch" transitions until they match a rule, after which the token is extended with the assigned 
ch'ussification and sissociated confidence attributes. 
6.3 Translating CPNs to Code 
.A.n algorithmic translation is presented that generates code from CPXs. A developer creates an 
implementation by following the algorithm to write the code. The developed code contains places that 
hold tokens and transitions that match and unify tokens. 
By using the translation algorithm to convert CPN designs to code, we can be certain that the 
code implements the CPN design. Also, if the translation algorithm preserves CPN semantics, any 
analysis performed on the CPN design should also apply to the implementation. Finally, creating an 
implementation in code allows the developer to improve performance over the execution of a general 
CPN. 
I l l  
6.3.1 Java-based CPN implementation algorithm 
The algorithm for translating a CPN to an implementation in .Ja\-a is as follows (the nomenclatm"e 
is based on the object oriented programming model used in the .Ja%3 programming language): 
1. For each place in a CPN. instantiate a Place object that implements the IPlace interface: 
2. For each transition in a CPN. create and instantiate a Transition class that implements the 
ITransition interface such that the nmO method takes and unifies tokens from incoming places 
and puts output tokens in outgoing places as specified by the arcs and guards in the CPN. 
The algorithm preserves the CPN semantics in the implementation and allows for efficient execution. 
Performance may be increased over the execution of a general CPN by optimizing the code segments to 
fit the intrusion detection application. For example, matching and unifying tokens is computationally 
intensive, at least O(n-) . in the general case. Matching and unifying tokens in specific cases may be 
made much faster by knowing in advance what types of tokens are expected and using that knowledge 
to implement fsister algorithms. For example, an implementation could match tokens in 0(n logo n) 
time i)ascd on binary search or 0(ri) time based on hash tables. 
The Token class is implicith* defined as a data type that holds the token data. The Place class 
is defined to implement storage areas for tokens and provide methods to receive tokens from and give 
tokens to Transitions. .-V sample interface implemented by a Place is shown in Figure 6.16. The 
iissuriatcd interface for token matching is shown in Figure 6.17. which allows a transition to selectively 
accept tokens that satisfy the predicate. Implementations of the TokenMatcher interface may make use 
of computationally efficient algorithms, such as binary searches or hash table lookups, to match tokens. 
public interface IPlace 
/** Obtain tokens that satisfy the ITokenHatcher. »/ 
public TokenC] getTokens(ITokenMatcher tm); 
/«» Store tokens. «/ 
public void storeTokenCToken t); 
} 
Figure 6.16 Sample .Ja^•a interface for a Place 
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public interface ITokenMatcher 
/** Predicate that returns true for matching tokens. •/ 
public boolean tokenMatches(Token t); 
} 
Figure 6.17 Sample Ja\-a interface for a Token Matcher 
The Transition class is defined which pro\ides methods that obtain tokens from incoming Places, 
operate on tokens when unifjing tokens are received from all incoming Places, and send tokens to 
outgoing Places. Figure 6.18 shows a simple interface that could be implemented by a Transition. 
public interface ITransition 
/«* Perform some operation (e.g., unification). «/ 
protected Token • operateOnTokens(Token[] inputTokens); 
/«« Execute the transition: obtain tokens from 
incoming places, operate on them, and store them 
in outgoing places. */ 
public void nm() ; 
} 
Figure 6.18 Sample .Java interface for a Transition 
Each transition implementation must connect to its incoming and outgoing Places and implement 
token matching and unification methods, operations on tokens, and token output methods. Custom 
tailored, efficient implementations of each of these methods may improve performance over that of 
directly e.xecuting CPXs. 
6.3.2 Preservation of CPN Semantics 
The implementation of the CPNs cis classes in Java satisfy the following properties of the CPXs. By 
e.xamination. the properties of CPNs from Section 6.2 are satisfied: 
1. Each token type is a color in set I!. 
2. Each instance of a Place is an element in set P. 
3. Each instance of a Transition is an element in set T. 
4. .Arcs .4 between Places and Transitions are encodcd in the Transitions; they are finite in 
number and satisfy requirement 4 as they are distinct from Places and Transitions. 
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5. The encoding of Arcs in Transitions is the node function :V. 
G. The encoding of outgoing Arcs in Transitions determines the colors of tokens that enter Places, 
giving the color function C. 
7.  The predicate in interface ITokenMatcher implements the guard expressions in g for each tran­
sition in T. 
S. The predicate in interface ITokenMatcher also implements the arc expressions in E for each arc 
in .-1. 
9. Each instance of a Place has initial state according to the initialization function I. 
The implementation of transitions and places may impose additional constraints not present in the 
CPXs in order to obtain efficiencies for particular expected token colors. As long as only expected 
token colors exist in the places, the CPN semantics should be satisfied by the implementation. 
6.3.3 Testing CPNs and Implementation 
.A. set of use cases (positive and negative examples of intrusions) will be developed to test the 
intrusion detection system requirements. The CPN design will be tested using the use cases to observe 
the behavior of the CPX and verify correct functionality. Equi\-alence classes may be used to test 
representative samples from groups of intrusions to reduce the testing effort [110|. 
Since the requirements model is less detailed than the CPN and may not be as e.xpressive as a CPN 
model, the CP.\ design further constrains the sets of events that will be identified as intrusions. Thus, 
some use cases that are identified by the requirements as intrusions will not be considered intrusions by 
the CPN model and the intrusion detection system implementation. Each use case must be annotated 
to describe whether the requirements and/or design will identify the use case as an intrusion. 
Four ways of analyzing CPNs include: 
1. Interactive simulation - Execute a CPN model in a way similar to interactively debugging a 
program. 
2. .Automatic simulation - Investigate functional correctness and performance of a CPN model by 
executing a CPN at full speed. 
3. Creating occurrence graphs - Determine reachability of nodes in a CPN model. 
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4. Place in\-ariants - Prove user-specified predicates to be satisfied for all reachable system states to 
prove properties such as absence of deadlock. 
Place iin-ariants in particular may be useful for the intrusion detection CPN design, as they may allow 
in\-ariants to be derived from requirements and verified in the CPX design. For example, a place in an 
FTP bounce attack detector of Figure 6.8 may have an "FTP RESPONSE" token only if there exists a 
matching "FTP COMMAND" token in the CPN. since a command must be issued to receive a response. 
Interactive simulation has been performed by building CPNs and simulating their execution in the 
Design CPN too! [28] using positive and negative examples of intrusions. .Automatic simulation has 
been performed indirectly by building an implementation of CPNs in .Ja\-a and executing it. 
6.4 Summary 
The use of formal models for IDSs based on CPNs was examined. CPNs are useful for modeling 
complex and distributed systems. CPNs provide a convenient model for describing the gathering, 
classification, and correlation activities of an intrusion detection system. CPNs provide a design which 
enables development of our agent-based IDS. 
This paper details the procedure by which a distributed, agent-based IDS was implemented from 
a CPN design. .A-lgorithmic approaches are used to create CPN templates from augmented SFTs and 
agent implementations from CPN designs. The end result is an intrusion detection system which detects 
the intrusions which were specified b\- the original requirements. 
Dividing components of intrusions into temporal stages allows the development of CPNs that detect 
individual attacks. Composition of the CPNs into a hierarchy models the correlation of individual 
attacks to detect complete intrusions. 
.A.n algorithm is used to convert CPNs into agent implementation templates. The implementation 
preserves the properties of the CPN design while providing agents for use as a distributed intrusion 
detection system. 
.\gents in our prototype intrusion detection system function as CPN places and transitions. Places 
arc generally static agents which either act as a source of information or hold information until a 
transition requests it. Transition agents are the active components which accept tokens from places, 
act on or unify the information in the tokens, and pass the resulting tokens to other places. Viewing 
MAIDS agents and data as an implementation of a Colored Petri Net has conveniently generalized the 
system and enabled further development. 
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We are implementing an FTP bounce attack detector and an NFS attack detector in MAIDS based 
on the CPXs detailed in this chapter. Thus far. we have concentrated mainly on the penetration phase 
of intrusions, but have also begun development of CPXs for other stages of intrusions. 
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7 SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
The requirements specifications using Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) [68|. the design specifica­
tions using Colored Petri Nets, and the software mobile agent implementation of an intrusion detection 
system are closely coupled together. An algorithmic approach for creating CPX templates from SFTs 
is proposed to ensure satisfaction of the SFT-based requirements by the CPN design. Likewise, an al-
goritlmiic approach to creating an agent-based implementation from the CPX design is demonstrated. 
7.1 Introduction 
The Software Fault Tree for Intrusions approach is a method for applying safety engineering tech-
niciues to the intrusion detection domain for developing IDS requirements. Similarly, the Colored Petri 
Xet model for an intrusion detection system provides a way to develop an IDS design. Finally, the 
software mobile agent intrusion detection architecture enables development of an efficient, distributed 
intrusion detection system. However, each component — SFTs. CPXs. and software agent implemen­
tation — is separate from the others, and we want to ensure the satisfaction of each stage in the 
development process with respect to the previous stages. 
.-Vn algorithmic transformation is useful to convert requirements into design templates and design 
into impleinentation templates. The constructive approach helps ensure the correctness of the design 
with respect to requirements and correctness of the implementation with respect to the design. Figure 
7.1 illustrates the development process. 
7.2 From SFT Requirements to CPN Design 
Two main issues are considered to enable developing CPX designs from SFT requirements. First. 
SFTs are augmented with constraints to more accurately describe intrusions. Constraints include tem­
poral ordering, trust relationships, and conte.xt. Second, an algorithmic approach to converting SFTs 
with constraints to CPX templates is examined. 
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Figure 7.1 IDS development process 
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7.2.1 SFTA for Intrusion Detection Systems 
We do not interpret the SFT directly as requirements, unlike [4o|, where the SFT has a formal 
semantics. less formal approach was desired in the intrusion application because we want the fault 
tree to he developed and maintained by system support personnel rather than by experts in formal 
.specification. It is primarily the support personnel's knowledge of the system and its \'ulnerabilities 
that the fault tree is intended to capture. To understand this, a brief description of the larger IDS 
system is in order. 
The intrusion SFT described here is the requirements phase of a larger effort to provide a more 
formal framework for building IDS. The IDS will use mobile agents in a distributed system to collect 
audit data, classify it. correlate information from the different mobile agents, and detect intrusions. 
The intrusion SFT drives the requirements for these mobile agents and the intrusion detection system. 
The SFT is mapped, by a correctness-preserving transformation, into colored Petri nets (CFXs) that 
serve as the design specification of the mobile agents in the IDS. Interactive simulation of these CFXs 
gives additional verification that the design satisfies the requirements (i.e.. blocks the rele\-ant path(s) 
in the intrusion fault tree). Code for the IDS mobile agents is generated from the CFXs and tested 
using, among other scenarios, the minimum cuts through the intrusion fault tree. Currently, prototypes 
exist of each of these phases (i.e.. CFXs and mobile agents for a selected set of intrusions) with work 
on-going to partially automate the code generation. 
Two interesting aspects of the requirements phase of this prototype are as follows. First, the intrusion 
SFT have been interpreted as specifications of the combinations of events that must be detected. That is. 
the IDS requirements are that each of the intrusion sequences possible in the SFT should be detected 
a-s soon (low in the tree) as possible. The leaf events describe what components of a distributed 
system must be monitored by the mobile agent software. The interpretation of the SFTA serves as the 
reciuirements specification. 
Second, the intrusion SFT have had to be extended with additional information specific to a particu­
lar system prior to their mapping into CPXs. This information is of three types: Trust (which members 
of a distributed system are trusted by other members): Context (which events must all involve the 
same host(s) or connection(s), process(es) or session(s)): and Temporal orderings (e.g., which events 
must be adjacent with no intervening events, or follow within a specific inter\-al of time). Without this 
additional system-specific information, the IDS yields manj- false positives, detecting intrusions where, 
in a specific network, there is none. That is, the set of events marked as intrusions by the SFT is a 
superset of the set of events that are actually intrusions in any specific network and must be constrained 
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by additional network-specific knowledge. 
7.2.2 Augmented SFT 
Constraint nodes are proposed for addition to Software Fault Trees for intrusion modeling. The 
nodes capture trust, order, and contextual relationships needed to develop a satisfactory' model of the 
intrusions that have been analyzed. With the addition of constraint nodes, the design of an intrusion 
detection system much more closely corresponds to the requirements for the intrusion detection system 
specified via an SFT. 
The effect of adding constraint nodes may be demonstrated by considering the set E of all com­
binations of events that make the root node of a plain (unenhanced) SFT "true". The set I C E of 
combinations of events that are actual intrusions must also make the root node of the augmented SFT 
"true". (|/1 ought to be much smaller than liTI.) The constraint nodes added to an augmented SFT 
should exclude the \-ast majority of the combinations of "false positive" events E—I. Thus the augmented 
SFT. enhanced with the constraint nodes described here, will more closely model the requirements for 
an intrusion detection system. 
7.2.2.1 Trust 
Members of a distributed system trust other members of the system. For example, a Network File 
System (XFS) server using AUTH_UNTX authentication trusts the user IDs in client requests. This 
allows a user on a client host to access files on the file server without having to login to the server. 
Explicitly stating a trust relationship that is required for an intrusion to succeed provides information 
to an intrusion detection system developer that will help derive an accurate matching model for the 
intrusion. 
Syntax: Trusts{{destination). (source)) 
where: 
destination'. Ordered list of constants and \-ariables describing the trusting destination, such as 
name of destination host, network, or netgroup and application 
source: Ordered list of constants and \"ariables describing the trusted source, such as name of 
source host, network, or netgroup and application 
Semantics: The Trusts predicate is true if the destination assigns some trust to the source. Specifying 
trust relationships in this way allows matching relationships to be unified [117] with other trust 
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relationships. A trust relationship is true if one of a system's trust relationships successfully unify 
with the relationship specified by the Trusts predicate. 
Example: Such a trust relationship may be; 
Trusts{{Rshd. targetHost). {sourceHost)) 
which states that the remote shell daemon (Rshd) on a targetHost trusts a sourceHost. By convention, 
elonionts beginning with upper-case letters are constants, and elements beginning with lower-case letters 
are variables. 
7.2.2.2 Context 
Certain combinations of intrusive events must occur in some common context. For example, a series 
of FTP commands and responses need to be grouped by a common network connection to an FTP 
server. 
Network Network-related events may be related by events involving a single host, a pair of hosts, 
or a single virtual network connection. 
Single Host A single host that must be a common source or target for network events may 
be specified as a common context for intrusive events. 
Syntax: Coritcxt{{: host Hostname) {FT X ode List)) 
where: 
Hostname: Constant name or address of a host or group of hosts, or a \-ariable 
FTNodeList: List of one or more fault tree nodes to be included in the context 
Semantics: The Context predicate is true when the host identified by Hostname is involvi^d in each 
node specified by the FTNodeList. 
Example: The context for a single host hostname that may be the target of two simultaneous attacks 
(indicated by fault tree nodes Attackl and AttackH) would be 
Context{{:host hostname) (.4t#acA:l, Attack'!)). 
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Host Pair A pair of hosts that must be the source and target for network events may be 
specified as a common context for intrusive events. 
Syntax: Context{{: hosts Hostnamel HostnaTne2) (FTXodeList)) 
where: 
Hostnamel. HostnaTne2: Constant name or address of a host or group of hosts, or a \-ariable 
FTNodeListi list of one or more fault tree nodes to be included in the context 
Semantics: The Context predicate is true when hosts identified by Hostnamel and Hostname2 are 
involved in each node specified by the FTNodeList. 
Example: After host attacker performs some reconnaissance against the host target, the attacker may 
he expected to perform \-ulnerability identification against the tjvrget. Such a context may be 
expressed as Context{{:hosts attacker target) {Reconnaisance. VulnerabilityID)). 
Network Connection A pair of hosts communicating using a virtual network connection that 
must be the source and target for network events may be specified as a common conte.xt for intrusive 
events. 
Syntax: Coritext({:conn Hostnamel Portl Hostname'2 Port'!) {FTXodeList)) 
where: 
Hostnamel, HostnameB: Constant name or address of a host or group of hosts, or a variable 
Portl. Pori.2: Constant name or number of a network port, or a \-ariable 
FTNodeList: List of one or more fault tree nodes to be included in the context 
Semantics: The Context predicate is true when a network connection involving the endpoints identified 
by Portl on Hostnamel and Port2 on Hostname2 are involved in each node specified by the 
FTNodeList. 
Example: The commands and responses involved in an FTP upload from a source host to a destination 
host may be set in a common context by the predicate: 
Context ((-.conn source ephemeral Port destination 21) 
(FTP_P0RT, FTP_PORT_OK. FTP_ST0R. FTP_STOR_OK)) 
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Host A common host-based context, such as processes or user sessions, may be necessary- for 
intrusions. 
User Session An authenticated user session on a host, such as via telnet, ssh. or ftp. may be 
a context for related events. 
Syntax: Ccmtext({: user User Application LHost RHost Terminal LoginTime) (FTXodeList)) 
where: 
User: Constant name or group of user(s). or a \-ariable 
Application-. Constant name of method of access (e.g.. telnet, ftp. etc.). or a variable 
LHost: Constant name of the host to which the user is connected, or a \-ariable 
RHost-. Constant name of a remote host or group of hosts, or a \-ariable 
Terminal-. Constant name of a terminal used for access (e.g.. ttyOl). or a \-ariable 
LoginTime: Constant specification of time of login, or a \'ariable 
FTNodeList: List of one or more fault tree nodes to be included in the context 
Semantics: .A. user session is established using the Application into the LHost from the RHost to 
the Terminal beginning at time LoginTime. The context involves each node specified by the 
FTNodeList. 
Example: The nodes corresponding to the use of the ps. who. and logout; command executed by a 
user during a login session on the host durango from host nova via telnet may be set in a common 
context with: 
Confext{{: user username Telnet Durango Xova ttypl startTime) {Ps. Who. Logout)) 
Process Events corresponding to a proce.ss (an instance of a program in execution) may be a 
context for related events. 
Syntax: C on text{{: process Process ID Program User Host StartTime) (FTXodeList)) 
where: 
ProcessID: Constant or variable indicating the identification number of the process 
Program: Constant or \-ariable indicating the name of the program executed 
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User: Constant user name, or a \-ariabIe. of the user who executed the process 
Host-. Constant or \'ariable name of the host on which the process executed 
StartTime: Constant or variable indicating the time the process began executing 
FTNodeList: List of one or more fault tree nodes to be included in the context 
Semantics: A process executes Program with ID ProcessID with the permissions of User on the Host 
beginning at time StartTime. The context involves each node specified by the FTNodeList. 
Example: If a process opens and writes the system password file, a common context for these events 
may be: 
Context{{:processpidprogram username host startTime) 
(OPEN _P.ASS\VD.\V RITE _P.iSSU-D)) 
7.2.2.3 Temporal Ordering and Intervals 
Events and conditions involved in an intrusion often must occur in a particular order. E.xplicitly 
specifying the event ordering excludes other non-intrusive permutations of events from being considered 
lis intrusive. We use .A.llen and Ferguson's inter^-al temporal logic [1| to develop predicates. 
Occurs After .A.n event which takes place nmst make its node in the fault tree true as long as 
the existence of that event may be combined with other events to make a parent node true. It seems 
an event's period may last as long as the context exists in which it may be evaluated. In this sense, 
"occurs after" is concerned only with the relative start of event's periods. 
""Occurs after" is the condition where one event's period is required to start after another event's 
period has started. The Starts{i.j) primitive is true when periods i and j begin simultaneously. The 
.\Icets{i. j) primitive is true when period i ends adjacent to the time where period j begins. Let 
Period{x) be the period that node x is true. Let: 
Occurs After : S ode. X ode -> Boolean 
Occurs.\fter{i. j) = 3m Starts(Period{i). m) A .\Ieets(m, Period{j)) 
Syntax: Occurs.\fter{FTnodel, FTnode'2) 
where: 
FTnodel, FTnode2: names of event or boolean expression nodes 
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Semantics: The event or boolean expression indicated by the node FTnodel becomes true in the time 
prior to the time that the event or boolean expression indicated by the node FTnode2 becomes 
true. 
Example: A response must occur after a command, not before. Such a constraint may be specified by 
the predicate OccursAfter{COMMAXD. RESPOXSE). 
Adjacent Events Certain situations exist where an event must occur after another event within 
the same context with no intervening events. Let: 
Immediately After : Node.Sode —>• Boolean 
Iminediatelij Af ter{i. j) = Occurs A fter{i. j) A -^{ 3 n  O c c u r s  A f t e r  { i .  n )  A  O c c u r s  A f t c r { n .  j ) )  
Syntax: Immediately Af ter{FTnode\. FTnode'l) 
where; 
FTnodel, FTnode2: names of event or boolean expression nodes 
Semantics: The event or boolean expression indicated by the node FTnodel becomes true in the time 
prior to the time that the event or boolean expression indicated by the node FTnode2 becomes 
true. Xo intervening events become true between FTnodel and FTnode2. 
Example: In an FTP session, a commcind must be followed by a response before a second command 
is issued. Such a constraint may be specified by the predicate; 
ImmediatelyAf ter{COMMA\Dl. RESPONSE) A 
Immediately A f ter (RESPONSE. CO MM AX D2} 
Interval An event may be required to follow another event within some amount of time. Let 
StartOf(i) be the start of discrete time period i.  The Overlaps{i.j) primitive is true when period i 
overlaps period j.  
Inlnterval : Xode. Xode. E —> Boolean 
Inlntr:rval(i.j.t) = OccursAfter{i.j) /\Overlaps{{StartOf{Period{i)).StartOf{Period{i)) +t).j) 
Syntax: InInterval{FTnodel. FTnode'2. t) 
where; 
FTnodel, FTnode2: names of event or boolean expression nodes 
<: amount of time after FTnodel becomes true in which FTnode2 must become true 
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Semantics: The event or boolean expression indicated by node FTnodel becomes true in time prior 
to the time that the event or boolean expression indicated by node FTnode2 becomes true. 
Additionally. FTnode2 must become true during the period specified by t.  
Example: A TCP SVX (connection request) packet must be followed by a SVN ACK packet (connec­
tion accepted) \%ithin 75 seconds for the connection to continue. A constraint that models this 
requirement could be: 
InInterval{TCP_SYS. TCP_SYS_ACK. 75 seconds) 
7.2.3 Generating CPN Templates from SFT 
Template Colored Petri Net intrusion detectors may be generated from Software Fault Trees for 
Intrusions to ensure correctness and correspondence between a requirements specification based on 
an SFT and a design using CPXs. The constraints added to an augmented SFT to describe the 
ordering relationships between nodes requires special handling to develop accurate CPX templates 
from augmented SFTs. 
7.2.3.1 Leaf Nodes 
Loaf nodes in the augmented SFT for intrusions correspond to basic events in the system which 
must be detected. Leaf nodes then correspond to token source places in the CPN. The token source 
places produce a new token each time the basic event takes place. Tokens generated by token source 
places nmst have sufficient descriptive information so that tokens may be matched and unified to satisfy-
any trust, context, and ordering constraints that exist in the augmented SFT. 
7.2.3.2 AND Nodes 
.A.ND nodes in the SFT are of special interest in intrusion models. Semanticaily. when all child nodes 
of an .A.ND node in a SFT are true, the .A.ND node is true. 
AND Nodes without Ordering Constraints An AND node unconstrained by an ordering in 
an SFT corresponds to a transition and outgoing place pair in a CPN. .A.n .\ND node with n inputs 
translates to a transition with n incoming arcs. Each incoming arc comes from either a token source 
place of an SFT leaf node, or the outgoing place of an SFT gate node. Figure 7.2 illustrates the 
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correspondence between an AND node and its equivalent CPX transition place pair, where; 
A' = 
Y = 
{ 
{ 
1. if X E 
0. otherwise 
1. if y € Dy 
0. otherwise 
Z = 1. if (x 6 Dx) A (// e Dy) 
0. otherwise 
1 L 
X Y 
Figure 7.2 Unconstrained AND node with corresponding CPX 
A' and F are the binary inputs to the AND gate, and Z is the binary output of the AND gate, x 
and // are the incoming tokens to the CPN transition, where Dj. and D,j are the domains of x and y. 
respectively. ; is the output token from the CPN transition. 
Tokens leaving the transition must be unified such that they satisR- any trust and context constraints 
that e.xist higher in the augmented SFT. 
AND Nodes with Ordering Constraints Nodes connected to an .A.ND node in an augmented 
SFT may have an attached constraint that requires the nodes to become true in some particular order. 
Two cases e.xist: first, nodes may be required to become true in order, but intervening events may occur; 
second, nodes may be required to become true in order with no intervening events. 
To support ordering. CPN tokens are required to contain times or sequence numbers. If event a 
occurs before event b. the timestamp in the token representing event a must be less than the timestamp 
in the token representing e%-ent b. and no two events may have identical tiinestamps. Likewise, if event 
a occurs before event 6, the sequence number in the token representing event a must be less than the 
sequence number in the token representing event b, and no two events may have sequence numbers. 
Literal wall-clock times used for comparisons are a problem when the times are obtained from 
different computers in a distributed system (126|. Each computer has its own notion of the current time. 
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and computer clocks tend to skew at different rates. We assume that the clocks are kept synchronized 
by the intrusion detection system (synchronized at least once every twenty-four hours), and the skew 6 
between a computer's clock and the actual time is ver%- small. As an implementation detail, the intrusion 
detection system may itself synchronize the clocks and monitor the measured difference 6m between 
clocks. The IDS may have an established maximum skew and may consider any 6^ > to 
be an intrusion. In addition, the implementation may include 6 in its comparisons between timestamps. 
The comparison ti + 6 < t-2 — S yields a tight bound on two events, which may result in false negatives. 
The comparison ti — 6 < t-j + S \-ields a loose bound on two events, which may result in false positives. 
In the case of sequence numbers, they are maintained per context. .\o comparison may be made 
between sequence numbers across contexts. 
The addition of temporal ordering to SFT and the associated representation of time information in 
event tokens enables temporal reasoning. 
Occurs After The case "occurs after" covers the situation where augmented SFT nodes must 
become true in a particular order. 
Figure 7.3 shows an example of an .\XD node constrained such that node y must occur (become 
true) after node x becomes true, where: 
1. if X € Dr X = ; 
0. otherwise 
Y _ y ^ 
0. otherwise 
^ 1, if (x € Di) A ((/ e D y )  A ( t imel < time'!)  
0. otherwise 
In Figure 7.3, t irnel  and t iTne2 denote the timestamps for events x and y.  respectively. The related 
CPX segment shows that a token for event x must have a smaller timestamp than the token for event 
//. Tlie significant differences between Figures 7.2 and 7.3 are the addition of time information to the 
tokens, and the guard on the transition that enforces the ordering on the token's time. 
Timestamps in the "occurs after" case may be either wall-clock time or sequence numbers. 
Immediately After The case "occurs immediately after' covers the situation where augmented 
SFT nodes must become true in a particular order. Inter\-ening events may not occur. 
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OccursAfter(X. Y) 
(x, time I) (y, time!) 
[timeI < time!] 
Figure 7.3 AND node, constrained by "V after X". with corresponding CPN 
Figure 7.4 shows an example of an AND node constrained such that node y must occur (become 
true) immediately after node x becomes true, where: 
A' = 1. ifx 6 Di 
0. otherwise 
_ r 1- if J/ e 
y 0. otherwise 
Z = if (x € D i )  A ( 7 /  e  D,j) A (seql + 1 = seq2) 
otherwise 
In Figure 7.4. se^l ajid seq2 denote the sequences numbers for events x and y. respectiveK". The 
related CPN segment shows that a token for event y must have the timestamp immediately following 
the timestamp for event x, implying that discrete timestanips (sequence numbers) are necessary for the 
operation of this CPN segment. 
Z (x, seqJ) (y, seq2) 
[seql + I = seqZI 
/mmediatelyAfter(X, Y) 
Figure 7.4 AND node, constrained by "Y immediately after X", with corresponding CPN 
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7.2.3.3 OR Nodes 
When any of the child nodes of an OR node in a SFT are true, the OR node is true. 
An OR node in an SFT corresponds to a transition and outgoing place pair in a CPX. An OR node 
with n inputs translates to n transitions, each having 1 incoming arc. Each incoming arc comes from 
either a token source place based on an SFT leaf node, or the outgoing place based on an SFT gate 
node. Figure 7.5 illustrates the correspondence between fui OR node and its equi%-alent CPS transitions 
and place, where 
1. if X € 
0. otherwise 
A' = 
r = 
1. if y € D,j 
0. otherwise 
Z = if(x e D^)  V (y € Dy)  
otherwise 
Tokens leaving the transition must be unified such that they satisfy any trust and context constraints 
tliat o.xist higher in the augmented SFT. 
X 
X y 
Figure 7.5 OR node with corresponding CPN 
7.2.3.4 Example: FTP Bounce Attack 
The Software Fault Tree in Figure 7.6 represents the combinations of events for an FTP bounce 
attack to succeed. Deriving a CPX template from the Download-RSH subtree of the fault tree gives a 
CP.V ;us shown in Figure 7.7. The variables seijJ. seq2. seq3. and seq5 are sequence numbers, and the 
variables timeS. time4. and timeS are times. Figure 7.7 illustrates the use of both sequence numbers 
and time in the same CPN based on an augmented SFT with temporal constraints. 
The use of both sequence numbers and timestamps are necesscirj- for this augmented SFT because 
there are two separate contexts for events in this tree. The main context is that of the commands and 
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responses in the FTP session, which are ordered sequentially by sequence numbers. The second context 
is that of the TCP connection made by the FTP server to the RSH port, whose relationship to the FTP 
session can only be established by timestamps. 
The designer must complete the CPN by augmenting it with: 
• Places that provide tokens when events occur in the monitored system 
• Information that fully describes the tokens entering and lea%-ing transitions 
Figure 7.8 shows the CPN of Figure 7.7 after places have been added that provide the inputs to the 
transitions. 
Figure 7.9 shows the CPN of Figure 7.8 after it has been fully completed with token descriptions 
using the Design CPN tool [28]. .-Vn additional place has been added, named Incoming, to allow this 
particular CPX to be used as a component in a hierarchical CPN. 
7.3 From CPN Design to Distributed Agent Implementation 
The MuIti-.-\gent Intrusion Detection System (MAIDS) uses a distributed agent-b£ised system to 
detect intrusions. If the CPN model of intrusion detection is expanded to include multiple data source 
nodes (which arc simply duplicated places that provide the same token colors to transitions), and 
transitions are given mobility, the result is a distributed CPN (DCPN). 
Previously, section G.3 examined the implementation of a CPN as .Ja\-a code. This section further 
details the implementation of a CPN as agents in a distributed system. 
7.3.1 Node Categories 
The IDS CPN design resembles a tree where data is obtained at the leaf nodes, fed up through the 
internal nodes, and finally reaches the root node when an intrusion is identified. Tokens in the IDS 
CPN represent information that, as tokens "Tise" through the tcee. is correlated with other information 
to identify intrusions. Figure 7.10 represents the general CPN for the IDS. 
Source places (places which have no incoming arcs) are considered leaf places. The transitions 
adjacent to leaf places are considered leaf transitions. 
Sink places (places which have no outgoing arcs) are considered root places. The .\lert place is 
currently the single root place in the CPN IDS design. 
Internal places and internal transitions are the remaining places and transitions, respectively, in the 
CP.N IDS design. 
I "-r:; 
111' >|IK l>K 
M r .  r  
i«i« > iik4i ^ 
'<7" 'T3" 
l-TI'-HOUNCl- - ITI' Bminco 2(100/1(1/11 t'agcS 
Figure 7,(i Fault, tree for FTP bounce attack, with constraiiits 
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(FTP_PORT, seql) 
[seql + I = seqZI 
(FTP_RETR. seqS. tinieS) 
{seq2 + / = seqS/ 
(FTP_RSH_CONN. time4) 
flirneS < tiine4J 
(FTP_RETR_OK. seq5. timeS) 
[seq3 + / = seq5 && time4 < timeS] 
FTP RETR 
FTP RETR OK 
FTP RSH CONN 
FTP_PORT & 
FTP PORT OK 
Figure 7.7 Template CPN from SFT for FTP bounce attack 
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(FTP_PORT. seqJ) 
[seql + / = seqIJ 
(FTP_PORT_OK. seq2) \ 
1 ' 1 f 
FTP_PORT & 
FTP_PORT_OK 
Network 
Monitor 
FTP 
{seq2 + I = seqSJ FTP_RETR 
(FTPJRETR, seq3, tirneS) 
Network 
Monitor 
TCP 
(FTP_RSHjCONN. time4) 
[time3 < iime4} FTP RSH CONN 
[seqS + / = seq5 && time4 < timeS] FTP_RETR_OK 
(FTP_RETR_OK. seq5. time5) 
Figure 7.S Template CPN for the FTP bounce attack after augmentation with source places 
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IP^ENDS Incoming 
1 •{src=src_host.dst=dst_host} 
[seq1-(-l=seq2] 
• 
FTP_PORT & 
FTP_PORT _0K 
1 -{rtypesCOMMAND. 
conn={ends={src=src_host. dst=<lst_host}. 
src=src_por1. dsf=FTP_PORT). 
value='PORT .*.2.2S*.s=seq1 
.t=time1) 
l'(ends={src=src_host.dst=dsl_host}. 
src=src_port.dst=FTP_PORT. 
s=seq2,t=time2) 
TCP_OUAD 
1'{ends={src=src_hosl.dst=dst_host}. 
src=src_port.dst=FTP_PORT. 
s=seq1.l=time1} 
Network 
Monitor: 
FTP 
FTP 
[seq1+1=seq2] 
• 
rrp_RETF« 
1'(ends={src=src_host.dst=dst_host}. 
src=src_port.dst=FTP_PORT. 
s=seq2.t=time2} Y 
TCP QUAD 
V{ends={src:=src_host,dst=dst_host). 
s rc=src_port.dst=FTP_PORT. 
s=seq1.t=time1J 
[time1<tlme2] FTP RSH CONN 
V{rtype=RESPONSE. 
conn={ends={src=dst_host. dst=src_host). 
src=FTP_PORT. dst=src_port>. 
value="2xx" 3=seq2.t=time2) 
r{r1ype=COMMAND. 
conn={ends={src=src_host. dst=dst_host}. 
src=src_port. dst=FTP_PORT}, 
value="RETR*.s=seq2.t=time2} 
Network 
Monitor: 
TCP 
Connections 
r{ends={src=dst_hosl.dst=targel_host}. 
src=FTP_DATA_PORT,dst=RSH_PORT.s=seq2.t=lime2} 
r{ends={src=src_host.dst=dst_host). 
src=src_port,dst=FTP_PORT. 
s=seq1 .t=lime2) 
TCP_QUAD 
r{ends={src=src_host.dst=dst_hostJ. 
src=src_port.dst=FTP_PORT. 
s=seq1.t=time1) 
(seq1-i-1=seq2. FTP_RETR_OK ^ 
time1<time2] 
1'(ends={src=src_host.dst=dst_host}, 
src=src_port.dst=FTP_PORT. 
s=seq2.t=tlrne21 ^ 
TCP_QUAD Penetration 
Successful 
r{itype=RESPONSE. 
conn={ends=(src=dst_host. dst=src_host). 
src=FTP_PORT. dst=src_port). 
value="2xx'.s=seq2.t=time2} 
Figure 7.9 Fully augmented CPN for the FTP bounce attack 
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Figure 7.10 General CPN for IDS 
7.3.2 Leaf Places and Transitions 
Raw audit data of \-arious types and formats is obtained from monitored systems for the IDS. Data 
cleaning agents have been developed to read and process the raw audit data for use by the IDS. The 
data cleaning agents correspond to the leaf places and transitions in the CPN design. 
Leaf placcs and transitions are duplicated at each monitored system to manage the constant process 
of data retrie\-al and cleaning. Figure 7.11 graphically represents the distributed CPX where the leaves 
are duplicated on each of three monitored systems. 
The leaf placcs (data cleaners) are agents that remain in a single location to obtain raw data, such 
as that available from log files. In the MAIDS implementation, the leaf places are dispatched by the 
console to the monitored host, where they will remain stationary for the duration of their activity. 
The console may also recall the agent to replace it with an updated agent or cease monitoring. The 
loaf places perform minimal processing and do not place a substantial resource load on the monitored 
systems. 
Loaf places are an instance of places in the MAIDS DCPX implementation that require customized 
coding. Nearly all other places are passive containers of tokens. 
Leaf transitions (data gatherers) are mobile agents that travel between monitored systems to obtaiin 
tokens. Figure 7.11 represents the leaf transitions with dashed boxes to indicate tliat the leaf transitions 
are mobile. Currently, single instances of each leaf transition perform the data gathering duties, but in 
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Alert place 
i 
f Internal nodes 
Leaf places 
Leaf transitions 
Figure 7.11 Sample DCPN with duplicated leaves 
the future, multiple instances of each leaf transition could cooperate to gather data in a large distributed 
system. 
Infonnally. the leaf transitions perform the first level of data gathering and filtering in the IDS. 
Formally, the leaf transitions perform the token matching and unification specified by the CPN IDS 
design. 
7.3.3 Internal Places and Transitions 
Internal places act as passive containers for tokens. Internal places are not duplicated: a single 
instance exists and accepts tokens from all (possibly mobile) transitions connected to it. Internal places 
currently reside at the machine running the console, but internal places could be given mobility if it 
becomes advantageous. 
Internal transitions are similar to leaf transitions in that they apply token matching and unification 
rules to tokens £is they are obtained from incoming places and sent to outgoing places. Like inter­
nal places, internal transitions are statically positioned at the machine running the console. Internal 
transitions could be given mobility if advantages are found to such mobility. 
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7.3.4 Root Place 
The root of the CPN IDS design is the alert place. It acts as a passive container, but when a token 
is added to the alert place, the IDS console interprets the token and displays it. Transitions are required 
to set an urgency level pcirameter in tokens for use by the IDS console. Tokens are sorted on the IDS 
console display by their urgency and then by their arri\-al time. 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter details the procedure by which a distributed, agent-based IDS was implemented from 
a SFT-based requirements and a CPX design. Constraint nodes, specifying trust, temporal, and con-
te.xtual relationships, are used to augment SFTs and restrict the combinations of events which define 
intrusions, .\lgorithmic approaches are used to create CPX templates from augmented SFTs and agent 
implementations from CPN designs. The end result is an intrusion detection system which detects the 
intrusions which were specified by the original requirements. 
Constraint nodes were added to enable SFTs to model temporal, contextual, and trust relationships 
between events. Such information is necessary to distinguish actual intrusions from events that bear 
similarity to intrusions and improve the false-positive rate of the implemented system. 
.A.n algorithm is used to convert SFT intrusion specifications into CPX intrusion detector design 
templates. This conserves the relational constraints of the SFT and preserves the logic of the SFT. 
The SFT constraints. SFT to CPX template conversion algorithm, and implementation of the IDS 
using the CPX design act together to ensure that correctness is preserved from requirements to imple­
mentation. The requirements engineer must refine the initial SFT by adding constraints to specify the 
temporal, conte.xtual, and trust relationships between events that take place as part of intrusions. The 
designer must finish the CPX design by adding places to provide tokens to the CPX and refining the 
tokens so that they unify to satisfy the contextual constraints. 
Our use of SFT with trust, temporal, and contextual constraints to model intrusions for a require­
ments specification is novel in the intrusion detection domain. The use of CPXs to model intrusion 
detection is not new, but the creation of CPXs for intrusion detection from SFT intrusion models is 
new. Likewise, intrusion detection sj-stems have previous been built using agents, but this is the first 
use of a CPX model to define the topology- of an agent network. 
138 
This chapter also detailed the procedure by which a distributed, agent-based IDS was implemented 
from the CPN design. The implementation preser\-es the properties of the CPX design while providing 
an implementation for use on a distributed system. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Summary 
This di.ssertation has developed several key ideas for a distributed intrusion detection system based 
on mobile agents. A flexible, btisic architecture for a mobile agent-based intrusion detection system 
was designed and implemented to demonstrate the operability of such a system, which could be further 
extended into a complete, operational intrusion detection system based on the modeling work presented 
in the previous chapters. 
A machine learning approach to anomaly detection using system call data from privileged programs 
was examined. Individual system calls were grouped into windows and then the "bag of words" technique 
was used to create bitwi.so feature vectors that described the entire execution of a privileged process. .A. 
rule learning algorithm was used to obtain a hypothesis that categorized feature vectors as normal or 
anomalous. .\ genetic feature selection technique was used to further improve the accuracy of the rule 
learning algorithm. Further work along these lines has successfully applied the technique to the .Ja\-;i 
interpreter to detect anomalous applets [47j. 
.\ temporal division of intrusions Wcis presented that splits intrusions into reconnaissance, vulnerabil­
ity identification, penetration, control, embedding, data extraction k: modification, and attack relaying. 
Such a categorization of intrusions facilitates development of intrusion and intrusion detection models. 
The temporal categorization also allows an intrusion detection system to relate discrete intrusive events 
to a single complete intrusion. 
Software Fault Tree .Analysis was used to model intrusions as combinations of events leading to 
intrusions. Such a model documents events that lead to intrusions in a such a way that requirements 
for an intrusion detection system can be based on the SFTA model. The SFT.A. model results in a 
convenient, easily-readable specification of what intrusions may be detected, what event data is arailable 
to an intrusion detection system, and what combinations of events correspond to intrusions. 
Colored Petri Xets were used to model the design of an intrusion detection system. Colored Petri Net 
designs may be tested and verified against requirements, translated easily to code, and automatically 
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analyzed for deadlocks &: reachability. CPN designs may also be anah-zed to determine points at which 
counter measures may be applied to stop intrusions in progress. The modularity offered by Colored Petri 
.\ots allows individual intrusion detectors to be composed to form the intrusion detection system. 
8.2 Contributions 
Specific contributions of this work include: 
• .A.nomaly detection using machine learning and data mining technologies 
• Intrusion cuiaiysis using Software Fault Tree Analysis to model intrusions 
• Creation of IDS requirements from intrusion SFTs 
• .Analysis of intrusion SFTs to discover countermeasures 
• Development of agent-based detection of coordinated attacks by correlating basic attack detections 
• Inclusion of data warehouse for data management, data integration, and data reduction k: sum­
marization 
• Development of a detailed intrusion detection system model using Colored Petri Nets 
• Demonstrating satisfaction of SFTA requirements by CPN design through additional constraint 
nodes in SFT and algorithmic CPN template construction 
• Demonstrating satisfaction of CPN design by distributed agent implementation through algorith­
mic agent construction 
• Distributed intrusion detection sj-stem implementation using agents based on CPN design model 
8.3 Conclusions 
.A.n intelligent multi-agent intrusion detection system is convenient, powerful, and dynamically-
upgradable. The machine learning approach to anomaly detection has been and will likely continue to 
ho an area of research in the intrusion detection field. The feature vector approach for system call data 
sufficiently described complete executions of processes such that the RIPPER rule learning algorithm 
was able to classify anomalies on which it had not been trained. Feature subset selection was employed 
successfully to further reduce the number of features in the vector. 
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Software Fault Trees were employed to analyze intrusions. The structured analysis of intrusions 
enables statement of requirements for an intrusion detection system. The close correspondence between 
software fault trees as requirements specifications and the design of an intrusion detection system assists 
development of the design and checking the design for accuracy. Countermeasures may also be identified 
through analysis of developed software fault trees for intrusions. 
Colored Petri Net models enable modeling the design of an intrusion detection system. Such a model 
may bp compared to the requirements for an intrusion detection system to detect faults in the IDS itself. 
Colored Petri Xet models closely correspond to the implementation of the intrusion detection system 
a.s agents, reducing the opportunity for errors in implementation. 
•Algorithmic development of design templates from requirements and implementation templates from 
de.signs were e.xamined. If the algorithmic approach correctly maintains the properties of the input, 
the output templates will automatically satisfy the constraints expressed in the input. The algorithmic 
approach ensures that the CPX designs maintain the requirements expressed by the SFT-based require­
ments. Likewise, the algorithmic approach ensures that the mobile agent system faithfully implements 
the designs expressed as CPXs. 
8.4 Future Work 
This project has just scratched the surface of several areas of intrusion detection that merit further 
research. Ideas for future research into a distributed multi-agent intrusion detection system include fur­
ther incorporation of anomaly detection into the IDS. continue working on the requirements specification 
and design analysis of the IDS models, improve the efficiency and security of the IDS implementation, 
and develop support for a widely-applied distributed IDS. 
8.4.1 Anomaly detection 
The developed SFT.A. and CPX models for intrusion detection concentrate on misuse detection. Past 
e.xperience has shown that there will always be new intrusions which do not conform to prior models 
of intrusions (e.g.. intrusions which have yet to be discovered and publicized). It would be necessary 
to incorporate additional anomaly detection algorithms into the IDS to help discover such intrusions 
and assist the enhancement of intrusion models to handle the new intrusions. Candidate algorithms for 
anomaly detectors include frequent episodes (67|, association rules, and instance-based learning [65|. 
.\nomaly detection algorithms may misclassify normal activity as anomalous. It would be very useful 
to develop CPX models that correlate anomalies with related intrusive activity. If an anomaly can not 
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be automatically correlated with other intrusive activity, it may be less likely to be intrusive. 
8.4.2 Requirements specification and analysis 
The fault trees developed for requirements specification and analysis are working prototypes. Fur­
ther research, development, and analysis of the SFT.\ model of intrusions will help answer questions 
including; 
• Is the SFTA technique ideal? 
• .A.re there alternative specification techniques that work better? 
8.4.3 Design using CPNs 
.A. few examples of misuse were selected for modeling using CPNs. It would be useful to de%elop 
a more complete CPN design for the intrusion detection system based on a full set of requirements 
specifications to determine how well the requirements specification documents the system and how well 
tiio CP.V design models the IDS. 
The correspondence of the requirements specification to the CPN design will help demonstrate the 
correctness of the CPNs given the requirements specification. 
The CPN design needs to be enhanced to include anomaly detection. Methods of developing models 
of anomaly detection need to be investigated. .A.nomaly detection models need to be developed. Com­
prehensive models that correlate anomalies with other anomalies and misuses also need to be developed 
and analyzed. 
8.4.4 IDS Security and Performance 
The prototype intrusion detection system that was developed as part of this project is implemented 
in Java using the \'oyager Object Request Broker. .-Vny intruder with sufficient privilege may kill the 
agent server or interfere with agent communication. The IDS requires a fair bit of CPU power and 
memory, which may be an unacceptable load on production systems. 
It would be necessary to improve the security of the IDS such that it would be resistant to tampering. 
Idoius for hardening include; 
• Moving parts of the IDS into the operating sj-stem kernel; 
• Moving the IDS into a process specially protected by the kernel; 
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• Securing communication between agents to prevent spoofing, modification, and eavesdropping. 
Performance improvements include moving parts of the IDS from an interpreted language to a compiled 
language. It may be sufficient to compile the existing Ja\-a code into machine code instead of the 
interpreted byte code. 
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